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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Five states, Florida. North Carolina. California, Oregon, and Washing:.:n, have been 
unusually effective in developing laws and institutions for controlling oil spills, ir.~uenc!ng outer 
continental shelf oil exploration and development, and managing their coastal zones. The 
purpose of this study is to examine the laws and institutions in these five states to determine the 
basis of their success, and whether their experiences might prove useful for Alaska. 
In each state we examine federal and state laws, institutions and poUcies dealing with 
offshore oiJ and gas development. including outer continental shelf (OeS) adivfties. and oil 
transport ~ state water. We then anaJyze the origins, development, and current state of each 
state's coastal zone management program. 
Florida has been particularfy successful in influencing federal oes decisions by keeping 
'jn the ~s office the authority to deaf with federal agencies on this question. Oregon has 
enhanced its ability to manage its coastaJ zone and influence OCS decisions by adopting 19 
carefu11y drafted and widely debated goats to provide ciear guidance to state and federaJ officials. 
Oregon has &!so created a system of statewide land use planning. Oregon and Washington 
have enhancad their aburly to deaf wiU1 oil spills and OCS development by mandating a series 
df ~ :Studias.Washingtonhas created the Puget Sound Water Quality Authority to study and 
develop a' management plan for water quality control in the Sound, coordinating among the 
400 or more govemmental entfties tnat have some jurisdiction there. california has had 
significant success with Its -Joint Review Panels- which have brought state and federal authorities 
'* .~---
together in efforts to pretect environmental quality on a project by project basis. AD of these 
states have emphasized active dtizen participation in their management. programs. Each one 
of these concepts is explored in some depth In this study. 
From this background study we have seleded seyeraJ of the most successfuJ Ideas ~ 
have made recommendations to the Commission based on these ideas. 
, 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are distiUed trom the 5 state study and Otr.ei materials 
examined by the al.:tnors. They are designed to present to the Alaska en Spill Commission a 
number of options for institutional and legal changes that might improve Alaska's ability to 
manage ojl exploration, development transportation, storage. and spill risks, on land as weH as 
on the sea. 
The focus of 1his study is on long term institutional improvements. ones that should give 
AlaSka better direct controJ over oil and gas activfties. as weil as enhancing the state's capability 
Df influencing .federal actions In this arena. 
An idea that has worked in one state may not work exadiy the same in another, because 
at different geography. demography. history. Jegal structure, etc. Certainly this is true with 
Alaska., which surely is one of most unique of the United States. Recognizing this we have . 
endeavored to glean some of the "better" ideas for institutional changes from the 5 comparative 
states and mold and shape these recommendations to the special conditions of Alaska. We 
have made references back into the main text to some of the key places where the ideas were 
generated. 
In each case we have made rather specific recommendations in order to foC1JS attention 
on a particular issue and a proposed solution. However it is quite impossible to anticipate the 
ebb and ftow of politics in Alaska which Would affect. and be affected by these proposals. Thus-
Alaskans. may. while finding the concapts useful, wish to modify them to comport to the real-
... _- - -- _.. ---"'_. 
pOJroc:s cf ~e state. 
RECOMMENDATION NO.1. PERMANENT OIL OVERSJGHT COMMISSION 
(or Oil Transport Commission) 
on is a dominant factor in the economy of Alaska, providing as much as 80% of the state 
budget in recent years. In no other state is 1I1e productl'on of a single resource so VftaJ to 
2 
-economic and social welfare. While oil production brings great economic and social benefits. 
at the same time it poses great hazards, both on the land and on the sea, to the human social 
fabric and envlro:-:mental quality of the state. It is difficult to imagine a topic that ceserves higher 
priority by the Alaska state government For this reason we recommend that a Permanent Ojl 
CO!11missJon be created. 
Precedent for such action is suggested by the actions- of three other states. In Rorida 
the development of outer continental shelf oil and gas development poses potentially devastating 
haZards. Clean. sandy beaches are Florida's greatest reaeationa! and tourist asset and one of 
the prized aesthetic assets for the nation. A major oil spiJl that washed onto those beaches, or 
onto the fragile ecology 01 the Florida Everglades or Keys would be a major catastrophe 10r the 
state and the nation. While the risk 01 such a spiU occurring may be small, the ExxonjValdez 
spiU teaches that it is nonetheless possible. The amount of devastation such an accident could 
cause in Florida is enannous. so great in fad that the issue has remained under the direct 
control of the Governor, in spite of the fad that other coastaJ zone management and 
environmental issues have been delegated to the regular line agency 1hat handles environmental 
matters. the Department of Environmental Regulation. 
Development d the cuter continental shett oil and gas resources is almost entirely a 
1ederal matter. where the ·stam has little eontroJ and only consulting rights. A state's political 
influence is-fat more important than its legal pOwer, as numerous faiIed lawsuits by unhappy 
states have proven. A state Governor ordinarily Is the focal point for the state's politfcal power 
-'-
and is most likefy to have the greatest impact on the designt location, and timing of federal 
. . . 
programs. Reccgnizing this Florida has kept in the Governor's office the responsiblf'rty for 
participating and exercising inftuence over the federal OCS process. 
The Govemor of Florida is advised on these matters by the CoastaJ Resources CitIzens 
AdvisQry Committee, composed of representatives 01 interest groups as well as representatives 
!rom severaJ levels of government In the state. The CHfzens Advisory Committee .performs 
general oversight functions, and advises the Interagency Management Committee, the Governor. 
3 
I 
and the legislature. 
In Oregon the Governor created an -executive order- ocean resources task force in 1979. 
Its report was rendered in 1979 containing numerous recommendations fer the state's 
participation in ces planning and development. ihis led, in 1967, to the creation 01 a 
legislatiVely mandated Task Force, reporting to the Governor, the legislature. and to the people. 
Membership is broadly based, induding state agency directors, ocean users (fishermen). local 
government representatives. and citizens. Jt is backed up by a 30 member Scientific and 
Technical Advisory Committee. The goal of the Task roree is to assure that the state is an 
. effective and influential partner with federal agencies. The Interim Report 01 the Task Force. 
published in July. 1988. concludes that the state should develop clearer, more coordinated state 
Jaws about oes actMties. that it obtain better information, and improve the network linking state 
and focal agencies together on issues relevant to oes development Of speciaf relevance to 
AlasKa is the recommendation 1hat a coastai oil spill response plan be prepared, and that a 
compensation fund be created through 8S$8$Sments on the oil industry in order to create a 
fishermen's contingency fund. 
The Washington legislature. in 1S87, Initiated a program to prepare the state for federal 
oil and gas devetopment on the outer continental sheff. Washington Sea Grant received a 
legislative appropriation of $4OC,ooo to ccndud the required studies. Sea Grant created a 
'special entity. the Ocean Resources Assessment Program (ORAP) to carry out the required 
'StUdies. The iegis'ation afso c:eated an Ac:Msory Committee composed 01 32 members from 
-. different cfiSdpflnes and backgrounds. induding state legisfators, state agencies, oil companies, 
. . 
.. _-- ---" 
Indian tribes. commercial and sports ashfng organizations, federal officials, focal o1ftciafs, and 
environment..al organizatfons. The Finaf Report of 1he Advisory Committee was an excel/ent 
stat~ment of information priorities for Washington's participation in the OCS prcces.s. 
Oil production and transportation Is vastfy more important to AJaska. both in terms 01 
economic benefit and environmentaf hazards. than OCS adMty is to Oregon or Washington. 
And. indeed. it is more important to AJaska than OCS activfty is to Florida. Jt justifies the highest 
4 
priority in governmental organiZation. 
The Permanent on Commissjon should be created by legislative action, rather than by 
Exec:..'tive Order, oecause legislative creation gives the Commission more p-::;!!cal clout, and 
tecaL:Se approoriations from the legislature will be essential for Commission :0 carry out its 
work. 
Composition of the Cgmmlssign. 
The Commi.Ssion wouJd have 7 members; tour would be appoimed by the Governor 
from among -citizens.· representing commercial and sports fishing. environmentaf interests, local 
govemments. and native communities. One would be from the oif industry. A federal member 
of the Commission showd be appointed by the President This would be a voting member I but 
this person would receive advice from other federal. nonvoting members representing different 
teder.al agency views.. Putting people from these different backgrounds together, a1 this high 
.level. wiD assist both the commission and the Govemor to benefit by soUd. Informed disaJssion 
and reCClmmendaticns on oil exploration, transportation, and oif spill problems.' This 
Commission should be kept small because ifs members woujd be expeded to devote much 
'time to COmmission duties. The Commission report dirediy to the Govemor and the legislature. 
Although the Commission would ba a policy making body. it would nonetheJess be 
expededto commit sufficient time to Commission work to make on-site visits, and to provide 
- dose oversight attention to bath state and federal activities in the oil area. 
The ·Commission would have sufficient budget to COntrad far apl=lrol=lriate studies to be 
4 
... ~-- -_. 
performed.. These studies might be done by federal or state agency experts who would be 
assigned to special investiga~e teams working for the Commission and reporting to iL 
. •. _ 1 ~ompare the 1967 yvashington Advisory Committee, p. 9, and the eeoc p. 42.. 
5 
Duties of the Cgmmission. 
~. The first duty of the Commission would be oversight of state, federal, and r::rivate 
oil and gas activity within or near the state. An important function would be to assure that state 
ana federal agencies are carrying out their duties with regard to spill hazards, e:ther from the 
pipeline, from terminal facilities, or from tanker operation. The Commission would exercise 
oversight functions over tanker traffic. the pipeline. Nol1t1 Slope exploration and production, oil 
storage. and cuter continental shelf ieas.ing, exploration and development. 
2. The Commission would contract for appropriate studies to be completed. 
3. The Commission would have respcnsibility to assist the state and specifically the 
Governor co recommendations that should be made to the Coast Guard, and to Congress. on 
federally preempted issues such as vessel design and construction (e.g. double hulls) • 
.quaImcations of mariners, vessel traffic control systems and their operation, safe routes for oit 
tankers. etc. 
4. The Task Fcrce should advise the Govemor on needed i1ilI. legislation. where 
not preempted by federaJ legislation. covering such matters as creation and implementation of 
contingency plans. optimum areas where tankers should pick up pilots. and routes where tug 
escorts must be used. 
RECOMMENDATION NO. 2. CmzEH PARTICIPATION 
All the .. .ates reviewed rely heavily on citfzen participation, the advantages cf which are 
"now widely perceived and understood. We recQmmend that Alaska adopt a strong citfzen 
A NEW CONCEPT FOR CITIZEN PARTlCZPATlON. 
Lack of vigilance by the Coast Guard In enforcing federal safety laws and regulations is 
alleged to be one reason for ttle ExxonNaJdez oil spill . Complacency was encouraged by 
several factors, inciuding the lack of serious spiIIs fer several yearst statements by "the aD 
6 
:r.Cl.'S:'!, acout the lack of danger of spills. Coast Guard budget limitations, and, to some extent, 
the dose social. professional. and peer group relationships between Coast Guard personnel and 
AL YESKA ant: Exxon employees. This sense of et:lmplacency also seemed to caffee: the relevant 
state a;encies. probably for similar reasons. The problems associ~ted with re;;.:!ator jregulatee 
relationships are not unique to the Coast Guard and oil et:lmpanies. Is it, in fact, a typical 
-regufated industry" phenomena. 
One of the most et:lmmended approaches for handling the -industry influence- problem 
is through more active citizen participation. One of the best ways to assure continued vigilance 
by regutators is to integrate into the regulatory process a constituency whose interests are 
different, if not opposite. from that of the regulated industry. In Alaska there are two groups 
whose long and short term interests are most often at odds with those of the oil companies, and 
of the Coast Guard. These are the commercial fishermen, and the environmentalists. If their 
lrig~ance. p:::rwered by their own sa« interest, could be integrated into the decision process then 
the chances of creeping complacency would be reduced. At the same time, their participation 
in the process should not be so great as to thwart the eccnomic goals sought by the regulated 
industry. We would like to suggest one way that this might occur, although other methods can 
,also be devised. 
A 'dtizen cparticipatlon committaecouid be formed, comprised, for example of 15 
. ·,membetS.One might represent the oif industry. one the state, one the federal govemment. 
. This would leave twelve members repmenting Iocaf govemment, commercial fishermen, and 
environmental groups. Such a Committee would serve several functions, serving as a forum .for 
...... ~ * ..... - --- .--
puelic debate. putting federal, state, and local personnel in direct, face to face contact. and 
anowing the Committee to insist on public answers to perceived problems. 
Such a Committee would provide a valuable forum for public debate and discussion of 
important off transportation and spiD risk issues. It would put federal and industry officials into 
direct and personal contact with local citf:zens, fishermen, and environmentalists, groups vitaJly 
interested in these issues.. A continuous education process would be generated. educating the 
1 
H 
r 
~arJc:;ams as weil as the public, with important information acout ccstS, r:SkS. economics. ar:c 
human values affected by oif transportation and spill risks. 
One problem with citizen committees generally is that. while they initially are effective, 
over time they often lose their impetus. Because they have no real legal power tt:ey tend to be 
less and less heeded and sometimes ignored. unless they are woven into in the actual decision 
process. One way to accomplish this in Alaska would be to assure that local citizens, fisheries 
and environmental groups have a dear majority of the votes on the Committ~e (although it 
would be hoped that decision-making by the Committee would be by ·consensus· rather than 
by technical vote counting). 
The key element that would cflStinguish this entity from the ordinary citizens advisory 
committee is that the committee would have specific. Jimited -legal- powers to participate in the 
process. This could be accompJished as foUows: 
a) The Committee should have subpoena powers, both for persons and for 
documents. These subpoena powers would extend to relevant Coast Guard 
personnel and files. Alternatively the congressional bill creating and empowering 
the Committee could instruct the Coast Guard to cooperate with the Commtttee 
in all Committee investigations. 
b) The meetings. deUberations, files, and entire process of the Committee should 
be· ·pubUc,· available to the press, appropriate state and federal officials and to 
. Congress. The 8xperience of the San Francisco Bay Conservation and 
Oevelopment Commission is instructive. WIdely divergent views were exPressed 
.... _ M .. ___ .. 
at the outset of the ecoc, but with public debate among all interested parties,. 
they eventually reachedaceommodation. 
c) The Committee could be authorized to conduct investigations and make findIngs 
and recommendations. Its recommendations would normally carry only polIticaf 
weight, that is they would not have to be adopted by the federal or state agency, 
or by the industry. with one key exception. If the Committee recommendation was 
8 
-not adopted then the agency wo~ld have to explain why it was not adopted. in 
Wl"iting. and with fulfy developed reasons. all of which woutd be available 10 the 
pu!:;iic. the press. the state legislature. and the Congress. The agency answer 
WC!.ild have to be pucliShed within 120 days or else the recomme"dations would 
automaticaJly become binding on the agency. 
This woutd focus agency, industry. and public attention on problems before they got cut 
of hand. The obligation on the agency is not overburdensome; if H chooses not to implement 
a recommendation. H must show H was considered by stating publicfy and in writing .. its reasons 
for not so dOing. 
The citizens Committee would have statewide authority. It would report to the Oil 
Commission. and to the Govemor. 
,ficCOMMENDATIOH 'NO. 3. JOINT REVIEW PANEI.S.. 
In California the most important component of the state government's formal OCS 
response system is the Joint Review Panel. In 1970 the Cafifomia legislature enacted the 
California Environmental Quanty Act.. tailored after NEPA. requiring environmental impad reports 
for all projects expected to have important adverse environmental effects.. In cases of proposed 
,dftshorecil development projects. several state and federal agencies often prepared reports 
covering different aspects O! the same project. To reduce costs. and enccur:age federal/state 
Cooperation. Joint Review Panels were formed. Each is a tempt;lrary assqeiatfon of permHting 
agencies which directs preparation of a report on the environmental effects of a single project 
The panel oversees report preparation and conduds pubUc hearings. 
8even such panels h~ been formed in california sfnea 1983. AD have included a 
federal agency. most often either the Minerals Management Service, US Army Corps of 
Engineers, or Bureau of land Management. Representatives from county and state agencies 
and from the Govemor's office are incfuded on the panels. Applicant oU and gas co!"panies 
prepare detailed project desctiptions and assist in the review of environmental issues; after this, 
9 
they are permittee to testffy at pubiic hearings, but have no further role in the review cr::::ess. 
1n California the Office of Permit Assistance, in the Governor's office, and the Office cf 
the Secretary of e."'Ivironmental Affairs assist panels. In the ease of Alaska. this ::uJd be dene 
by the Permanent Oif Commission. 
The California process has also resulted in area studies: evaluations of expected effee-.s 
and necessary mitigation measures for later oil and gas development likely to take place in the 
general area where a permit application has been filed.. Potential cumulative effects can then be 
evaluated. and the study format allows the panels to obtain access to data not normally made 
pubfic by the Minerals Management Service. 
CREATJON OF JOINT REVIEW PANas IN ALASKA. 
Alaska does not have any Jaw similar to California's in requiring a state environmental 
impact statement. Joint panels to prepare environmental impact assessments should 
nonetheless be created for all major oil and gas exploration, development. transportation or 
stcrage projeds. This couk:l be done under the general environmental authority of the 
Department of Environmental Conservation. This would cover pipeline related projects as welf 
as those concerned with production. terminal facilities, and transportation by tanker. Such a 
program would enhance federaf/state cooperation, keep the state better informed on federal 
plans and programs, and enhance the state input to the process. 
. Such Joint Pane's would' also be useful for .ongoing inspection and monitoring of the 
Alyeska pipeline. A joint federal/state Panel could work asa team inspecting and investigating 
- . 
problems .!""h the pipeuit .. 
RECOMMENDAnON NO. 4. DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIFIC GOALS. 
One reasen the state of Oregon has earned a reputation for effective participation in 
coastal zone and OCS federal actMtJes is that Oregon has developed and articulated its goals 
and policies more fully than most states. Soth the public precess of creating these goals. and 
10 
!he articulated goats themselves, provide direction for state and federal officials en the use cf 
land. water, and other resources. Time and again, in the 5 states study as weil as the study 01 
ethe:- states. a ¥,,'as apparent that effective state participation depends first on :";::ovlng a clearly 
defined set :t s~te goals and policies. 
Recommendation. Alaska shoufd initiate a public process of darifying and articulating 
its goals and policies with regard to the exploration, development, production, storage and 
transportation of oil and gas, and management of the hazards posed by these activities. At no 
place in Alaska laws has this been done in the depth or with the completeness of the state of 
Oregon. See Appendix A for the Oregon goals, No.s 16. Estuarine Resources. and 19, Ocean 
Resources. 
RECOMM£NDAitON S. COMPf..ET10N OF IMPORTANT STUDIES 
Oregon. Washington, Califomia. and Florida. have all enhanced their ability to influence 
federal action on the coastal zone and the outer continental sheff by conducting their own 
studies and creatlng. their own body of experts and expert knowledge. The old adage 
-knowledge is power- fits precisely here. A state with littfe knowledge of its resources, federal 
plans, envitcnmerrtaJ impacts. regal and instftutional options, etc., will understandably have rrttte 
to say about how Its resources are develcped. and what hazards will result from that 
development Therefore we, recommend that the state of Alaska. either through the new 
Permanent Task ForCII, through Alaska Sea Grant. or through some other agency, arrange for 
appropri~e studfes to be made. It Is important that mon~y for such studies be spent wisely and 
thus that a knowfedgeable group design and oversee the studies. Again, this could be the 
Permanent Task Force, Alaska Sea Grant, or another entity created for ~is special purpose. 
It is not possible here to actually design the studies that should receive prioritY in Alaska. 
however the following Is a fist of studies recently completed, or recommended in the 5. 
comparator states aJong with a few others that we believe might be especially appropriate for 
Alaska. 
" 
, . Is the state taking acvantage of all federal laws tMat provide tor state partic:patior: 
in oil and gas actMty? 
2. Should the state engage in monitoring of -incidents- and -close calls' (as the 
FAA does with airplane near-misses) from spills. in order better to understand the risks involved? 
3. Are Alaska laws rationaJized and coordinated to achieve state goais. or are they 
conflicting and inconsistent? 
4. Are the routes used by oil tankers safe enough 10 protect Alaska's interests? 
5. What state action should be considered for protecting coastal native and 
nonnative communities from the threat of spills? What IocaJ planning or other action should be 
encouraged? _ How can native views best be integrated into the decision process? 
S. How much storage capacity is there at Valdez? How much should there be? 
RECOMMENDATION NO.6. NATIVE PARnCIPAnON 
Design a system (see the report on the Siwnniuq. of the NANA region) to bring the native 
popufation into meaningful participation on the oil spill/COastal zone management process. 
The widely held perception among Native peoples Is that their voices are not heeded in the 
normal "hearings· process. Natives in the NANA region devised the SIwnniuq process, 
incorporating a traditionaJ dec:ision-making approacn into coastal management. Similar 
proces.ses should be developed for ether Native villages and regions. 
RECOMMENDATION NO.7. PRINCE WlLllAM SOUND AUTHORITY 
Consider creation ofa Water Ouaflty AUthority for Prince William Sound. and another for 
Bristol Say. - The Puget Sound Water Quality Authority has proven to be effective in explaining 
and rationalizing the multiple jurisdictional probrems on Puget Sound. and In devising a 
comprehensive plan for improving 'Nater quality. VV'hrte ttle number of jurisdictions involved in 
Prince William Sound Is far fewer than on Puget Sound, and'the management problems not so 
,complex, nonetheless a singfe "Authority,· concerned with gathering data, performing stUdies. 
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-deveicping water quality management pJans. and oversight of federal and state operations in 
Prince William Sound would provide a focus for protecting this body of water, and enhance state 
influence with the federal agencies. 
This authority would be composed of representatives of the local, state, and federaJ 
agencies having jurisdiction in the area. U would have an Executive Director and staff. It's initial 
duty, for the first two years would be to study the water and environmental problems of the 
water body. and to recommend a structure fer a permanent management authority • 
. RECOMMENDA nON NO. 8. CONTINGENCY RESPONSE PLAN 
Create a comprehensive oil spill contingency response pfan for each major bay, sound, 
or region of the Alaska shoreline. Alaska statutes, AS 46.04.030 and 40.04.200·210 provide fer 
eontingency ,esponseplanning, both by oil tankers and by DEC. DEC was directed in legislation 
enacted in 1989 to annuaUy pr~pare statewide and regional master response pfans. identifying 
the responsibilities of govemmental agencies and private parties in the event of a catastrophic 
ci1spill These plans should be fully implemented. We have included, In the Appendices, the 
contingency response pfan for Calffomia. for Coos Bay. Oregon. and the table of contents of a 
privately developed plan for the San Juan islands. Washington. 
Test drills shculd be conducted to assure the effectiveness of the contingency response 
plans. Funding sho~d be provided to assist private efforts to develop contingency response 
plans. 
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INTROOUC110N 
Alaska is reevaluating its options on now to participate effectively in oil and gas 
transportation/spill/development decisions. This study is designed to aid in that reevaluation. 
One way to approach such an evaluation is by examining the experience of otl'ler states 
in related areas. We have selected five states for compari~on. Florida. North Carolina, California. 
Oregon, and Washington, and have reviewed their experiences in marine resource and coastal 
zone management, cuter continental shelf oR and gas development, and spin risk management 
These ffve coastal states have eamed spedal reputations for effective coastal zone and marine 
. 
resource management.. and especially for their ability to work with, and influence federal agency 
decisions. Could components of these states' management programs be useful to resource 
pofiey makers in Alaska? This paper describes the marine resource and coastal zone 
management programs of these states and attempts to identify such components. 
Special emphasis Js devoted to recent efforts of these five states to prepare for 
participation in cuter continental shelf oil and gas development. The institUtional. legal. and 
policy changes initiated by l1ese efforts are particularty relevant to Alaska because they stem 
from similar state/federal dashes that are apparent in Alaska. The goal of each state is effectiVe 
I'e.sourcs management. To accomplish this it is essential to be able to influence federal offshore 
oil and gas actMties 1hat impact the state and its citizens. 
Oevelopment of 011 spiff corrtmgancy plans is a critical part of preparation for handling 011 
..,. 
--spills. 111,!S study reviews l1e contingency plans, and process, in california. Oregon, and 
Washington. and Includes In the Appendices contingency plans for Coos Say, Oregon, for the 
state 01 Califomia, and the table of contents of an extensive contingency plan developed by a 
concemed citizens group in 11"Ie San Juan Islands of the state of Washington. 
Po. variety of legislation delineates federal jurisdiction over marine resources. The outer 
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Continental Shelf Lands Acf (OCSLA), for example. establishes federal jurisdiC:ion over marine 
resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act~ (197.2) gives 
the U.S. Coast Guard responsibility over marine navigation. including oil tanker traffic. and port 
safety. The Federal Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970~ and Water Pollution Control Act of 
19ns together delineate plans for federal response to oil spillS and for spill prevention. They are 
also intended to promote federaJ·state coordination of spill response. The U.S. Coast Guard and 
U.S. E-w;ronmental Protection Agency have primary responsibilityt~ minimize effects 01 oil spills. 
The Federal Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act' holds the owner of the Trans-Alaska 
Pipeline oil. through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline UabUity Fund. vicariously liable for damages 
(above the $14 mOOon in the Fund) caused by oil spills from vessels which service the terminal. 
CoastaJ states share authority with federal agencies in the state-owned territorial sea. 
'but haYenc ·directjurisdidion over activities in the Exdusive Economic Zone (EEZ) beyond. 
,~h these actMties often affect the interests of coastal residents. Existing federal legislation 
leaves states with frttfe, authority to regulate marine commerce, induding oil tanker traffic. 
9..ates are ate to protedtheir offshore interests primarily by making alterations in federal 
management programs. Options available to states include: use of CZMA consistency 
provisions'to after federaJadions in accordance with state polides.lobbying or consultation with 
Comgre£s and federal agencies. use of OCSLA state eonsurtation provisions! to negotiate with 
the Department of Interior. -mung in- around federal legislation with state laws, development of 
.. ..._------
2 43 USC 11331 at seq •• 1953. and amendments. USC §1801 at seq., 1978. 
3 33 USC 11221 et seq. 
.. 33 USC 11151. 
5 33 USC §1251, §132t. 
• <43 USC §51651-1655. 
'7 116 USC 11458. 
I 43 USC §§1351~ .1352. __ . __ 
2cint feceral-state management programs, and litigation. In some cases, especiaJJy use cf 
consistency provisions, the nature and extent 01 a state's options are ambiguous; there have 
been few court tests. 
Curing the past few years, in response to the Federal govemmenfs poiiey of extensive 
leasing en the OCS, these same five states have initiated a variety of programs designed to give 
them greater control over oil and gas development on the OCS. This poses special Challenges 
because the OCS is owned by the federai govemment. Conflicts are also generated because 
all the benefits of OCS oil and gas activity accrue to the federat govemment. whereas the risks 
of environmental degradation accrue to the states. The states do not feel their environmental 
and social cQncems are adequately addressed by the OCS leasing/development process, partly 
because the Minerals Management Service of the Department of Interior has two conflicting 
missions. The first mission, and the dominant one, is to develop oil and gas on the OCS. The 
second. and much Jess powerful mission is to preted the environment The states also feel that 
their conflicts with MMS are exacerbated by the lack of any dear national energy polley. 
The commitment of a state to protection of its coastal zone and marine resources, and 
the effectiveness with which It is able to manage its coastal region and regulate development, 
can best be assessed by examining the last several decades of its history. The history of active 
state coastal zone and marine resource management can conveniently be divided into mo 
phases. 
The first phase incudes the 10 to 15 yem before the Coastal Zone Management At::t 
was pass~ by the U.S. Congress in 1972. Coastal states varied in the time at which they first' 
. . 
began serious study and development of ccastaf zone management programs. in the number 
of pieces of marine resource management legislaUon which they passed, In the cohesiveness 
and completeness of that legislation, and in the adequacy of appropriated funds.,' 
By 1972, about half of the coastal states had begun major studies of coastaJ zone 
I '? USC §1~1 e~ seq. 
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resources and management options. 'C1 Several, notably Washington and Rhode Island, /":ac 
already estabUshed broad coastal zone management programs. In Oregon, North Carolina. and 
Fiorida. 1he studies were specificaHy designed to be the first steps in creating coastal zone 
management plans. 11 
Many states made their first attempts to regulate industry activity in their coastal zenes 
in the late 1960s and earty 1970s. On the AtJantic seaboard, where extensive estuary systems 
exist, and where development pressures built up earty. several coastal states passed legislation 
to protect wetJands against dredging and filling. Many states also passed legislation in the early 
1970s to regulate sighting 01 thermaJ power plants in coastaJ areas. In both 01 these cases, the 
incentive for legislation passage was the need to control Increasingly heavy pressure from 
industry to develop coastal areas. In perhaps afl states. pressure from conservation 
organizations and growth of concern for environmental protection among the general public also 
~Hed passage of legislation. 
After passage 01 the federaJ Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZlVIA) I nearly all 
states prepared formal coaStal zone management prog~, and many states reorganized 
existing agencies or created new ones in order to meet goats of management programs. Ouring 
this second phase 01 increasing state coastal management activity. the dominance of federal 
ewer :state aJItI'fhority in coastal resource use decision.making had become increasingly evident 
The expanding scope of federal regulation, intended originally to be primarily restricted to foreign 
affairs, treaties, and Interstate commerce, is well ... 1fustrated in the case of its increasing authority. 
to regulate adivft:kts in navigable waters. 11 The desitis of federal agendes have often differed . 
from those of coasts! state governments. especially in the case of offshore energy development 
10 Bradley and Armstrong. 
11 Ibid. 
12 ~ish, p~ "-?-:. 
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State Marine PoJicy and Coastal Zone Management: A Review 01 Five States 
Commentators differ in their identifications of the coastal states which have most 
successfully developed marine resource and coastal zone management programs. FlYe states 
are commonly mentioned by researchers: Washington, Oregon, California, North Carolina. and 
Florida. 
Washington 
Puaet Sound 
Many levels and types of local, state, and federal government agencies are involved in 
management of the state's coastal and near shore areas. The coastal area in Washington state 
(arguably) most difficult to manage. ~e it lies adjacent to a rapidly growing human 
population center, and because it is subject to many human uses, Is Puget Sound. It has been 
designated an -estuaty of national significance" under the federal Water Quality Act of 1987.'3 
The Puget Sound Water Quality Authority estimates that -more than 450 public bodies have 
responsibility for some aspect oUhe Sound's water quality:'. 
The Authority was created by state legislation in 1985, and was given responsibility to 
develop a Puget Sound Water Quality Management Pfan." Secause of the existing complex 
system of overlapping jurisdictIons, the state legislature identified the need for coordinated state 
and local management as a priority for plan design. The current Plan eatls for partnerships 
among state agencies and between S*..ate and local governments. It also contains provisions for 
joint state and federal management of certain programs. An example is the Puget Sound 
Estuary Program, established In 1SSS and jointfy run by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
'Agency, the Puget Sound Water Quality AuthOmY:~d;-; WashinSton-Oep~ent of Ecology." 
t:s 33 USC § 13300). 
'4 PSWCA, 1SSS. 
15 90.70 RON. 
18 33 USC §1330, W~h~ t:a~ 1~8S, ~h .. 220_ame_nd~r:g~CW~.48.260. 
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E?A is responsible for ccnduC'!ing studies ot estuary resources. and for developing managemer.t i 
protoccJs.17 The Authority is responsible for plan oversight. additional research. and public 
education programs. The Department of Ecology implements point source discharge, wetlands 
protection. stommater control. CQntaminated sediment, and pollution reduction provisions of the 
plan.l • 
Offshore 011 and gas development and oil transport tn state waters. 
In September. 1989 the Puget Sound Water Quality Authority issued a draft paper on 
·SPJLJ. PREVENTION- of oil and other hazardous substances, this was a topic that was not 
covered in the first or second Puget Sound Water Quality Management Plans. This study was 
initiated in October. 1988. Since that time the barge Nestucea spilled over 230.000 gaJlons of 
oil off the coast of Washington. and the tanker Exxon Valdez spiUed 11 mimon gallons of oil into 
. . 
Prince WBiam Sound. Alaska. As a result of those sPWs. Alaska. British Columbia, WashingtOn, 
and Oregon have formed a Task Foree to examine oil spill prevention. response. financial 
recovery and inbrmation1ranSter. The PSWCA is partidpating in the efforts of the Task Force. 
The spill prevention draft study makes recommendations in eight different areas: 
.prevention and contingency planning, operator training, public education, vessel traffic safety. 
federal tJ:esign ~ hydt0Staphic surv;,ays. liability for costs and damages, and penalties. 
Of special interest Is the breakdown of these recommendations, some of which can be 
- . . 
implemented by state adian and some of which ,are merely the subject of state 
recomme~dations to federal agendas. A few of the· mere important recommendations are: . 
Develop state statutes and regulations requiring prevention and contingency plans for 
specmc facilltles and operations. 
Develop a hazardous waste handlers card program, sfmUar to the food handlers card 
program. to assure minimum training requirements fer hazardous material handlers. 
17 33 USC §13300). 
tl PSWOA. 1988. 
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Recommend strengthened qualifications fer mariners. 
Recommend strengthened qualifications and training for personnel piloting and operating 
vessels subject to Vessel Traffic Safety (VTS) requirements. 
Recommend implementation of selected traffic centrel as part of the VTS system. 
Recommend imposition of selective speed limits for vessels in the VTS system. 
Require that pilots be picked up prior to entering the Straits of Juan de Fuca. 
Recommend requiring improvements in vessel design. 
Require additional tug escorts. 
If cnanges are made in federaJ vessel regulation. revise Washington law, specifically the 
Tanker Act. to accommodate those changes. 
Inventory vessel groundings in Puget Sound caused by inadequate navigation or 
hydrographic information. 
,Support passage of a Comprehensive Oomestic Oil Pollution and Compensation Act (by 
Congress) that does not preempt state unUmited ii~ility provisions. 
5u;)port amendment of the Federal Umitatian of UabiJity Act. to anew for state recovery 
of all expenses and costs. 
The final version of this issue paper wllf be produced by January 1. 1990. That study 
. 
should be watcned carefully because it promises to be especially thoughtful. and might have 
much relevance to Alaska. 
State preparations tor out.r contfn.ntal sheft Off and gas dtytfopm.nt, 
. . 
Washington is not quite so far along as Oregon In Its preparations fer participating in 
federal OCS development The Oregan legislature created a Task Force in 1981 to deveJop a . 
-Management Pian.a The Washington legislature in 1987 created a study and information 
gathering program. rts next step will be to study the management and policy issues. One 
significant dHference between Oregon and "ashington is that Oregon has a statewide fan~ use 
p1atining program. under the Land Conservation and OeveJopment Commission. Washington. 
along with nearly all of the other states has only municipal and county planning with the 
8 
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exception of the coastal 2ene. In this limited zone Washington has a statewide J::lIan uncer the 
Shoreline Management Act. 1IiI 
In 1987 the Washington legislature enacted the Ocean Resources Assessment Acr"¥J to 
prepare the state for the potential development being planned on the outer continental shelf by 
the federal s;ovemment. Washington Sea Grant received an appropriation of 5400,000 to 
conduct studies mandated by the 1aw.21 
Sea Grant created its Ocean Resources Assessment Program (ORAP) to implement the 
k\lgislative mandate. Demonstrating actlve interest in the Sea Grant program. the Legislature's 
Joint Seled Committee On Marine and Ocean Resources acts as an oversight committee for 
ORAP. 
ORAP developed a program for several studies to be compteted. Of special interest are 
three studies. The comr:ntttee study was a product of a legislatively mandated Advis~ry 
Committee, consisting of 32 members from different disciplines and backgrounds, including state 
legisfatars. state agencies. oil companies, Jndian tribes, cOmmercial and sports fishing 
organizations. federal officiaJs. locaJ officials, and environmental organizations. In 19S5 the 
Advisory Committee produced a book. Washington State Information Priorities; Final Report of 
the Advisory Committee. o RAP. 8, 
The study ·State and local Influence Over Offshore OU Cecisions· was prepared, as a 
paperback book. by Hershmar4 Fluharty, and Powell. and was published in 1988. This excellent 
study describes the oes decision making process in some depth from release through 
explorati~n. It then discusses tne problems associated.with bringing oil ashore by USing. and 
analyzing three case studies: ARCC's Coal Oil Fojnt Project, Exxon's Santa Ynez Unit. and 
Chevron's Point ArgueUo Project. At each point the authors are careful to note where state and 
l' SO.S8 RCW • 
.20 Wash. La'NS. 19S7, Ch. 408. 
21 Wash. La'NS. 1~87. C!,!- 7, §603(3). 
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lOCal governments might have an input to industrial development. or tederal managemem. 
The third study was preduced as a workshop report, and is entitled -reward a Conceptual 
Framework for Guiding Future OCS Research.- The workshop, and the report. placed great 
emphasis on -risk analysis· in detennining policy for OCS exploration and development The 
report reflects the viewpOint that the ·state of knowtedge- should have a more premi,:ent and 
explicit role in the identification, prioritization. and selection of environmental research concerning 
offshore oU and gas funded by the Minerafs Management Service (MMS) of the U.S. Department 
of the Interior. Since about 1978. MMS has applied study sejection criteriazz that are quite 
mission-oriented within the legal framework of federal Jaws and court decisions applicable to the 
agency. Consideration of the state of knowtedge within the field of environmental and 
socioeconomic studies has been largely a matter of internal, subjective evaluation by the staff 
and advisory committees of MMS. Nevertheless, it has functioned as an infonnal. unwritten 
criterion and is a continuing source of frustration and dissension within the leasing process. . 
Workshop participants identified critical problems fadng the state of Washington in 
connection with oil development/transportation/spill risks. Several of these are relevant to the 
problems posed in Alaska: 
The need exists to distinguish dearly the intensity and frequency of risks [of spills, etc.}. 
The priorities of risk should be used to determine where the state invests its efforts and 
worries to reduce spedffc risks. . Sma/I risks should not unduly occupy state or county 
efforts. 
all spills from shipping far outweigh any other type of risk. Yet the OCS process 
managed by MMS Is the weakest In addressing this problem. 
10 
Prevention of oil spills should be emphasized over mitigation and compensation. even 
though prevention is more expensive. We cannot completely avoid damage, so greater 
attention to prevention is needed (e.g •• transportation farther offshore. doucle huHs, state 
of the art navigation, no movement in severe storm}. Greater contrel by the Coast Guard 
and changes in state and federal laws are needed. 
How;s it possible to get MMS to respond to concerns about damages that OCCtJr at the 
state and JocaJ level but where no revenues from OCS activity are allocated to these 
levels of govemment? One means may be to allocate a share of the revenues of OCS 
deveJopment to state and focal govemments so that these entities can balance the 
revenue benefits against the costs bome at this 'evel. 
There is a need to develop a state capability to help coastal counties respond to near-
shore and onshore aspects of the OCS process. The counties do not have the capability 
to proted themselves, or the state, under the CZM process or to significantly affect the 
process. 
Jt should be recognized that the process of lease-produdion-decommissioning and the 
various associated impacts consist of a complex system of Interconnected governmental 
. Jurisdictions: A simple es check Ifst by MMS does not reftect the true nature of the 
system. 
The MMS decision-making process results In a fundamental process Inequity. That 
inequity is characterized by the absence of a meaningful role ~or those who bear most 
of the burdens and impacts in the lease dedsion. The process inequity generates 
Significant conflict and undermines cooperation at Jater points in the process. 
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CRAP is still working on several ot.,er studies under the 1987 legislative mandate, 
reflecting the high priority given to these issues by the Washington legislature. 
Washington on Spill Contingency Planning: 
The Washington state oil spiff contingency plan is prepared and administered by the state 
Department of Ecology (DOE). The plan focuses on coordination among and procedures to be 
followed by the various agencies and volunteers that respond during an oil spUf. The plan was 
revised in 1988 and is currently undergOing review foUowing anaJysis of the response to the 
. Nestucca incident. a major spill off the coast of Washington in 1988.= 
As with the Exxon Valdez. the response to the Nestucca spill jncident illustrated the 
vulneracility of state and federal plans under emergency conditions. Certain plan procedures 
were ignored. and communjcations and coordination difficulties abounded. Nevertheless, the 
deanup was faiJ1y successful largely because the responsible party worked actively to undo the 
damage. 
In 1987. the state legislature enacted a bill requiring the state Department of Community 
Development to prepare a model contingency plan for Washington localities. The plan must 
jnclude recommendations concerning equipment and faciIiUes, personnel training, cooperative 
public-private training exercises, and establish the relationship of local plans to state and federal 
plans.24 The model plan has not yet been published. 
The 1987 bill .aIso cfirected coe to promufgate. rufes requiring air petroleum transfer 
operations to keep containment and recovery equipment readily available with personnel trained 
-: _.. .--~.------
to use it. ZI aeyond general notice and removal obligations, this statute is the onlY dired state 
regulation of the petroleum industry's spill response capability. 
23 Washington COe. 1989. 
24 RON 38.52.420. 
2! RON 90.48.510. 
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FinaJly, a private organization in the San Juan 'stands. funded by a state water quality 
education grant. prepared its own oil spiU contingency plan to address emergency respcnse in 
that region~ The isl'ands' OU Spill AsSOciation, frustrated by the lack of attention and equipment 
available in the San Juan Islands area, and concerned about the risks posed by major oil tanker 
traffic using the sealanes surrcunding the islands, has prepared a thorough plan outlining how 
volunteers can initiate locat. state and federal response. (See Attachment 8.) 
Pre-Federal Coa$1 Zone Management Act 
While most .cosstal states were stiU conducting studies of coastal resources and 
management altematives. Washington and Rhode Island became the first two states to establiSh 
coastal zone management programs. 
The Washington state legislature passed the Shoreline Management Ac::(' in 1971. There 
1N'8R! twa main feaScns tar the early passage of this legislatlon.a First, strong pressure for a 
program was exerted by the state's conservation organizationa, especially the Washingtcn 
Environmental Council (WEC), a coalition of conservation groups. The WEe had first pressured 
the state legislature for several years for an environmentally oriented shoreline management bill, 
and eventually developed its own initiative biD. 1-43. a more preservation.oriented bill. Second. 
the state$upreme Court. in WilbO'.Jr ¥s. GalJagher,2I called into question the state's right 10 
permit construction and filllng in state shore areas until planning legislation had been enacted. 21 
-Hence. an incentive existed for development interests to support passage of a bill they wouid 
otherwise likely have opposed. Washington voters passed the.Shoreline Act as drawn up by the 
. . 
legisfature in 1972; 8ish notes that both wee pressure and the uncertainty produced by the 
21 90.58 RON. 
:tI Sradfey and Armstrong. 
21 77 Wn. 2d 306.462 P.2d Z32. 40 ALA 3d 760 (1969). 
21 Sish, p. 8.6; Mack. 
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:::urt ceosion were prooaoty essential to the Act's passage.:O 
7!le basis of the Shoreline Management Act is a set of guidelines and standards drawn 
IP by the state Department of Ecology in 1972.~1 The Act directed local govemments to develop 
horeline master plans tor future shoreline development, induding shoreline resource 
lVentories.32 The Department of Ecology was given authority to approve local master plans.;Q 
lans for all Puget Sound counties and aU but one city were approved by early 1980.3' Local 
lmS form the basis for permit systemst~ developed and administered by local govemments. 
ach permit application must be publiciZed and citizen comments accepted for at least SO days 
Ifore approval or rejection.:II 
Both the Department of Ecology. permit applicants. and affected patties retain the right 
appeal to a Shoreline Hearings BOard;~ permit violators can be given fines and/or jail 
ntenees. The state Attomey General and locaJ attorneys general have been given authority 
enforce the Shorelines Ad.:sa Because of these dear enforcement and appeals provisions, 
IShingtQn'S Shoreline Act is considered to be better-designed and more enforceable than 
-ular legisJation produced elsewhere.-
Lack of local funds and staff to compile resource inventories has slowed implementation 
ja Sish, p. 88. 
~ Washington Administrative Code nus 173. Chapters 16, 18. 19, 2D, 22-
.zt RCVV 90.58.080. 
:'SI RCVV sOSJ.09a. 
~ Bish. 1'.91. 
• RON 9OSJ.1DO. 
• RON 90.58.140.' 
rr RON 90.58.180. 
• RON 90.58.210. 
• Bradley and Armstrong. 
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of the Ad. but that it has been used by local governments in notable cases. San Juan County, 
for example, used its authority under the Ad to reject state-proposed recreation facijjties . .&O 
State and local officials have successfully used the Shoreline Act to minimize environmental 
damage, generally by modifying projects rather than prohibHing them.41 
The Washington state legislature had already produced other legislation regulating 
development and use of the state's coastal areas by the time 01 CZMA passage. The Thermal 
Plant Sighting Ad of 197041 established a Thermal Power Plant Site Evaluation Council • ..:J 
composed of representatives 01 major state agencies as well as county representatives. The Ad 
mandated that environmental and ecological guidelines'" were to be given priority in 
.development of a site evafuation program. It required that power companies pay a fee 01 
525.000" to fund environmental impad study of a proposed sHe by an indepenoent consultant. 
and it required that at feast two public hearings be held whenever a site was evaluated.~ 
Violation 01 permit terms was to be punishable by revocation of the permit4'7 and criminal 
prosecution.'" 
The Washington power plant sighting act is considered to be one of the most complete 
and effective statutes passed during the late 1960's and early 1970's. because it includes 
.. Sish • 
. , McCrea and Feldman. 
. 
42 80.50 RCW. 
~ RCW 8O.so.030. 
'" RCW 80.50.040 • 
.. RCW 8O.50m1. 
AI. RCW 80.50.090. 
.., 
RON 80.50.130 • 
... RCW 80.50.150. 
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)Visions tor enforcement, funcing of environmentaJ sweies. and puciic input • .Ii 
, 
8efore CZMA passage. the Washington state legislature had already passed the Shoreline 
~agement Act and power plant sighting act. as well as a State Environmental Policy Act.50 and 
I established the Department of Ecology.S! To create a state coastal zone management 
t. the legislature largely adapted these and other existing programs to CZMA guidelines. 52 
re were severaJ advantages to basing the Washington program en existing components: 
traI agencies are able to coordinate most coastal programs with one state agency, the 
artment of Ecology; the power plant sighting act served asa good prototype for new 
isions regutating coastaJ energy development; and likewise, the Shoreline Act provided a 
j basic plan and guidelines for state/local cooperation in planning and permitting. 53 
Bish notes that the state government made one major strategic error when it devefoped 
~astal zone management plan. approved by NOAA in 1976. The state-pemaps because 
I developed Its plan largely from existing components-nad solicited almost no input from 
aI agencies during devejopment of its plan. and the initial version, submitted In 1975. was 
ed. The effect of this omission on the state's abiUty to influence federal decision.maJdng 
undear.'" 
~ Washingten state has a history of relatively strong funding for coastaj management 
b. beginning with the legislature's appropriation of $500.000 In 1971 for implementation 
Bradley and Anns1rong. 
43.21C RCVV .. 
RON 43.17.010. 43.21A.04O. 
8ish, p. 94. 
(bid. 
Ibid, p. 99. 
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of ttle Shoreline Management Act.55 In 1986, it established the Cernennial Clean Water Fund,!6 
financed by an ee per carton tax on cigarettes. The Fund is expected to provide about $40 
million annually for four years, and $45 million annually in subsequent years for water quality 
mana~ement throughout the stateS7• The state legislature has allocatee 59 millionS! for 
implementation of a Puget Sound Water Quality Management Plans from 1987 to 1991. Finally. 
the 1 987 legislature set higher permit fees for point SOUtC8 discharges;!I these fees are expected 
to provide up to $3.6 million annually to state programs to control toxins in discharges and 
improve permit enforcement" 
Nann carouna 
Offshore oil and gas development and oil nnSRO" In state waters. The Office of Marine 
Affairs within the Oepa.~nt of Administration was form~d in 1972;1'1 it was given responsibility 
to coordinate state and federal coastal and marine management programs. and to generally 
provide leadership in coastal ptanning. The Otftce eversees three state visitor centers, the 
Marine Resources Centers and an Outer Continental Shelf Task Force (formed in 1979), as well 
as the Marine Science Council 12 
The state's Coastal Area Management Acta was passed by the state legislature in 1974. 
II ·Wash. Laws, ·1971, Ch. 256, Sec 39 • 
.. RCW 82.24.027. 
57 Puget Sound Water QualitY" AuthoritY (psWcA). 
51 Wash. taws. 1987 2st Ex. Sess., Ch. 7, Sec. 309. 
51 RCW 90.48.601 and 610. 
eo PSWQA, leSS • 
., NOS § 143S-390.1. 
12 North Carolina Ocean Policy Council 
s:s NeS § 113A4 1oo et seq. 
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;t is intended to serve as a comprenensive plan tor cooperative state ar:o Iccal managemem 0: 
~e 20-ccunty coastal zone.$1 The Coastal Resources Commission (eriC) is responsible 10r 
implementing the Act, primarily by developing a set of guidelines·! describing the state's 
objectives, policies, and standards tor coastal zone activities, and by designating Areas of 
E:wironmental Concem" within the coastal zone. All state policies, permits. and land use plans 
are to be consistent with this set of guidelines. f1 
The CRe is a 15-member citizen pane!.- Members are nominated by local govemments 
and appointed by the Govemor. All but three must be experts in some asped of coastal 
Jffairs.G The CRC is assisted by the Coastal Resources Advisory Council (CRAC) ,70 composed 
,1 representatives of coastaf cities and local govemments. state agencies, and pfanning groups. 
Several state agencies currently share administrative authority over the coastal zone, 
"Jduding the Department of Natural Resources and Community Development. which includes 
,e Office of Coastaf Management and Divisions 01 EnvironmentaJ Management and 01 Marine 
isheries, and, the Departments of Commerce and of Administration, with the Office of Marine 
:ffairs, OCS TaskForce, and Marine Science Council. Several administrative bodIes are 
lteragency in composition: the OCS Task Force, for example, includes representatives 01 
lVeral other state agendes and the League of Munidpallties. Several govemor-appointed 
bards and commissions, including the CRC. each with some ocean pollcy-making authority, 
10 exist. These boards· and commissions oversee marine fisheries, mining, and issues of 
.. NCS § 113A-102. 
-_. __ . ----
.. 
15 NCS § 113A·107 • 
.. NCS § 113A-113. 
", NCS § 113A-108. 
sa NCS § 113A·104 • 
.. Ibid. 
70 NCS § 113A-105. 
- - .-. 
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envircr.mentsl protection. These. as weil as the CRAC. provide opportunities tor c::ncemec 
citizens as well as experts in marine-related issues to become formatfy involved in the setting of 
ocean poHcy.71 
Hershman (1986) notes that the North Carolina coastal management network includes 
both a major pre-CZMA component, the Marine Science Council, and a second major 
component which evolved directfy out of the state's CZM plan. He recommends instead 
developing state ocean management systems· directly from a CZM plan without incorporating 
older components, to avoid repeating at the state level the -rragmentation at the federal level.· 
However. incorporating older components, redesigning them if necessary, may in fact be more 
leasible;etiminating agencies is not an easy task at either state or federal levels. 
North Carolina began work towards the development of a state ocean policy which would 
take .into aceountthe existing complex set of federal jurisdictions and at..'ttIorities when a special 
ocean policy committee of the Marine Science Council evaluated and reported on 16 ocean 
policy issues important to the state, ranging from ocean dumping to OCS leasing. In 1985 • 
. Govemor Jim Martin directed state agencies to take action on nine of the Council's 16 
recommendations. 72 Uke other coastal states, North Carolina finds it difficult to promote 
environmental protection within its coastal zone and comply with the development mandate of 
OCSLA. The state has reviewed federal cffshore oil and gas lease sates for consistency, but 
officially supports the oes OU and gas leasing program. The Marine Science Councl noted in 
1984 that me state had not yet esta.bflshed policy or a regulatory process for 'easing of 
submerged lands under its territorial sea; it recommended that the state develop such a poRcy 
- . 
and precess. 71 
The state negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. MInerals 
n North . Carolina Ocean Policy CounciL 
12 Hershman. 1986. 
?:I Tbid. 
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1/1anagement Service in 1983, before South Atlantic SaJe 78. The state's intention was to ;:rctec: 
tearshore resources and to ensure that spill trajectories were adequately predicted by the 
:.:rrent MMS model. By signing the memorandum, the state agreed not to file suit against the 
tase sale. After deficiencies in the medel had been identified by state contractors. the MMS 
tsponded slowly, requiring more than a year more than expected to convene a technieaJ panel 
1 consider the model's problems. The North Carolina government is generaJly unhappy with 
• way the terms of the memorandum were met; the case illustrates the difficulty in setting up 
mechanism for resoMng federal-state confiict.1' 
. . North Carolina is an example of a state which has produced legislation for comprehensive 
uta! zone management. 7S rather than rearranging existing agencies and legislation to meet 
:MA criteria. Commentators suggest that the set of coastal zone legislation, policies, and 
titutions created by the North Carolina state government since the earty 1970s may be the 
. 7'1 
It in the U.S. 
1h carolina Contingency Planning: 
North Carolina does not currently employ a state oil spin contingency plan. However. the 
~ature this summer directed the State Emergency Response Commission to prepare one.17 
. 
state has developed a statewide muftl-hazards response plan, which plan does not explicitly 
-ess oil ~iUs, but outlines procedures to be foffowing In the event of a spiff of any hazardous 
1 lance. 7'1 . 
The state coordinates oil spitt response and contingency planning with both the U.S. 
. . 
Hershman at aL. 1S88. 
Hildreth and Johnson, 1984. 
King and Olson. 
: NCS 1143-215.940. 
'Wiggins. 1989. 
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Coast Guard ar:c U.S. E:wironmental Planning Agency through its Divisions of E."l"lergency . 
Management and Environmental Management (Department of NaturaJ Resources and 
Community Development)." 
Agendes are authorized to acquire and deploy response equipment in the event of a spill. 
and. are required to engage in some pr .. pfannjn~ effort. IQ Petroleum terminal facilities must 
rumish information to regulatory authorities conceming facility operations, site schematics. and 
spill response procedures. h However, these requirements have not been strictly enforced.G 
A successfuf element 01 the state mutti-hazards response plan is the coordination 
between the Division of e:nergency Management. which has offices and contact personnel 
1hrcughout the state, and the Oivision of Environmental Management, which is able to provide 
necessary technical expertise.. A clear deUneation of duties allows the twa offices to work 
together weB under emergeneycondjtions.a 
No major oU spill has yet occun:ed in North caro1ina.. The Ocean Polley Council (1984) 
notes that both state and federal laws provide for minimal liability for spill damage. concentrating 
largely on ~. penalties. and deanup mechanisms. The state's pollution protection 
fund lW is generally underfunded.· 
North caroUna's earJiest coastal management legislation was the Sand Dune Protection 
,Act" II passedin1S55. This ad authorized beards of county commissioners to appoint shoreline 
71 Hershman, 1986. 
10 NCS 1143-215.84-.86. .- .--~---
., 
NCS 1143-215.96. 
-12 Wiggins., 1989_ 
13 Wiggins, 19B5. 
IW NCS 1 143-215.87. 
815 Hershman. 1986. 
II NCS §§ 1049-3 to 1049-15 repealed by Session. L:a~. 1~79! C. 1~~._ ~. ~. 
21 
retection officers responsible tor aoministering, by a permit system. human aC"JVities in cune 
raas. 
Uke other Atfantic seaboard states. a more important coastal development issue faced 
( the North Carolina state govemment was the loss of estuarine wetiands by dredging and 
ing for con~Jon. The first action taken by the legislature was passage of Act 1164 
stuanne Zone Study) in 1969. This Act authoriz~d the DiviSion of Commercial and ~port 
lheries ot the Department of Conservation and Cevelopment to -conduct studies of the state's 
tuaries in order to prepare an -enforceable plan- for managing the areas.17 
The state legislature also passed Act 791 in 1969. outlining state regulations to control 
tdging and fiffing in and near estuaries and other state lands, later consoJidated with a related 
• Act 1159. the Dredge and Fill Law,upassed in 1971. Together, these acts require applicants 
,btain permits from the state Department of Conservation and Development for dredging and 
19projed:S. If an applicant or other state ~gency wishes to appeal a decision, a review board 
at be formed, composed of representatives 01 several state agencies. Permit violations are 
demeanors. punishable by up to SO days in jan and/or a fine of up to SSOO; each day ot 
flnued infraction is considered a separate viofatfon. • 
A weakness 01 the two ads is that they require no public hearings unless the applicant 
I state agency objects to a permitting decision; appeals to the state Supreme Court can be 
~ only by .anageney or affected property owner"'. It is ironic that concemed citizens are 
~ded from 'partid~ng in the formal review or appe~s processes; Bradley and Armstrong 
l that the legislation passed ·onfy after the growth of environmental concem was able to 
F?c 
~ --- -----
'It pressures from development interests.· Later coastal zone management programs 
f Bradley & Armstrong. 
I NCS § 113.229 et. seq. 
Bradley & Armstrong. 
NCS § 113-229(f). 
deveioped by North Carolina. however, include extensive provisions for cttizen panidpaticn. 
'The state legislature established the North Carolina Marine Science Council in 1567.i1 
The Coundl serves to assist the state government in planning tor participation in both Sea Grant 
programs and projects initiated by the Coastal Plains Regional CommisSion (01 representatives 
of the North and South Carolina and Georgia state governments). 
The Council was given a set of specific duties: to encourage use and study of marine 
environments; to develop education and training programs; to ad as liaison with other states: 
to advise the state on development of an ocean resources inventory; to coordinate 
implementation offederaf, state. and local JegisJaUon concerning marine resources; and to advise 
on the coordination of resource devefopment. remaining mindful cf the need fer e:mservath:;m. 
Florida 
Offshore on and gas development and oU transport In state waters 
Fierida is vuinerabfe to oil spiffs from tankers now and may in the Mure be at risk from 
spills from offshore oil production. All 42 weUs drilled on federaf OCS off the Florida coast have 
been nonproductfve. About 1 ~ million acres are under current lease in the Guff of Mexico off 
of Florida. Most of the oil transported along the United States coast passes Florida. t:z The 
Department of Natural Resources has developed a state oil spm contingency plan and a spill 
response team, the Hazardous MatenaJs Task Force. to be activated only in the event of a major 
spia According ~ the plan. the Coast Guard and the Cepar1ment are to coordinate spm 
response, with federal responders taking the lead. By Florida poRcy, no state mon,ey is to be 
spent on spm deanup until available federal funds have been exhausted." However, Florida 
has established a fund for emergency response; this money may also be used for resource 
~ NCS § 1438-389. 
fIZ Christie, 1989. 
sa Ibid. 
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~enaciijtaticn and to c:mpensate local governments or private parties fer damages er c:s:s.·4 
_Eecause of concems raised by Ronda Governor Martinez, lnterior Secretary HodeJ 
agreed in 1988 to delay further leasing off southwest Florida until 1989; Jeases near the sensitive 
Florida Keys have been canceled. The Govemor and Secretary agreed to form t'vvo study teams 
to examine oil spill risks and other potentiaf environmental effects 01 offshore drilling. _ C.R. 
:hristie suggests that the state condud research and mapping programs to identify sensitive 
ueas which should be excluded from further Jease sales, then work lor federal legislation to 
Ircted 1he identified areas. 
Florida has no Single, comprehensive plan for ocean resource use and conservation; 
'.R. Chris~e. under centrad by the Environmental Policy Unit 01 the Govemor's Office of 
tanning and Budgeting, compiled a report on the state's existing laws, policies, and agencies 
2ncemed with ocean resource issues. She intends the report to be a first step towards 
welopment of such a comprehensive plan. 
cItation of oes and CZM Authority 
1her8 are eight policy units within the Governor's OffIce c1 Planning and Budgeting (OPS) , 
tuding the Environmental Policy Unit (EPU). Its legislated objectives indude: protection 01 
rida'snatJJraJ resources by policy planning, budgeting, and advising the legislature; and 
ftinism.tionm ;state ;coordination of federaJ, state, ar1d regional permitting and planning , 
rots under NEPA. the OCS Lands Act, and the CZMA.-
Hershman- -contrasts the case of Florida, where OCS decision.making has been-
. -
loUdated -into the EPU while CZM authority remains with the Department of Environmental 
. 
Jlation (CER). with those of Washington and Oregon, where OCS authority has remained 
~ FSA §376.11. 
Christie. 
Hershman, Ruharty & PoweU (19SS). 
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with tl-Je same agencies which also retain eZM management authority. In Florida. CCS plannrng 
remains in the governors cfflce apparently because it began there before CZM planning was 
initiated. and because of the enormous importance of this issue to the state's economic and 
social welfare. 
Separating OCS and CZM planning may be a beneficial arrangement. OCS legislation 
specifies that the Secretary of the Interior must meet a number of times with the governor of a 
state to consider that state's views on OCS development r1 Consolidating OCS planning into 
the govem9r's office may simplify information transfer between planners and the govemor. and 
hence improve the governor's ability to dearly define and defend the state's position, when that 
position may be counter to Interior policy. 
In fad. the Fiorida Govemor's office has been effective in achieving its OCS objectives. 
OPS has required modeling of spill trajec:t.ories and biological bottom sampling before all 
exploratory drilling. Florida, in negotiations with the Minerals Management Service, also 
achieved cancellation of Lease Sale 140 in the Straits of Florida and deferment of two other 
proposed sales.· 
Coastal Zone Managemem 
Florida is an example of a state which has -networked- existing development controls and 
resource .management legislation to create a coastal zene management program.· Of all the 
coastaf states. it has enacted. the most coastal zene management legislation; the stat~ 
government's management effectiveness has been hampered. however, by insufficient 
consensus and coordination among state and focal agencies.1DO 
., Christie. 
II Ibid. 
• Hildreth and Johnson, 1983. 
100 Guy. 
-!.:...- -
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Development 01 the -current Rorida Coastal Management Program (FCMP) t01 was 
authorized by the Florida CoastaJ Management Act~Q2 in 1978. Under this Act. the Department 
of Environmental Regutatlon. aiso the lead agency in regulation 01 air and water quality and of 
dredging and filling projects, was charged with compiling existing statutes and rules into a 
coastal management program. The Act is eften referred to as the -No Nothing New Acr.1O:I The 
current program indudes 26 acts and implementing rules, and involves 16 state agencies, mainly 
1I1e Departments of Environmental Regulation, Natural Resources, and Com~unity Affairs. A 
particular cfifficulty of coastal zone management in' Fiorida is that the Program defines the entire 
state to be within 1he ccastaJ zone.* 
The Interagency Management Committee (lMC) was created by joint resolution of the 
Sovemor ~d Cabinet in 1980; it is responsible for coordinating this network of laws as a 
:oherentprogram. The Committee is composed 01 the heads 0110 state agendes responsible 
er ccastal management. 1t is responsible for integrating agency activities and policies. and for 
~ new rules. legislation, and memoranda of understanding.'os 
The state Advisory Councrl on Intergovemmental Relations (lAC)t'OI originally designed 
1 '975. serves as a 'Uaison among agendes to effect the FCMP, and prepares background 
spers for the IMC. The Govemors Coastal Resources CItizens AdvisOfY Committee (CAe) 
elides concemeddtizens. Members are appointed by the governor for 2-year terms; they 
,btude ~p_8nt.atives of Interest groups as wen as representattves from several levels of 
~ in the state. The CAC advises the 'MC. Govemor, and legislature on coastal zone 
101 FSA §3S0.22. 
1C1Z FSA §1380.19-380.27 11987J. 
1ca Christie. 
~oc Guy. 
10S Christie. 
101 FSA §163.701 at seq. 
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management issues.,07 
Observers question whether the Florida coastal management program is teo fragmented 
10 be effective. The NOAA Office ot Coastal Resource Management (DCRM) pericoically reviews 
state coastal zone management programs. DCRM issued its most recent evaluation of the 
. Fiorida program in leaS. questioning whether OEM functions effectively as the lead agency in 
program implementation, and whether the fMC and lAC are in fad able to coordinate agencies 
and resolve disputes. as required. Christie suggests redefining agency responsibilities in a 
series cf memcranda of understanding, and codifying the responsibilities of the lMC, in 
particular. Guy notes that the Coastal Management Prcgram does not sufficiently specify criteria 
for local govemments to use in making permitting decisions. and suggests making the Office 
of Coastal Management, now cnfy a small branch within the Oepartment of Environmental 
Regulation. a larger, caJ:)jnet..fevel agency. 
Pre-CZMA 
The Florida state government's first ad of coastal management was unique. The Florida 
Board cf Trustees of the Intemal Improvement Trust Fund'Oi (composed cf the govemor. 
secretary cf state and attorney general. and other state officials) passed a resolution in 1969 
establishing a:set of state aquatic preserves; 41 such preserves had been designated by 19S5 
and inCQrporat~ into the Florida Aquatic Preserve Ad cf 1984.101 
In 1970. the legislature passed Act 259, establishif'lg the FIerida Coastal Coordinating 
Coundlt:O within the state Department cf Natural Resources. The Council was intended to be 
the eventual coastal .zona authority. GuIdelines included In the legislation directed that the 
107 Christie. 
101 FSA § 253.02-
101 FSA § 258.35 et seq. 
11'0 FSA § 370.0211 t subsequently abolished and duties transferred to the Department of 
Envircnmenta1 Regulaticn. __ .. ____ .. ____ _ 
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pnne:pat consideration in all resource allocation decisions was to be maintenance cr even 
improvement of environmental quaJity. and that aJJproposed uses were to be measured against 
the public interest The IegisJatura allocated S2OO,OOO to fund the council, which was to initiate 
.resource studies and draft a ccastal zone management plan. A weakness ef the act is that no 
jeadlines were set fer completion of the plan and studies.111 
In 1971, the Florida Jegislature passed Ad 280.112 to regufate coastal construction and 
uccavation. The act required that setback lines were to be drawn in coastal areas. with no 
cnstruction allowed seaward of any line. The legislation included a provision for public hearings 
nd for 5-year reviews. 
Oregon 
ttshore oil and gas devefopment and oil transport In stat. waters 
Good and Hildreth evaluated Oregon's institutional caPability to manage its tenitoriaJ sea. 
'leY ccnduded that· •• .1he State of Oregon has excellent provisions in place for multHJse ocean 
anagement. better provisions, in fact. than the federal government or any other state-. They 
Jntify the Oregon's 19th land use goal. Ocean Resources Goal (Appendix A). as the key 
~sion. This goal gives renewable resources top priority in decision-makings, and imposes 
ict requirements for resource inventory. analysis of impacts of a proposed project, avoidance 
~ 
pOftution. and coordinat!t~n among agencies). It serves as a useful framework both for 
1 Jrdin~on among agencies and fer dedsiorwnaJdng by a single agency.u. 
A !Ve8.kness of current management practIces Is ~at. although Oregon land Use law 
-- -. .. ... - ._- -..... - .. ~. - .. _---- -- - --
uires that agreements drawn up for coordination of state and focal management adIvitIes be 
Iffied to be in compUance with the Ocean Resources GoaJ. no agreements reviewed fully 
'11 Sradrey &. Annstrong. 
112 FSA § 61.053. • 
M3 CulL 
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incc:-:orated the provisions of the goal. Tnese agreements will be revisec to meet reCently 
updated regulations defining coordinati~n. ~'4 
Recently the Secretary of Interior announced a !=Ircposed lease sale, no. 132, on the outer 
continental sheff off the Oregon coast. In response. in 1987 Oregon undertook an impOrtant new 
initiative concerning ocean pJanning. The legislature enacted the Oregon Ocean Resources 
Management Ad, ttl directing the state to develo!=l the means to manage the use of its offshore 
resources.. The overall management pian will describe resources and uses within the 200 mile 
U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone. induding the Otegon territorial sea. and must be com!=lleted by 
June. 1990. This plan must be approved by the Land Conservation and Development 
Commission by December 1 t 1990. A more detailed management !=Ilan for Oregon's territerial 
sea must be completed by July. 1991, and then adopted by the State Land Beard. which is the 
manager of al1 state lands.11' 
Precursors to the Oregon Ocean Resources Management Task Force had perlermed 
preparatory work. In 1978 a book far interested laymen was published, ·Oregon and Offshore 
Oil" which 'raised questions about Oregon's abUity ta manage development under existing state 
laws. An earlier Task Force, appOinted by executive order, rendered its report in 1979. 
containing numerous recommendations for improving Oregon's !=Iarticipatien in OCS !=Ilanning 
and development. The 1987 Task Force was a direct product of the recommendations ot the 
earlier Gucematorial Task Force.. In 1985 the Oregon Ocean Sook was completed s:»d 
published by ~e LCCC. It provided a com!=lrehensive review of the resources and dynamic 
conditions of the ocean off Oregon. In 1987 the excaIfent study "Territorial Sea Management 
~---- ...... _. __ .. - .... - -- .. - ......... _----
Study,' was completed. prepared Jointly by Oregon State University's Marine Resource 
Management Program and the Ocean and Coastal Law program of the University of Oregon Law 
1M Ibid. 
115 ORS 196.405 et. seq. 
1" ORS 196.475. 
SChOOl. This sway is a easie reterence tor the Task Feree's evaluation of Oregen's ccsan 
management plan, and makes recommendations for program improvements. Finally, in 1987. 
the Oregon Department of FISh and WildUfe published its -Research Plan,· identifying the 
information needed for sound management. and listing currentty·identffied research needs. 
The 1987 Task Force is .broadly based. with state agency directors, ocean users 
(fishermen). Jocaf government representatives and dtizens."" it is backed up by a 30 member 
Scientific and Technicaf Advisory Committee. nl AJso important is the provision requiring that 
federal agencies be invited to participate in task force meetings and preparation of plans.'" The 
Interim ~eport of Juty 1, 1988 reflects active federal agency partiCipation. 
A majQr goaJ of the Oregon program is to ensure that the state is an effective and 
'nfluential partner with federal agencies. This wiJl require. says the Task Force, clear state 
~s. sound intorma:I:ion. and technical expertise. to assure that existing fishery and 
enewlble resources are protected If offshore oil, gas, anc:t minerals are to be developed for the . 
Hlnefit of the state's citizens. 
The Interim ReQQrt ccnducfas that the state presently has only a -bare framework" for an 
Ifedive management program. Numerous changes should be made. (1) State laws and 
olides snould be made dearer, more consistent, and mutually reinforcing. (2) Th~ state needs 
!tter infonnation, and should create an ocean management information network to take 
1 
lvantage of the substantial existing information in state. federaJ. and university sources. Gaps 
! 
'-a to be id~ntifted. (3) A coordination network !inking state and loeaf agendes could provide . 
. . 
nora e!fective and flexible management structure. 'The Report condudes that no new agency 
.. - - -,. . - ---.. - -- .. - -.... - - .. - ---- - - --
needed, but argues 1hat offshore development presents entirely new demands for state and 
:aJ agencies and thus addH:IonaJ resources Le., dollars, wiD be needed to work with citizens, 
117 ORS 196~445. 
". ORS 196.450. 
11. ORS 196.455.. 
fishermen, anc teceral agencies to compiete the Cregon Ocean Resource Management Plan. 
A few of the many specific recommendations are worthy 01 speda! note. The Interim 
ReRort recommends that all of the affeded state agencies should submit an integrated package 
of their budget needs to the Legislature to ensure that the state can ·effectively represent state 
interestS in federal lease sale planning. The Aeport recommends that a coastal oil spill response 
pian be prepared; that for the 1991 legislative session a ·spin damage assessment and 
compensation fund be established, and that a fisherman's contingency fund be created (the 
report does not provide details on how this should be done): and that the Legislature should 
. provide special grants to focaJ govemments for planning for onshore development resufting from 
offshore oes development 
The Final Recoa 01 the Task Force is due in 1990 and should be studied carefully by 
A~aska because of the carenn and extensive study and thinking it will represent. 
.one prodUd of the Oregon state planning ettcrts was the establishment of a Placer 
Mining Task Force to study the possibility of placer mining off the southem Oregon coast This 
isa federal/state task force, with representatives c' au the affected federaj and state agencies. 
An advisory group was formed, representing mining companies, environmental organizations, 
and a college of Oceanography. Thla Task Force is primarily concemed with economic, 
biological, and economic factors. Information will then be fed into the enhanced 
legaJ{mstit1.rtionaJ structure which Is the responsibjlity of the Oregon Ocean Resources 
Management Task Force. 1211 
Oregon on SpUJ Contfngencv pfannlng; 
Two types of contingency planning exist at the state level in Oregon. and a third has 
recentfy been authorized by the legislature. 
The ciJ spill section of the statewide oil and hazardous materiaJ emergency response 
120 OOGAMI~ 1989. 
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p1an~2'I (see Appendix C) is administered by ttle Department of E:wironmental Qualjty. Tne plan 
is an organizational document that identifies and aJlocales agency responsibilities during the spill 
f'esponse precess. While the hazardous materials section of the plan is administered by the 
State Fire Marshal, oil spill response is viewed as correctly belonging with the CEC because the 
state's role and interest is in resource protection.'zz The CEC has promulgated a few guidelines 
egulating spill response, primarily establishing notice requirements and forbidding the use of 
ill but inert chemical dispersants during an oil spiU.'IZI 
Over the last decade. in response to requests by the u.s. Coast Guard and funded by 
18 CZMA Coastal Energy Impact Program. the CeQ also prepared three regional ccntfngency 
tans focusing on environmentaJ resource identification and protection. (The most recent p/an, 
ascribing the Coos Say region. is attached as Appendix C.) These plans describe bio!l::lgical 
1d other resources at risk during a spiU, anaJyze the impact of physical factors such as tidal 
'ltion and weather, 'outline cleanup techniques, and previde maps and charts that indicate 
.... ,i.Domsand ·ctherequipment shoufd be deployed. 
During the 1989 session. the state legislature enacted a bill authorizing the CEQ to 
spare ail spill contingency plans for the entire coast and the length of the Columbia RNar 
mmg Oregon's northem boundary.124 These plans win incorporate sophisticated resource 
pping using computer generated geographic information systems (GJS). 111e plans will aJso 
~ on response resources and mechanisms available in each ptan area. 121 
. 
,- Oregon does not cwrantfy impose contingency. pfannjng requirements on petroleum 
ities ~n the state. and must rely therefore on the U.s.. Cnvironmentai Proted:fon Agency's 
--"'- - .. _.- ,,;;.-- .. ,.. ... _---- *--- ---- - .. _-
12'1 Authorized by ORS 466.620. 
2Z Sutherland. 1989. 
zs Oregon Admin. Rules Ch. 340, Dfv. 41. 
~4 Oregon Laws, 1989, Ch. 1082. 
• Suth~rlan.dt 1989. ____ . _____ _ 
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entcrC!!ment 01 SFeC plans. i"r.is entorcement is Viewec as lax. anc state regwation ct inc:.:s:ry 
is cornemplated.121 
Oregon is similar to Alaska in that there have histcricaJly been tew pressures to deveicp 
its coastline relative to other coastal states. such as California. This is in farge part because the 
state's population is concentrated in the WilIamette River valley, away from the coast.
'
Z1' Perhaps 
because most residents live in a rapidly urtJanizing area. there has historically been strong 
support in the state for careful managemem of its natural resources. -Sy 1983. the state's unique. 
strict land use legislation had survived three initiative recall petitions; the margin of cruzen 
support fo~ the Jegislatlon has increased each election.,a 
Pre-CZMA 
The eaniest coast management concern of the Oregon government manifested in 
legislation was provision of public access to beach areas. The Seach SiD, passed in 1967. 
estabnshes the rights of citizens to use beaches up to the vegetation line.,21 The Nudear 
Sighting Task Force. a sub-unit oftne existing Nudear Development Committee. was established 
by Executive Order 01.Q69.25 in 1969. The task force, after considering environmental issues. 
was to advise the Governor and fuO Committee on proposed sites for nudear power plants. 
Bradley and Armstrong cite two weaknesses of this action. Primarily. the task force was 
not to consider sightfng and construction of 1os$iI fuel power plants, more common and hence 
-potentially more damaging to the ccastaf zone. Second. a task force created by executive order 
can easily be abolished the same way. Compared with Washington's and Maryfand's much 
- - -_... .. _... -- - ..... -- .... -~ - ... - _.... .. - -- - -----
stronger power plant sighting legislation. the executive order serves as a pcor prototype for 
,211 Ibid.. 
127 Cull. 1983. 
121 Ibid. 
'3 ORS 390.630 •.. ______ . ___ _ 
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rurJ"ler state aCtions to CCr.trCI ccastaJ incus:ry. 
Act 608,1:10 passed in 1971, established the Oregon Coastal Conservation ana 
:Jevelopment Cemmittee (OCe & DC). Its 30 members induded dy, county, and port officials. 
epresematives of Oregon's four coastaJ zone districts. and others appointed by the Governor. 
"e Committee, which was given pJanning and advising functions only, wu re$pcnsible for 
aveloping a ·comprehensive plan for the conservation and development of the natural 
!Sources of the coastal zone_·; I:H this plan was due in 1975. The legislation mandated a 
:)n~e~n bias to the pfan: conflicts among uses were to be resotved so that the coastal zone 
as not irreversibly damaged. and pollution was to be controlled. t.1Z Governor Tom McCall 
sued an ei8aitive oidefpl8drig ,rmoratcriurn on ccastal construction until plan completion.'= 
Oregon has defined a broader coastal zone than most other states: it indudes aU areas 
1St of the Coast ,Range. and areas further irJand along major river drainages. within the zone.':M 
contrast, Washington state inciudes only the 200 feet of land inland from the tide line. 
S1-C%MA 
The oce & DC was inadequately funded during its first 3 years of operation, and had 
, . 
CuJty in deeding on directions and methods; it finally was allocated federal CZMA funds in 
14. The Commission hetd a series of public WOrkshOpS in all coastaJ counties; this workshOp 
k ra1her than public hearings, was chosen In order to provide an unintimidating forum fer 
,\.ns to express theli- views.'· 
I 
:10 ORS en. 91. repealed OCL.A. 1S77. Co 664, 142-
II Ibid. 
12 Levinson and Hess, 1978. 
1:1 Bradfeyand Armstrong • 
.. Ibid. 
• Ibid. 
... _. __ ._ ..... ----- .... --
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The ace & DC presented its Natural Resources Management P~cgram to the state 
legislature in 1975. When commiSSion members were surveyed at that time. they identified 
several factors as having most influenced their selection 01 policies: (1) state agencies and 
resource specialists. and the results of land use inventories; (2' industry and trle private sector; 
(3) environmental groups; and (4) citizen participation.'~ 
In 1975. acc & DC was absorbed into the Land Conservation. and Development 
Commission (LCDC), which had been established by the Land Use Planning Act of 1973.':17 The 
major responsibility of the LCOC is to coordinate land administration through comprehensive 
plans developed for afl areas in the state. In order to prepare plans, the Commission was to 
develop a "Set 01 statewide resource management goms, prepare land use inventories and 
statewide planning guidelines, review Joca.J plans. and prepare example pians. acts. and 
orainances.'3 There are especimly strong provisions in this legislation for ensuring citizen 
participation as welf as for coordinating state, federal. and locaj agendes.1:11 The administrative 
arm of the Commission is the state Oepartment of Land Conservation and Deve!opment ,. 
The LCOC held hearings in four coastm cities to evaluate the planning recommendations 
made by OCC&OC, then established a tecnnicaJ advisory committee to ful1l1er evafuate the 
recommendations; it published a revised set of policies, or 'goats' in 1976 for public review. 
After 20 hearings throughout the state in 1976. a revised draft was published, and more hearings 
and pubUc meetinQ$ were herd be1cre statewide goats were formatly adopted in 1976.'41. 
OrB9on is unique among the coastal states in requiring JocaJ gcvernments to prepare 
131 Ibid. 
1!!1 ORS 197.030. 
131 ORS 197.040. 
1:11 Dun, 1983. 
140 ORS 197 .07!5. 
,., Doubleday et aJ., 1977. 
.-
:mprenenSive plans acc::rding to state-imposed standards, its Jand use gOalS. 142 The LCCC 
stabUshed 19 statewide planning goals, each addressing a specific topic, and each specific with 
~garc :0 the resources to protect. uses to accommodate, hazards to avoid.levei of inventorying 
• doc:.:mentation required. and geographic area of coverage. U:S Planning goals themselves 
we tt:e torce of law; each is acccmpanied by advisory guidel1nes. Most goals are stated 
Inerally. to allow flexibility in local planning. Local govemments may choose to follow the 
tablished guideUnes to develop a comprehensive plan. or may identify an altemative way to 
Jet planning goals.'4& 11 a local government fails to create a plan which conforms to goals, 
thortty to establish regulations passes to the LCCC.'''' The citiZen participation goal requires 
-cumemed feedback showing that attention has been paid to citizen concerns; this goal is 
sed cn the premise that pians will be more successfuf when Citizens have assisted in their 
tpSracU:m. 14 Two of the 19 ,goals are set out in Appendix A. 
ICon's statewide planning geals: topics ttrpm Dull. 19S3) 
CIfzen invofvement 
Land use pfanning 
AgricutturaJ lands 
! FC'lfeSt lands , 
1 
Open spaces. scenic and historical areas, and natura! resources 
Nt, water, and land resources quality 
Areas subject to natiJraI disasters and hazards 
G: Levinson and Hess, 1978. 
q Cull. 1983. 
... Ibid. 
• ORS 191.251. 
II OUU. 1983. 
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B. Recreational needs 
9. Economy 01 the state 
10. Housing 
11. Public taciiities and services 
12- Transportation 
13. Energy conservation 
14. UrbarUzation 
15. Wiffamette River greenway 
The followjng four goals, added in 1976, address coastat topics: 
1 s: Estuarine resources (See App. A for full statement) 
17. Coastal shoTelands 
18. Beaches and dunes 
19. Ocean resources (See App. A for full statement) 
Another unusuaJ feature of Oregon land-use law is that requests for changes in any 
approved comprehensive pJan must be acccmpanied by evidence of a public need for the 
changes!C7 The laws aJso provide unusual opportunity for both cH:izens and agenci~ to appeaf 
permitting or other resource allocation decisions, by.arguing that a dedsJon does not ccmpfy. 
with I pfan or goal. t. 
1<11' tbld. 
.'''' Ibid. 
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California 
CalHcmia remains the only state outside the Gulf ot Mexico with oil and gas development 
: the federal outer continentaJ shelf; it is secend only to Louisiana in offshore oii procuction. ,.i 
fshore ofl and gas Jeasing cegan in the state in 1963, wnen the federal govemment offered 
tease 57 tracts in six offshore casins. These tra~..s were all eventually acandoned,150 cut 
feral additional state and federa/lease sales had ceen held cy the time ot the Santa Sarbara 
blowout in 1959. Soth the state and federal govemments imposed moratoria on further Jease 
as foHowing the spill; both moratoria were lifted in 1973.161 Since 1965. more than 20 offshore 
ling platforms have ceen cuilt in Santa Barbara Channel alone. Perhaps because of the large 
ant of OCS oil development in Caflfomia. and the opportunity to observe the effects of the 
S blowout. great puclic support for strong coastal zone protection has developed in the 
e.ta 
i pil and ;as development: C8lffomi;t, meriene! 
During the late 19705 and eariy 19S0s. caufomfa's attemptS to strengthen the state's 
enee ovar oj) and gas leasing decisions were marked cy COntroversy.'S1 The state filed 
nJ lawsuits in order to force the Department of tnterior to pface greater weight on state 
;ems. Suits were filed over Lease Sales 53 and e8, the tirst S-year OCS leasing program, 
,baed S-year leasing program. and air quality regulations imposed on OCS operators cy 
I -
I 
)apartment of Interior. 
The state administration, because litigation proved to be a costfy, time-ccnsuming, and 
• Kahoe. 1987. 
o Nationm OceaniC and AtmospheriC Administration, 1980. 
'I Hershman et m., 1,988. 
I Ibid.. 
t Kahce. 1987. 
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inefficient way to aevance the state's concerns. has since concentrated on uSing eXls:mg 
legislation to strengthen the state's negotiating position. The most useful legislation includes 
Sections 18 ana 19 01 CCSLA. describing consultation opportunities for states:~S<I the CZ\1A 
consistenci provisions;1!! and a variety ot statutes including NEPA,151 the Endangered Species 
Act, 157 the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 151 the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, ~ss 
the Clean Air Act,'" the Water PofJution Control Act,'ft and other statutes. which provide 
environmental safeguards to proted state interests. and sometimes consultation requirements 
tor states as well.'· 
The .Secretary of Environmental Affairs has been designated as the Govemor's CCS 
Policy Coordinator. charged with mediating and ensuring coordination among agencies and 
representing the state administration's position. The Secretary is to meet regularly with adVisory 
groups and representatives for focal and city govemments, conservation and community 
organizations, and oes operators. He or she is to prepare !4 Sing!e state administration 
response to each oes adMty under provisions of Sections 18 and 19 of OesL.A.113 
It should be noted. however, that a distinction should be made between the initial leasing 
phase and preparation of development proposals. The leasing phase has become a highly 
, ... 43 USC §§13St, 1352. 
'11 16 USC §1456(c). 
151 4~ USC §4321 at seq. 
117 16 USC 11$31 et seq. 
'III 16 USC 11361 at seq. 
'III 16 USC 11 S01 et seq. 
'''42 US<? 17401 et seq. 
Sin 33 USC 11151 at seq. 
1tz Kanoe. 
1a Ibid. 
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:olitical process that centers en the federal and state agencIes cescnbec above. Tne CaJiferraa 
:oastal Commission (the CZMA consistency review agency) participates minimally in the lease 
~ase because consistency review has been eliminated f~r initial oes leasing. However, after 
laSes have been awarded, the oil companies must prepare Plans of Exploration (POE's) and 
<tIvelopment and Production Plans (OPP's). At this point the govemor's office becomes passive 
,d the CCC steps in with consistency review. 
In previous years, the consistency precess was one of ·hard bargaining- between the 
:C and industry. However, because of the political climate, the process is now much more 
m1rcntationaL More decisJons of the CCC are appealed to the Sec'y of Commerce. Examples 
recent problems include the question of who determines OCS air quality standards (COlor 
I state under the CM program), and whether the state can require installation 01 seabed 
'Itforms to prcted sub-seabed resourcas. Attempts at negotiated rulemaking have failed. Soth 
, state and industry are lOOking for the right lawsuit to litigate state authority and powers. 
f*Jmil's Joint Rftew P~Flffl 
The most important ccmponent of the state government's formal oes response system 
he Joint Review PaneL These panels occur at a much later time than the Calif. Coastal 
nmission consistency review. In 1970. the state legislature passed the Califomia 
i 
; 
rnmental QuaJity Act, tailored after, NEPA. requiring environmental impad reports to be 
~d for an projectS exp~ed to have important adverse environmentaJ effedS. '''In cases 
'Oposed offshCre oil development projects, severaf state ~d fadera! agencies often prepared 
iftS covering different aspects of the same preject.'· To reduce costs and time to evaJuate 
:2ject. Joint Review Panels were fonned. Each is a temporary association of permitting 
lcies which directs preparation ofa report on the environmental effects of a project. The 
M Calif. PublIc Resources Coda §21ooo et seq. 
II Hershman et sf ... 1988. 
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panel identifies the most relevam issues to address. then interviews and seleas an independent 
c:nsultant to prepare the report. The panel oversees report preparation and conducts three 
public hearings: one before beginning the review of environmental issues, a second to evaluate 
the draft reper .... and a final hearing once the report has been determined to be complete.'· 
Eleven such panels have been formed in Califomia since 1993. all for projects related to 
offshore oil and gas development. All have induded a federaJ agency; most often either the 
Minerals Managemem Servi~ US Army COI'lJS of Engineers, or Bureau of Land Management. 
Representatives of county and state agencies and from the Govemor's office are induded on 
. the panels. Lees! govemments pfay a big part In the Joint Review Panel precess because they 
will manage many of the onshore impacts of OCS development The existence of SEOA js 
especially important here as it gives local governments a good bargaining d'1ip. Applicant oil 
and gas companies prepare detailed preject deScriptions and assist in the review of 
~ental issues to addms; after 1his. they are permitted to testify at public hearings. but 
have no further role In the review process; however, appUcants pay consultant's costs. and 
sometimes agency staff tlme as wen. 117 
The Offlce of Permit Assistance, in the Govemor's Offtce, and the office 01 the Secretary 
of Environmental Affairs assist panels. A representative from the Secretary's office normaJty 
serves as a non.voting panel member, to help resolve disputes and to assist with meeting 
deadlines.1• 
Hershman·at aI. and Kahoe note that the review panel process promotes a coordinated 
approach which reduces disputes among agencies, allows agencies opportunity to share 
expertise and resources, and promotes dear identification 01 needed mitigation measures which 
can be drawn up as permit conditions. 
UII Calif. PubUc Resources Code §68735. 
,., Hershman et aJ., 1SSS. 
,. Ibid. 
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The precess has also resulted in area studies: evaluations of expeCteo effects and 
necessary mitigation measures for tater oil and gas development likely to take place in the 
generai area where a permit application has been filed. Potential cumulative effeets can then 
be evaluated. and the StUdy format allows the panels to obtain aecass to data not normally made 
public by the Minerals Management Service. These studies help ~ocaI govemmentS project and 
pian fer future developments and growth in their areas "o1jurisdiction.1• 
Hershman reports 1t1at agency members whom they contacted believed the review panel 
process to be generally effective and he!pfui. as well as flexible. One contact listed several 
problems remaining to be resolved: methods of determining panel composition and feadership. 
-
of resolving conflicts arising from different agency mandates and opinions, and of werking with 
:cnsultantS to select research methods and criteria. 1M 
In savanH notable cases, the state has been able to successfully promote its oes " 
cncems.. Using OCSLA Sedan 19 consuftatlon provisions, Governor Oeukmeijian submitted 
!COmmendations for spedftc lease sale stipulations and tract deletions for protection of sensitive 
reaL These recommendations ware used as a basis fer beginning negotiations. m In a 
Iemorandum of Understanding achieved through such negotiations. the state obtained deletion 
t 22 tradS. added oil spHl contingency measures and a set 01 mitigation measures to protect 
, 
theries and marine mammals and to mandata consuttauon with locaf fishermen.'12 Kahoe 
~es: "The use 01 negotiated stipulations cannot guarantee that au State interests wiD be 
lCeessfully addressed 1hrough the fease sale prccass, but these· negotiations have been 
1. Ibid. 
170 Ibid. 
·1" Kahce, 1987. 
14'Z Ibid. 
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suc:essr..JUy used to recuce the number of issues It.at must oe hancJed tnrougn other 
measures·. 
California Contlngenev Flannlng; 
Oil spill contingency planning in Califomia is conducted ooth at the state agency and 
industry facility level. The state plan (See Appendix 0) is administered by the Oepartment of 
Fish and Game.'n Because 01 federal preemption rights. the stat8 acts primarily to advise and 
monitor federal agencies during spills. Thus. the state plan is an organizational decument 
identifying agencies that are involved in spill response. The Io')fan outlines the hierarchy 01 
authority in an emergency and the sequence of steps to be taken during the response precess. 
Contact information is provided for agencies, cleanup contrac:tcrs and coops, ... vildlife 
reha.i:liJitation facilities, etc. The plan also provides in1ormation about funding sources available 
·to repay costs of deanulo') and copies of necessary forms. 
The state does retain veto Io')CIW8f over use of chemical agents. such as dispersants. in 
slo')iU cleanup 17& and acceptable chemicaf agents are also listed in the Io')lan. 
In 1986 the legislature mandated a review of the state contingency plan 175 considering 
such factors as adequacy of manpower and equipment. The petroleum industry is required to 
comribute to the cost of this review. f1I 
Thrcugh ~ consistency provisions17T the California Coas+..aI Commissio.n has some 
jurisdiction over oif-development related adMties. 'The state requires that all petroleum cargo 
vessets.·refineries, tenninals, and offshore production facilities prepare contingency plans and 
In Public Resources Cod~ §3!50S0. 
17& FISh and Game Code §5650. 
175 Government Code §SS14.8. 
171 Government Code §8S74.6(d). 
," 18 USC §1456. 
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:rovic::e emergency response training for their personnel. 171 Tne eee oversees implementation 
-,t these requirements through its planning authority ,'19 and is authorized to call practice drills 
md exercises in order to test the effectiveness of induStry pians. '10 
The State Lands Commission, an executive agency within the Governor's office, is also 
.uthorized to require drfUs and tests of industry contingency plans, and otherwise investigate 
,ethocs of marine poUution CCntrol.111 
The California pfan and process has been praised for its dear delineation of authority 
tJring emergency response. In addition. the ceo program of on-site testing of industry plans 
IS enhanced generaf preparedness by locating and correcting response problems before a spill 
:curs. However, the plan is criticized forfnduding too many state agendes within its ambit. 
thout dearly defining responsibilities. 1n addition, the legisfatively mandated review of the plan 
s been underfunded thus far. So far as possicle, the plan review will take a systems approach 
the pro clem. considerfng response from point of spill to the dumpsite. Following the Valdez 
Ut, the state is also concerned with potential response to a massive spill incident 1. 
Formal coastal zone ·management began in Califomia in the San Francisco Say area. 
t San Franci$co Say Conservation and Development Commission (SCCCj. which in 1955 
Fe the nation's first regional coastaJ management agency. resulted from a decade of citizen 
Its to prot~ the Bay.fa The area of the Say had diminished by diking and flllIngfrcm an 
171 Government Code §S574.6(c). 
m PubUc Resources Code §30232. 
eo Baird, 1989. 
it Govemment Code §11 1 SO. Public Resources Code §622S. 
12 Baird. 1989. 
a Sradley and Armstrong. 1912. 
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initial eeo to 437 sCjuare miles by 1955. tl<4 and concerned Say area residents tcrmed the Save 
San Francisco Bay Association in 1961 to counteract this loss of area. "'e group worked to 
focus public attention on Bay management. and by 1 S64 had been able to have legislation 
intrccl..'Ced and passed by the state legislature establishing a commrssion to study the Say 
problem. "'e recommendations 01 the commission resulted in formation of the eccc. by 
passage of the McActeer-Petris Act tIS 
The seoc, originaJJy intended to be a temporary agency created to develop a 
comprehensive management plan for the Say Area. submitted the San Francisco Say Plan to 
the state legisfature in 1959. The seoc has been made a permanent regulatory agency, and 
is composed of Z'! members: representatives of loeaf. state. and federal agencies, as well as 
Ctalens.~11 
Sradley and.Armstrong note that the ecoc's decisions are rarely challenged. perhaps 
because its varied membership lends tt credibifrty. They cite as other factors ccntributing to its 
success: public support for action to preted the Say and control development: a dearly present 
danger to the environment; the initiative of private citizens; as wen as the respect which the 
commission developed during the years tt wcrked on the Say Plan. 
Post.gMA 
The basis of California's Coastaf Management Program is the California Coastal Act of 
1976..111 The Ad. desaibes a set of state policies for protection of coastal zene resources and 
. management of human actMUes and development within the zone. The Ad. deftnes the coastal 
zone to contain waters out to the 3.mile boundary of the territorial sea and inland usually 1,000. 
114 lbid. . 
111 Government Code §66600 et seq. 
111 Government Code §6662O. 
117' Public Resources Code §§30000 at seq. 
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yaros ~sco rn). 7;,e zone boundary is extenced inlanc to the first major ndgeHne in estuarine c: 
recreationaJ areas and important hat:litat til 
The Act estatlfished the California Coastal Commission, the main coastal zone 
management authority in the state. as well as several regional authorities. all charged with 
implementing the Act.'" Regional commissions were given permit authority until coastal 
management plans submitted by local govemmems have been approved by the CoastaJ 
Commission. The Coastal Commission remains the permitting agency for ocean activities. The 
=cmmission also reviews federaJ activities for ccnsistency under the CZMA. The State Lanes 
:ommission administers tidelands and submerged lands out to the 3-mife boundary .. It also 
~s in Jocaf planning.'tO 
4at'iM Sesourca ana Coastal Zen. Management In AJaska 
The history 01 Alaska state marine resource and coastaJ zone management differs from 
tat of ether coasta1 states in important respects. 
,first, ·untiI initiation of federal programs to encourage oil and gas leasing and 
MIOl=lment on the continental shelf. there had been littfe pressure for industriaJ development 
,Alaska's coastaJ areas. WIth the arrival o11he oil indUstry, the state's government has in a 
m time bMn canfrcnted with the need to regulate a single, politically powerful, farge-scale 
"Ii 
'fuWY promoted by the mere powerfut federal government. Conversely, otnerccastal states 
1..been ccnfranted over much longer periods 01 time by many. mostfy smalJ-sca'$. gradually 
lIving.types of coastal development and resource use conflicts. In this sense, Alaska's state 
I8mm~mt has lackedtheopportunitfes presented to governments of other coastal states to 
:. evaluate. and refine management programs over a period 01 years. 
, .. NationaJ Oceanic and AtmospheriC Administration, 1980. 
1. Public Resources Code §§3030Q.30305. 
'to Public Resources Coda §30416. 
Second. the state achieved statehood in 1559. fts government was still in a starn.:p 
phase when other, older states had begun serious consideration of problems of coastaJ 
management and marine resource use. More than 90% of Alaska has until recently been owned 
by the federal government. Under the Alaska Statehood Act. 181 Congress gave the state 
government the right to select more than 104 million acres of unreserved federal Jands; the state 
was given a ~year period to make these selections.'· (As in the cases of afl coastal states. 
the Submerged Lands Act of 1953
'
1:1 gave the state We to tidelands and submerged lands under 
the territoriaf sea as well.) On achieving statehood. the new government began to conduct fand 
Uwen10ries and prepare plans for Jand management Fewer than 10 million acres had been 
transferred to state ownership by 1969, however. when the federal government instituted a 
-:reze-en all transfers of Jand ownership until Alaska Native claims to their historical lands had 
been resolved. The freeze remained in effect until· paSsage of the Alaska Native Claims 
SetUement Act in 1971.1" Section (d) (1) of the Act mandated a review of all unreserved federal 
lands in the state to ensure that the public Intetest was being met Lands under such review 
remained in a withdrawal status until passage of the Alaska Lands sm'• In 1980. Thus It was 
not until the 19BOs that the state finally received We to the bulk of Its selected land. Because 
it has only reeent1y obtained ownership of this land, the state's land management optJons have 
been limited, again Dmfting its accumulated resource management experience. 
. Third. pemaps because of the low popuJation density in Alaska. and ~ecause residents 
have not felt the stresses of urbanizatIcn and observed the rapidly increasing development 
pressures which have bien the common experience 'of residents of 'The L.cwer 48-, concem fOr 
181 48 USC, note pree. 121. 
182 Arctic Environmental Informatfon and Oata Center, 1975. 
1C 43 USC §1301 et seq. 
1M 43 USC § 1601 et seq. 1. Alaska NationaJ Interest Land Conservation Act. 
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!nvironmental protection has grown marKedly more Siowiy in Alaska than in other c:astaJ states. 
;oth Congress and the Administration. in making decisions on allocation of Alaskan lands and 
esources under federal jurisdiction. have been extensiVeiy pressured by nationaJ ccnservation 
TOUPS, which formed. the Alaska Coalition in the mid·1910s to lobby Congress In tawr of the 
'eska Lands Sill. Aelative to the other West Coast states. though, Alaska's indigenous 
:mservation groups have been small in size and number and have found it correspondingly 
:ore difficult to ded state4eve! decision-making. Anti-envircnmentalist feelings, demonstrated 
newspaper editorials and letters-to-thCHditor, by the public speeches of political leaders. and 
f t-srurts and bumperstickers r1.et the Sastards Freeze in the Dark Wrth-Out Alaskan OiJ-, and 
ierra. Go Home- were the commonest slogans in the state during the time of the pipeline 
arings), have traditionatJy been much more visible in Alaska than elsewhere on the West 
A ·fcurthditference is the muIticufturaJ nature 01 Alaska. Many communities with the 
I8test stake in" coastal resource decisicn-making are Alaska Native: Aleut. Eskimc, or coastal 
ian. Oadsion-making traditions in these communities dfffer markedly tom those of the white 
ioritY. Such traditions must be incorporated into pJanning programs in order for these citizens 
ave sufficient opportunity to assist in pJan development and to express their concerns and 
rmes to agency r.epresentatives. Public hearings, for example, are a common mechanism 
,neouraging public participation in resource management in Alaska as well as ether states. 
! • . 
, are of limited use in rural Alaska. though. where many residents hesitate to. express 
1selves in such an ~ forum. Many of these same residents. however, possess a 
01 knowfedge about their region unava.l1able elsewhere. 
These several factors have acted to sJow resource decision-making and coastal zone 
:ing per se in Alaska. By the eany 191Os. when most coastal states were actively 
Jcting ccastal studies and considering planning altemativeS, no legislation specifically 
1 
.... 
addressing coastal zone planning had been passed by the Alaska legislature. Pertinent AlasKa 
state law at that time induded the Alaska Land Act of 19591• and provisions of the state 
Constitution related to resource use. and deveippment Artide VIII of the Alaska Constitution 
states that the !=loHey of the state is to encourage settlement and maximum use of its resources; 
that an renewable resources are to be managed for maximum sustained yield; that the state may 
tease but net sell renewable resources, and may reserve areas c1 natural beauty or of scientific. 
cultural, or historical importance. The Land Act provided fer dassffication of Alaskan lands. 
induding tidal and submerged lands, acecrding to their -hfghest and best uses·, in area land use 
planS. The Ad mandates public participation in all land use decisions and requires public 
hearings on aU regulation.setting procedures and dassification actions. lIT 
However. marine fisheries have always been one of the several most important 
components of the state's economy. and both residents and the state government place high 
priority on maintenance of important stocks and their habitat.. A variety of marine research 
.programs have been instituted by Alaska's management agencies and celleges. ,. The Institute 
of Marine Science was established at the University of Alaska·Fairbanks by the state legislature 
in 1960; the Alaska Sea Grant Program was established in 1970, and University of Alaska fPC·· 
brancnes at Juneau and Kodiak run marine studies programs as well. Severaf state agencies 
with regulatory and research responsibilities for marine resources were established at statehood. 
-These include: the Alaska Departments of FISh and Game.. Natural Resources, Community and 
Regional AffairS, and Environmental Conservation.'· 
1. 38.0S AS. 
11T AS 38.05.945. . 
1M Jarvela. 1986. 
n. Ibid. 
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ine state legislature passed tne Alaska. Ccastal Management Act,:'Xl intencec to provide 
for-·coordinated planning tor use and conservation c1the state's ccastaJ resources' in 19n . .al 
The Act provides for a state management program based on sharing ot management 
responsibilities between the state and local governments, by development 01 coastal 
management programs for local districts.2CZ Thesedistrid plans are deveioped by 
municipaJiHes· or, in rural regions, by popularly etected Coastal Resource Service Area 
Soards. 20& Oistrid plans are reviewed by the public and by state and federal agendes. then 
must be approved by the local coastal board, state Coastal Pclicy Council, and NOAA.- NOAA 
approved Alaska's state ccastaJ management program in 1979. By 1987, NOAA and the state 
Coastal PoliCY Council had approved 21 pfans submitted by local govemments.-
lneerpprattnq the Alaska NattYe "mpeetr'll 
Tbe history of coastal zone planning by members of the NANA Native Corporation, in 
,orthWestem Alaska, illustrates the partlcuiar resource planning outreok and experiences of n.nJ 
1Iative A.Iaskans (NANAmembers are inupiat Eskimo). No municipal government exists in the 
lANA Region, so residents have no access to !and use ccntrols in common use -eisewhere, 
iJd'J as penn1Uing and zoning provisions. Ukewise, residents had been dissatisfied with their 
_"I='n~~ ,in the pubflC pa.rl:idpation processes of state and federal agencies. They found that 
I 
iJblIc (;;;:'r'Jnents were not usuaBy taken until late in the pfanrliing process. and they were 
! -
- 46.40 AS. 
. 
an Hanfey·and Smith, 1987. 
ZR AS 48.40.030. 
= AS 48.40.090 • 
. 2OC AS 46.40.140. 
- t~ et aJ. 1987. 
- Hanley and Smitl1. 1987. 
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::r:cemec that their commentS were not evaluated seriously by agency representatives.207 They 
cec:ced to participate in the statecoastaJ management program. Because partidpation provides 
resicents with a formal, central role in planning, because any approved district management plan 
would be legafly binding on state and federaf agendes. and because they wOI.#d obtain some 
ct tf:e same ·consistency· benefits available to a state. with an approved coastal zone program. 
they saw an opportunity to increase their control over development activities in their coastal 
zone.2OI 
In 1978, NANA Region residents requested organization of a NANA Coastal Resource 
. Service Area. and in 1979 elected members of a NANA Coastal Resource Service Area Board. 
The Soard submitted a coastal management plan to the Alaska Coastal POfiC"1 Council in 
1919 . .:'11 
Once a plan is approved and development projects proposed. a Soard is normally one 
of several reviewers which mJke consistency recommendations to a state agency with legal 
authority to make a consistency determination. To improve their centrol over pfan 
implementation, NANA residents proposed an altemative method of implementation, Sivunniuq, 
r 
based on traditional decis!on~aking approaches. ZlO 
There Sf!) three important aspects to the SivuMiuq .method. First.. well before a permit 
application has been filed, petmit applicants are asked to present their project plans to the 
Soard,. which holds a pre.development conference of representatives of affected ccmmunities • 
. Iocal landowners, an~ the applicant. Additional discussions may be held as necessary to further 
cfarffy issues and conflicts. Second, once a permit has been filed, the Soard may request the 
lead state agency to schedule a permit application conference. 'The conference is attended by 
ZIt Isaacs et aI., 1987. 
2011 Ibid. 
2011 ibid. 
2'10 Ibid. 
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:epresentatives of communities and state agencies, the Board. and landowners; its purpose is 
to discuss the ccastaJ management implications of the proposed actMty and to Identify methods 
cf resoMng conflicts. Third. federal and state agendes are requested to indude representatives 
of the Soard, affected communities. and landowners in regional planning and study teams. This 
procedure is meant to ensure that state planning activities are consistent with the district 
management program.Z11 Isaacs et aI. note that when the NANA_Board presented the concept 
01 Siwnniuq to state agencies. it was -net waU received-, but that agency representatives and 
NANA members were eventuaJJy able to negotiate a solution which reasonably satisfied 
Iveryone. 
"aska statutes and regylatIons goveming oil pofJutfon 
Legistation goveming oil pollution and centrol in Alaska is found primarily in five c:i,apters 
If the Alaska Statutes. AS 44.46 estaDfishes the Department of EnvironmentaJ Conservation 
CEq and delineates its duties. AS 46.Q3 prohibits the refease of Of1 and astmrlShes a penalty 
cherne and various legat remedies in the event of a spilL AS 46.04 addresses poUution control 
, terms of finandaJ responsibility, ccntingency plans. containment procedures. and master 
. 
iSponse plans. AS 46.08 creates a spill res;lonse fund. AS 46.09 estabrlShes containment 
fd deanup procedures to be followed by persons responsible for a spilL Each of these 
~rs is described in mora detail below. 
i 
i The DEC administersprcgrams to prevent and 'abate poUution.Z12 and promulgates 
gu1a1ions to fuHiD Its missfon. Z1~ An environmental advisory board, consisting of non-
tVemmentaf pensonnel, fa created to review DEC prcgrams and policies, and make necessary 
:nt Ibid. 
2'12 44.46 AS. 
2'1:1 1 a Me Ch. 75. 
S2 
. 
recommendations to it. 214 
Alaska crohibits the discharge 01 cil into state waters except where permitted by 
regulation or internationat convention.2:15 ail discharge permits are issued only for research and 
scientific purposes.2:11 
Civil penalties for oil discharges are assessed per gallon spilled, based on the quality of 
the receiving environment, characteristics 01 the oil. and the intent of the discharger.211 The DEC 
has estabtished specific guidefiRes fer penalty assessment. zt. A statute enacted this year. 
effedive 8/10/SS. assesses additional penattles on spills of crude oil in excess of 18.000 
gallons. ZlS-avii actions may be brought by the state attomey generaf to coiled damages 8:"d 
penalties for discharges of less than lS,oeO gallons.= Oil dischargers are responsible for 
testoration of the environment ZZ1 
J Additional statutes provide for attomeys fees, injunctions, security detention of vessels. 
r criminal penalties. nuisance actions, emergency powers ofthl CEC, s1rid liability (and defenses) 
0.1 vat:ious parties. proof and requirements 01 financial responsibility. and actionable rights. zzz AU 
remedies for spills greater than 1e,ooo gallons are cumufative.= 
Oil discharged into state waters must be removed. and the DEC is directed to ceoperate 
2:1'AS 44.46.030. 
2:11 AS 46.03.740. 
211 1e Me 15.190. 
211 AS 46.03.758.. 
2:1. 18 Me 75.500 ... 600. 
2:1. AS 46.03.7=...9 • 
. 221:1 AS 46.03.760. 
Zft AS 46.03.7eo. 
%12 AS 46.03.763 ... seo. 
m AS 46.03.875. 
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he U.S. Coast Guarc and E:wironmentaJ Protection AgenC'{ in cleanup operaticns.:44 7:"':e 
is required to seek reimbursement tor its cleanup costs.225 All oil produd%on and transport 
es, including vesse' transfers. must prepare and nave ready a contingene'j response plen 
j discharges. as approved by the OEC.Z2S The DEC has promulgated regulations 
SSing the requirements of contingency plans. induding applications procedures. contents 
ements. apprcvai criteria. etc. ZZ7 
Oil facilities and vessels must provide preef of financial responsibility to the state.22I The 
,fftnancial responsibilityforvesseJ transfers ara established underfederaf statutes. i.e., the 
'Jaska Pipeline Authorization Act=' and the Clean Water Ad. ZI2 The DEC is authorized 
"nutgate regulations goveming spUl responsa "which do not ccnffid with and are not 
jted by federal law or regulations • .z:tf 
The legislature this year enacted new laws requiring the CEC to annually prepare state--
td regional master response plans. These pfans wiD identify the responsibilities of govem-
agencies and private parties in the event of a catastrophic spUI.a 
The AIUka statutes provide for an oU spill response fund and a new law establishes an 
lhazardous substance response ottIce within the DEC. = The fund is financed by 
! 
16.04 AS. 
IS 46.04.010. 
S 46.04.030. 
B Me 15.305 • ..395. 
S 46.04.040. 
J USC 16S3(c)(3). 
J USC 1321 (PH1). 
3 46.04.070. 
346.04.200-.210. 
.OS AS. 
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~ovemmental appropnations and by damages and ;::enaities recovered trom parties resccr:s:bJe 
for spills.234 The fund may be used for deanup activities. and is intended to finance the new 
response office and voiunteer corps (noted below) and the master response plans.2:lS The eEC 
must report to the legislature on fund acccunting and on the activities suppor-ed by the fund.~ 
The DEC and the attorney general must immediately seek reimbursement for spill cleanup 
costs.217 The fund may be used to reimburse municipalities. The statute authorizes liens against 
property of persons responsibfe for spills.Z'3I 
The legislature this year created an emergency response office within the DEC.2:18 The 
office will establish and coordinate a volunteer deanup corps, response depots throughout the 
state. and emergency procedures to be followed dunng spills. 
Oil spills must be reported to the DEC, and responsible parties must make reasonable 
efforts to contain and dean up spills. Under certain circumstances the DEC may waive or 
intervene in private deanup operations. Guidelines for deanup must be consistent with federal 
statutes.240 
The statutes and regulations described above comprise the major laws addressing oU 
pollution control and liability. There are, however, additionaJ statutes that bear relation to the 
subject, induding the Alaska Coastal Management Program241 and a 510 millien appropriation 
ZI& ~ 48.08.020. 
ZJS AS 48.os.Q40. 
%II AS 48.oa.oso... 
%11 AS 46.08.070. 
- AS 48.08.075-
ZII AS 46.08.100 •• 190. 
24CI 46.09 AS. 
24t 46.40 AS • 
mace this year to me oil release response tunc. :42 
Emergency response to an actual or threatened oil spill is govemed by statutes scattered 
throughout the chapters described above. In addition, the Alaska Disaster Act'4:I and the 
Oisaster and e.."ergency Relief Funds statute24o& permit the govemor to act independently in 
response to catastrcphic oil spills. 
2Q 1989 SLA. Ch. 13. 
:za 26.23 AS. 
2" 44.19 AS. 
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Analysis 
Acplying components 01 other states' managemem programs to Alaska 
The Marcn 1SSS oil spill in Prince William Sound may have been Nort."l A~erica's worst 
environmentai catastrophe, yet the oil industry remains the most important component of the 
state's economy. Can the Alaska state govemment modify its marine resource management 
plans and policies to reduce the risk of further disasters? Would incorporating specffic 
components of the marine management programs cf ether states help tc improve Alaskan 
regwaDon of coastal and effshore oil industry? 
Promotion of fecal participation 
Many cbs elVers identify locaJ participation as a criticaJly important component ef any 
ccastaI zene, marine reseurce management programs.l ... One reasen frequently dtad is that 
ICCastal residents who have participated in preparation and implementation of management 
programs win more fully support them. There is another reason as welL: in some cases, private 
citizens have shewn great commitment to the objective of adequately protecting natural 
environments. A primary impetus for initiation ef coastal planning in many states was growing 
concern for resource protectien expressed by state residents, and otten pressure from 
conservation groups: as wetL 2~ 
In the case of Prince William Sound, a particu!ar group ef local residents has proved Itself 
10 be espedaJly cornrnitted to protection of local na:turaJ resources. Commercial fishermen, 
represented fcrmaUy by the Cordova Oistrict Fisherman's United, have acUvefy· promoted strict 
regulation of oil industry actMtles for many years. "They fought the pipeline. they fought the 
terminaf and the supertanker trafflc, and they sued. time and again. to fight the practices that 
2411 Dull. 1983; Mack, 1977. 
248 8raoJey and Armstrong. 1972: Sish, 1982. 
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ailowec 40 lesser spillS and teakages into the souna over the past .i2 years",:';:-
LccaJ residents may aJso in some cases be privy to important information not available 
to agency persor-nel. Residents 01 Valdez. for example, may have been mere aware of the 
increasing probjem.01 slack supervision of tanker crews, apparently an impcr.ant immediate 
cause 01 the March spiU. than were agencies charged with monitoring vessel traffiC. A Valdez 
. City Council member repotted in a Ma.rch NationaJ Public Radio interview that Valdez residents 
had been concemed about heavy drinking by tanker crew members for some months before the 
spill. and felt that complaints made to agency representatives had not been sufficiently followed· 
Restricted opportunity for meaningful citizen participation in state resource management 
programs may in fact be a problem in Alaska. As noted above, NANA Aegion representatives 
!r.e;xmed that tocaI :residents found theft c::mments accepted too 'ate in state planning 
processes. after main pOJicjes and dlrectJons had been determined. N Incot;.lorating severa! 
pubfic particiPation components of other states' management programs may improve Alaska's 
teSC*..ace pfanning a."'Id management programs. Canfomia's Joint Review Panels and North 
CsratinaJs CRC and CRAC seam especiaDy appropriate. Some of the ccmponents of the 
·Svunniuq approaen could be added to statewide management programs as weU. 
I 
~ 
i 
~new concept for emun Participation, 
j 
I : . Lack of vigUanea by the Coast Guard in en10rdng federal safety laws ind regulations is 
aJleged to be one reaso~ for the exxON-Valdez oil sP.iD.· Such a "too-complacanr attitude ~ 
probablY, encouraged by several faeters, induding the lack of serious spillS for several years, 
.,; 
stateme~ by the oa industry about theJr high degree of care. Coast Guard budget runitations. 
arid, to some extent. the dose soCial. professional. and peer group relatlonships:betINeen Coast 
24' SIms. 1989. 
2411 Isaacs et aJ.. 1987. 
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Guaro ;:::ersonnei and AL YESKA and EXXCN employees. This sense of o::::mpiacenc'l also 
seemed to affect the relevant state agencies. j:robably for similar reasons. 
T:-:e pr=o:ems associated with reguiator /regulatee relationships are r:~: ~r:ique to the 
C-oast Guarc ar.d cH companies. They are, in fact, a typical -regufatec incu~r pnenomena. 
One of the most commended approacnes to resoMng these problems is through more active 
citizen participation. Let us explain. One 01 the best ways to assure continued vigilance by 
regulators is to integrate into the regulatory process a constituency whose interests are different, 
if not opposite, from that of the regulated industry. In the case of Alaska tINe groups come to 
mind whose long and short term interests are most often at odds with those of the oil 
companies, and of the Coast Guard. ihese are the commercial fishermen. and the 
environmentalists. If their vigilance, powered by their self interest. could be integrated into the 
decision process then the chances of creeping complacency would be reduced. At the same 
time.. !heir participation in the process should not be so great as to thwart the economic goals 
sought by the regulated industry. We suggest one way that this might occur, although other 
methods can aiso be devised. 
A citizen participation committee coufd be formed, comprised. for example of 15 
members. Three might represent the oil industry. two the state, two the federaJ government 
This wouidleave eigJ'rt members representing local govemment. commercial fishermen, and 
environmerTtal groups. Such a Committee would serve several functions, serving as a forum f!:2r 
public debate, putting federal, state, and local personnel in direct, face to face contact. and 
allowing the Committee to insist en public answers to percefved problems. 
Such a Committee woufd provide a vaJuable forum for publ10 debate and discussion of 
important oil transportation and spill risk Issues. It woufd put federal and industry otfldals into 
dIrect and personal contact with (oeaf cftfzens, fishermen, and environmentalists. groups ~fy 
interested in -;.hese issues. A continuous education process would be generated, educating the . 
partfc!pants as wefJ as the public. with important information about costs, risks, econon:ics, and 
human values affected by of) transportation and spills. 
ene problem with citizen committees generally is rna!. while they initially are effec:..;':e. 
ever time they tend to jose their impetus. Secause they have no real legal power they teno to 
be less and less heeded and sometimes ignored. unless they are somehow invoNed in the 
ac:um decision process. One way to aecemplish this in Alaska would be to ass:Jre that loea! 
citizens, fisheries and environmental groups have a majority of the votes on the committee 
(although it 'Would be hoped that decision-making by the Comm.ittee would by ·consensus· 
rather than by technical vete counting). 
The key element that would distinguish this entity from the ordjnary citizens advisory 
committee is that the committee would have specific, limited -'egale powers to participate in .the 
process. This could be acccmplished as follows: 
I 
\ 
a) The Committee would have subpoena powers. both for persons and for 
documents. These subpoena powers would extend to relevant Coast Guard 
personnel and fifes. The congressicnaJ bill creating and empowering the 
Committee could ins'trUct the Coast Guard to cooperate with the Committee in all 
Committee investigations. 
b) The meetings, deliberations, files, and entire precess of the Committee would be 
·public.· available to the press, appropriate state and federal officials and to 
congress. The experience of the San Francisco Say Conservation and 
Development Commission is instnJcdve here. VVidely divergent views were 
. . 
expresSed at the outset of the eeoc, but with public debate among all interested 
partfes, accommodation was finally achieved. 
c) The Committee could be authorized to conduct Investigations and make findIngs 
and recommendations. Jts recommendations would normally carry only poUtfcal 
weight. that Is, they would not have to be adopted by the federal or state agency, 
or by the indus1ry. with one key exception. Jf the Committee recommendation was 
not adopted then the agency would have to 'expla;n why it Wis not adQcted. In 
. . 
writing. and with fully developed reasons, all of which wouJd be availabfe to the 
so 
public. the press, the state legislature, and the CQngress. The agency answer 
would have to be published within 120 days or else the recommendations would 
automatically become binding on the agency. 
This would focus agency, industry, and public attention. on problems before they got out 
of hand. The obligation on the agency is not "overburciensome because all it need do, if it 
chooses not to implement the recommendation, is to state publldy and in writing. its reasons 
for not so doing. 
PromQtfnq state-federal working reflt!onships 
California state officials24t have noted that when state and federal agency representatives 
work together in planning programs, not only do they have a greater opportunity to share 
expertise. but such CClordination allows resolution of disputes as weD. Formal planning 
programs, such as Califomia's Joint Review Panels, with roles for both state and federal 
representatives and specific planning goals and agenda. may afford state agency members an 
opportunity to promote state positions and describe state concerns to federal decision.makers. 
CfarfMnq state pfanning and resource management obJectfyes 
. . The federal govemment, with far more resources and offshore jurisdictional authorities 
. . 
that;l any state government, etten differs with coaStar states over marine resource management 
issues. In some" cases. state or loeaf governments may not differ with fennel federal positions • 
. 
but may feel that federal poflcies are Inadequately enforced. States are then at a negotiating 
disadvantage both because of this differential in resources and power, and also because state 
. authority over marine affairs is ·constitutionally winerable-,· ambiguous in nature and scope. 
2. Kahoe, 1983. 
250 Geod and Hildreth. 1987. 
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State govemmentS. then, which are Cleariy at a negotiating disadvantage whenever POiiC"1 
differences with federal agencies exist, can most effectively promote their concems and 
recommendations when these have been most clearly defined. Two measures adopted by other 
states would most effectively help in this: (1) Oregon's mandatory CClSStal goals and (2) 
California's system of evaluating proposals for OCS actMties, especially preparation of Area 
Studies by Joint Review Panels. Oregon's goals provide an unambiguous standard for state 
and local agencies and indMduaJ dtizens to use in evaluating proposed marine activities and 
defining state positions. CalIfornia's evaluation system. with its emphasis on broad, long-term 
regional planning, need not be limited to consideration of OCS leasing decisions; it seems more 
widely useful. 
In spite of the negotiating disadvantage of the states, they still have significant areas 
which have not been preempted and where cftrect state legislation and regulation are possible. 
In Ray va. Atlantic Richfield Co. 251 the court invalidated a state law that attempted to regulate 
design characteristics of oil tankers (double hulls, etc.) but upheld a state requirement for tug 
escorts. Similarly. in Chevron VI. Hammond,- a State of Alaska attempt to prohibit discharge 
of ballast cD by oil tankers into the territorial waters of Alaska was upheld. It dJd not conflict with 
coast guard regulations and was not therefore preempted. 
The questfon pf centralizing state a!.ltttcrttv 
In the ~ of Ca!ifcmia and Florida. ~ have attempted to improve their OCS 
bargaining posiUons. viS+Vis the federal government. by conscHdating decisIon-maldng authority 
In the g~. otfJce.. In thls era of extremism in politics. this solution may be flawed if too 
much reliance Is pfaced on an administratfon's commitment to wise resource management 
Checks C!" state administration authority shouJd be retained either by mandating extensive public 
2St 435 US 151, 19'78. 
2SZ 726 F..2d 483 (19'78). 
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panic:pation as Oregon does, crbyformally incorporating crnzens and marine expens into 1=cHc,! 
making bodies such as North Carolina's CRC and CRAC or California's Joint Review Panels. 
Knowledge is power 
Oregon and Washington have been especially effective at producing studies that gather 
and analyze information about Impacts that might come from oil transportation and development. 
The series of studies were started when tha Govemors Task Foree in 1979 recommended (P' 
heightened state participation in the OCS process. This recommendation was reinforced by the 
book ·Oregon 'and Offshore Olr published in 1978. In 1987 a Legislatfvaly authorized Task 
. Force· was created and It soon produced -remtoriaI Sea Management Study" with basiC 
recommendations for state program improvements. The goal of the 1987 Task Force is to 
assure that tha state is an effective and inftuentfaJ partner with the federal agencies and to 
assure that development, when It occurs, will accrue to the benefit of the state's citizens. jn 
~ 987111e Oregon Department of Fish and Wildllfe published its -Research Plan- identifying new 
research needs. The Interim Report oftha 1987 Task Foree provides a comprehensive blueprint 
of actions recommended for preparing Oregon forfuD participation in OCS 0» and gas decisions. 
Oregonians believe the Final Report of the Task Force wiD be fofJowed by legislative 
implementation. 
Washington has similarly tumed out an Impressive array of studies in preparation for 
institutional and legal reorganization. The 1987 Washington legislature was enacted to prepare 
the state for federal oil and gas development on the OCS. Implementation was delegated to Sea 
Grant, attha University ofWashIngtan. The Ocean Resources Assessment Program (ORAP) has 
moved efficiently to produce the required studies. First came the ORAP Ac:Msory Committee 
Report. Then came: Washington State Information Priorities,· -State and Locaf fnftuence Over 
Offshore on Oedsions,· and -Toward a Conceptual Framework for GuIding Future oes 
Research.· Addltfonal studIes are now coming on Ifne.. 
The OregonfWashington approach is to study to problem carefully, then, through Task 
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Force reports. to implement recommendations by coordinated legislative and administrative 
~ctions. Both states have dearly enhanced their positions vis-a-vis the federal agencies by the 
execution of these studies identifying their own goals and policies, creating a group of -experts" 
at the state level, and raising the level of the public dialogue on these critical issues. 
The Oregon and Washington Task Forces are quite distinguishable from the Alaska Oil 
spm Commission. The Alaska Commission was created in response to a particular incident and . 
lackS the resources and the time that were provided in Oregon and Washington. Very possibly 
a more permanent. more broadJy mandated Task Force would be the next logical step in Alaska, 
to anatyze on • broader scale changes in laws, policies, and institutions that would enhance the 
state's role in oil devefopmentjtransportation/spW management. 
C(QmprehensiYt Regjona' ptanninClj A Water Quality Authgrlty 
Water quality authorities have been established ttvcughout the United States where 
important bocfies of water are surrounded by muftlple governmentaf jurisdictions. The 
Chesapeake Say Program coordinates among several states, and multiple counties and cities 
that exert some authority over the Bay. The IntemationaJ Joint Commission pfans for an 
enormously complex system of governments abutting the Great Lakes. The San Francisco Bay 
Conservation and Development Commission in California and the Puget Sound Water OuaUty 
Authority in Washington prcvicle varying measures of planning and regulatory authority for the 
waters they are charged to pratect. 
. In each of these regions, the sound. bay or lakes are a significant economic· and 
~esthetic ~urca. Conflicts occur as development pressures and attendant pollution press on 
the resource. Often 1here are dozens, if not hundreds of state and local agencies. municipafrUes. 
ports and special use d~ds each regulating use of the waters. Evan wher~ agencies want to 
regulate comprehensively, jurisdictionai restraints prevent Jl The predictable result of this 
confusing array of laws and -governments has been serious degradation of water quality and 
Significant loss of habitat. 
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The funCtion of a water quality authority is to develop goals and prierities for the waters 
it must protect. and rationally coordinate among competing agencies and uses. While state 
authorities typically do not have power over the federal agencies also governing in the regien, 
a state·federal partnership may be formed. especially where the waters have been deSignated 
an -estuary of national significance • .2D 
The AJaska legisJature should consider establishing water quality authorities for both 
Prince William Sound and Bristol Bay, the two bodies of water in Alaska most seriously at risk 
from jurisdictionaf conflicts and development pressures. While Alaskan waters do not yet suffer 
the degree of environmental decline seen in the examples cited above, establishment of pro--
active authorities with the power to plan and regutate whife growth is occurring will provide 
needed protection to state waters. This is especialJy so given the special risks posed by oil 
transport in Alaska. and the extraordinary value of the state's natural resources. Water quality 
authorities usually are established as a reactive measure, working to rectify damage already 
done; AJaska should consider taking the initiative to address the problem of jurfsdlctfonal conflld . 
before it impacts state water quality • 
Powers of water quality authorities vary depending on the extent of the jurisdiction they 
serve. Mufti-state or international authorities must be elevated to the federal levet, but an authority 
created to proted waters within a single state is committed to the discretion of that state's 
legislature. Typically a water quafity authority conducts physical and Institutional surveys of the 
region. and prepares a management plan that seeks solutions to problems using institutfons 
already in place and by proposing new systems •. when appropriate. If the study procesS Is 
thorough, the authority may be ab(e to predict and plan for future problems. Authority powers 
range from ttIe purely acMsory. to the power 10 coordinate and direct other state and local 
agencies, 10 Independent regulatory powers alrowing the authority to estabnsh its own prc~rams. 
Citize~ business, and govemmental input to the planning process Is vital. 
2S! 33 USC §133O. 
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Oil Scill Contingency Planning 
Oil spills are inevitable, and experience teaches that contingency planS tor response to 
spills are notinfallible.2So' The crux of the problem is in preparing plans that are workable and 
effective. There are severaJ approaches to this problem. 
Alaska has a solid foundation fer effective contingency planning in two areas. First, 
petroleum facilities and transport vessels are required to maintain contingency plans for their 
.operations.Z55 While this is a logical requirement, onty cautomia. of the five states surveyed, also 
requires specific contingency plans of industry. 
Second. the AJaska legislature thls summer enacted laws to create statewide and regional 
contingency plans, and establish an emergency response office to administer the plans. Z5I This 
type of contingency planning. which identifies and coordinates the institutionm mechanisms fer. 
emergency response, is a more common practice found in all of the five survey states. 
However, simply requiring plans is not enough; the plans must be responsive, action-
oriented documents that wm be usefut during a spiU emergency. The key is familiarity with plans 
before they are needed. To this end, the legislature should provide the Cepartment of 
EnW'oM\8ntai Conservation (CEC) with the authority to r8q~ practice driUs of industry 
contingency plans. 
In califomia. industry plans must be tested before approval. In addition, agencies have 
au:hority to requite practice arms at any time. The California Coastal Commission regularly 
exercises that authorItY, and has learned that there are many laws that are undiscoverable until 
a contingency plan is put to the test. -
At the statewide plan level, the U.S. Coast Guard has developed an emergency response. 
~ . 
2SC See Townsend & Burr, The exxon·Valdez Spill: A Management Analysis, 1989, Center 
for Marine Conservation. 
25! 46.04.030. 
251 AS 40.04.200 - .210. 
~ Baird. 1989. 
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crill that tests Regional Response Teams and contingency plans, incorporating stare 
organiZational response as well. This drill, ·called the Yorktown exercise, is cited as an excellent 
test of state and 1ederal response capabilities.Z!I As the DEC develops the state and regional 
response master plans, it should ensure that they are tested under the Yorktown program. 
A second area where the legislature can encourage development of effective contingenc'! 
plans is through private citizen involvement The Islands Oil Spill Association of the San Juan 
tsfands in Washington is merely a group of individuals with a deep concern for their environment, "',e' 
a lot of initiative, and a government grant. Knowing that if and when an oil spill occurs, private 
citizens will probably be the first ones on hand to deal with it, their oil spill contingency plan is 
a resourcefut effort to be prepared for that eventuaJity. 
Alaska citizens are no less invested in their environment The Jegistature should consider 
a program to involve citizens in its regional planning efforts. The DEC could provide resources "'" 
ranging from a model plan. to money, to equipment and training. Given the complexity and 
remoteness of the Alaska coastline. citizen preparedness may be the key to timiting damage co 
during a spill. 
The fact of the complexity of Alaska waters is another important problem in contingency 
planning. Charting environmentally sensitive areas and developing site-specific containment 
procedures is a common element In response plans. But given the length and general sensitivity 
of the state coastline. such a task becomes Hercufean. The state of Oregon has determined that 
effective contingency pfanning will require use of a computer generated geographic information 
system. (GIS). GIS's are under development a,t many universities, and although iriitiaJJy 
expensive, provide remarkable lIexibility for land use and other planning efforts. Early GIS's were 
deveJoped for petroreum exploration purposes. The fegisfature should· direct the DEC to 
coordinate its contingency planning efforts with any Maska GIS work being conducted at state 
schools or elsewhere. Such computer-based information systems may be the only way to 
2!51 Baird. Wiggins. 
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manageaoly plan for the AJaska coastline. In addWon, well-doc:.Jrnented COastal c..,ans will ass is. 
in damage assessment. which turns in part on how sensitive a damaged area is.2!S 
Finally. the legislature has the power to regulate the petroleum industry. and that includes 
the power to tax. on extraction is considered a partnership between the petroleum industry and 
the people of Alaska. Planning for the eventuality of an oil spill has become an increasingly 
sophisticated, expensive, and absolutely vital part of government services. Where appropriate, 
as with industry pfan drills, or provision of equipment and training to remote areas 01 the state. 
the legislature can exercise its authority to require industry to pay its way, a price that is no more 
than the cost of the privilege of doing business in the state. 
Z5I AS 45.03.758, 18 AAC 75.510· .530. 
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nus deceptively simple provision is, on its face, rather limited in its gTant of power to 
petitioners. It possesses, however, a very practical potential for seizing the initiative 
from inert federal agencies and catalyzing federal rulemaking action. It 
straightforwardly sets in motion a progression of administrative procedures for 
putting particular provisions into federal regulations, with distinct tactical and 
political advantages, backed up by the opportunity for direct oversight by a federal 
court. 
Normal avenues for attempting to induce federal action (appeals to Members of 
Congress, political inquiries to the administration, less formal approaches to agencies, 
media campaigns, etc.) all have their place, but are relatively unwieldy, indirect. and 
unfocused. The S53(e) route is a direct line, and may offer Alaska more bang for its 
buck. 
rroccdm and Ptos.pccts: 
Who can petition for a rulemaking? 
Anyone-who arguably has an interest in an area of regulation may petition under 
S33(e). The standing requirement that has to be fulfilled is not very restrictive. The 
ph.raseW"mterested person" has been interpreted to be far broader than the standing 
requirement in judicial actions. It appears that any person whose "interests are or 
:wiD be e£fectecl·by the issuance amendment or repeal of a rule" can use 5S3(e), and 
that is a very broad definition indeed'! The State of Alaska clearly has ~e required 
interest in any imaginable area of policy proposal. 
Although any'interested person may petition, it is realistic to note that the more 
substantial the petitioning party, the more likely the agency is to grant it fullest 
consideration. Ii a sovereign state makes a well-publidzed petition to a federal 
agency, it is far more likely that the agency will immediately publish notice of the 
petition in the Federal Register and open a record for conunents, and hold hearings, 
whether formal or informal. The political momentw::n of the petitioner adds to the 
~usness with which S53(e} is considered by the agency, at the same time that SS3(e) 
adds !ocus and power to the petitioner's request. -
'Who' &ets P!titioned? 
A S53(e) petition is directed to any agency which has statutory authority to promulgate 
the kind of n!guIation being proposed. As to oil spill issues, a variety of agendes 
might be petitioned: the US. Department of Interior on pipeline corridor and 
terminal land management, and the like; the Coast Guard on double-hulling, crew-
size, navigation practices, required response equipment; the Department of 
Commerce on certain transport issues; etc. There is no set form in which petitions 
proposing rule-making must be made, although a number of agendes have set Qut 
1 AHomey--General's Manual on the Administrative Procedures Act, 38 (1947). 
~ 
1 
\ 
I 
1 
I 
I j 
suggested formats in the Federal Register. See Administrative Conference of the 
United States Recommendations and Reports 493, (1986) 1 CFR 305.86-6 (1987). 
The petition fOT'rulemakins-
A request under 553(e) can probably be made in oral as well as in 'Written form; it 
might in fact be submitted as just a broad undefined request "that a rule on so-and-
be enacted." 
Realistically, however, a SS3(e) petition should not only be in writing; it should aIs< 
set out an ac:tua1 proposed text for regulatory adoption in the exact form in which it 
could be published in the Federal Register. The drafting of language clarifies issues, 
pins down a rule's structure and language, advances the review proc~ss, and 
mobilizes momentum in a way that general policy exhortations would not. Even iI 
the proposed text gets amended and reworded in the agency process, its initial 
existence gets serious attention focussed and tends to shape the fmal product. 
A proposal for rulemaking can be substantive or procedural, that is, it can request fr 
an agency apply a new substantive standard to matters it regulates, or it may propo51 
changes for the internal working of the agency or its external procedures for workin 
with regulated parties. 
Agency consideration 
When a petition is directed to a regulatory agency that possesses statutory power in c 
field and 553(e) is cited, the specific proposal for rulema.king triggers a much more 
direct administrative process that substantially increases the chances of serious 
considerations of the proposal. 
When an agency receives a petition, it may make a variety of responses: it may 
summarily deny the petition, it may publish notice to the public of the petition, 
request public comments, hold a hearing formally or informally, fold the proposal fc 
~~g into ongoing rulemaldng procedures, file a notice of proposed 
rulemaki.ng (NPR.:M), or go right ahead to issue a final rule in cases where that is 
statutorily possible. 
Once the agency receives a proposal for rulemaking under 553(e) it must consider it. 
It cannot just receive it pro forma arid fail to react to it. (See APA legislative history, .w 
79th Cong., lei Session, Sen.. Document 248, 359.) 
The agency must act reasonably promptly: under the terms of APA section 555(b), an 
agency is required to "proceed to conclude a matter presented to it ... within a 
reasonable time". Agencies understandably are often not pleased to have to change 
their agendas or move on issues which they ~ad previously been passive about. 
When they stall a petition, a court can step in an order them to make a p.rompt 
decision denying or granting the petition proposal. In one case, administrative 
inaction of eight months produced a federal court injunction against the agenc:y.2 
Summary denial 
An agency's "consideration" can be quite summary in nature, if circumstances permit 
especially where the agency is inclined to resist the initiative. There is no statutory 
requirement that the agency investigate the matter beyond the particulars of whateveI 
the petition presented; that is, an agency which believes that a petition is not 
supported by sufficient obvious evidence can s1lll'UNlrily deny it The point is, 
however, that if Alaska accompanies its proposal for rulemaking with extensive 
evidentiary support, then the agency cannot summarily dismiss it, and must 
investigate so much of the evidence as is presented. Obviously, even if an agency 
doesn't wish to do so, the ever-present availability of judidal review will make an 
agency go through all supporting documentation presented with a petition. 
An Ageru:ys need to sumzort its decision. 
The strategic leverage upon the agency comes from the AP A's §m(e) legal 
requ.irements loran agency to justify its decisions: 
"prompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of a 
written application [or] petition .... Except in a.ffirming a prior denial or 
when the denial is self-explanatory, the notice shall be accompanied by a 
brief state;nent of the grounds for denial. • 
The case law under 555(e), incorporating the Supreme Court's decision in the 
Vermont Yankee case, 435lJS. 519,549(1978), establishes that a court will review with 
some particularity whether or not the agencys decision was reasonable, based on the 
,evidence on the recomof the petition. Where an agency decision appears to the court 
to be arbitrary and capric:ious1 the court can annul the agency denial as unreasonable. 
See 6S3 Fed. Su,pp. 1229(DC 1985). In a very few cases courts have been so impressed 
with the merits of the proposal that instead of sending it back to the agency for 
:teCQ1i.sid~on, they have directly required. the agency to put the rule into effect (Id.) 
MOre commonly, the court that finds an agency's decision to be insufficiently 
supported by facts and reason can remand it to the agency demanding an "adequate" 
explanation for the petition's denial See State Farm Mutual. 463 US. 29,43, 4S-46 
(1983). To support its dedsion, whether denial or otherwise, an agency must be able to 
show a reasonable basis for the decision. This means that from the moment it 
receives a nonfrivolous petition under 553(e) an agency must be sure to "build a 
record," by at least opening a file on it. Where the petitioner has supplied supportive 
documentation, the file must contain analysis of its merits. 
2 Public Citizen v. Hedder 602 F. Supp. 611(DOC 1985). 
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Further agency procedure. 
Faced with a serious petition that cannot be summarily denied, an agency must m 
to further procedures. 
The agency may, of course, decide ta proceed to enact the proposed rule. The 
procedure in this case follows two different avenues: 
If the rule is purely procedural, without direct impact on regulated parties or the 
public (being merely ttinterpretative,· a general "statement of policy," or setting au 
intema.l rules of agency organization, procedure or practice § 553(b}(3)(A}), or wher· 
practicality and public necessity require immediate a~on (§ 553(b)(3)(B», then the 
agency can just go ahead and publish it by a notice of Fsnal Rulemaking (l\i~), i: 
the Feder~ Register, and that's the end of the process. 
If the rule is substantive, as most petitioned rules will be, {and not an emergency n 
under (b)(3)(B», then the agency that wants to enact it must publish a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaldng (NPRM) in the Federal Register setting out a timeline for 
comments to be received. The agency may also voluntarily schedule formal or 
informal public hearings. Formal hearings, whether voluntary or required by statu 
(as they are in. some areas,) involve an elaborate trial-type procedure, involving ere 
examination by all parties, a full stenographic record, etc. (§§ 556, 557). After the 
comment period or formal hearing, the agency must prepare its responsive 
comments and then publish them along with the final rule in the Register. At that 
point the 553(e) petition has directly accomplished what it sought.3 
If the agency doesn't want to enact the rule, or is not enthusiastic, receipt of a seriou 
553(e) petition still requires it to assign staff to analyze the merits. But once that stet 
is taken, most agencies decide to give notice to other interested parties that the 
petition has been received, by publishing notice in the Federal Register or otherwise 
Even in the case of reluctant agencies, a comment period or even a hearing process 
may be established. 
Again it should be noted that where the 553Ce) petitioner is a state government, (anel 
even moreso if there has been a weil·publidzed media presence,) even hesitant 
agencies will tend to provide more process, which means that more of the merits art 
developed for review on the record. The more ments that are developed (if they are 
accurate and compelling,) the more constrained the agency will be to go along with 
those merits. Thus 553(e) initiates a process of ruIemaking momentum. 
3 It should be noted that some agencies have further procedural constraints 
imposed on them by their specific organic statutes, or by Executive Orders No. 12,291 
and 12,498, by which the Reagan Administration tried to control rulema.ldng. (It is 
not clear to what degree subsequent administrations will try to enferce those orders) . 
The Catalyst: Tudicial Review 
.Agencies will respond to petitions filed under 553(e) because the failure to respond 
has real consequences to the agency. The ready availability of judicial review is the 
tail that wags the agency dog in applying 553{e), (and S5S(e», especially when an 
agency inclines tOward denying the petition. 
Judicial review, of course, does require some initial steps. Anyone who will challenge 
the agency's denial must first of all show judidal "standing", an Article m case or 
controversy injury, although the very fact of having petitioned the agency and been 
denied may help elevate a person's interest to that level. Alaska's interest, backed by 
the public trust doctrine and "parens patriae" interests, is quite clearly sufficient for 
judidal review standing. 
The .gency decision must be "ripe for review," although a denial of a petition 
automatically satisfies this, and in some cases even where the agency has not issued a 
fon:nal denial, courts are willing to say that when action has been substantially 
delayed it effectively becomes a denial. ' 
The major potential judicial review problem lies with with "reviewability", in 
that courts have regularly said that the decision whether to take administrative action 
lies within the disaetion of the agency, and there is a presumption against broad 
reviewability of such decisions. In cases involving Section SS3(e) and Section SSS{e), 
however, courts have seemed willing to enter into the review of agency action with 
the purpose of enforcing the policy goals of the Administrative Procedure Act. 4 In a 
recent case, American Horse Protection Association. 812 Fed. 2d 1 (D.C Circuit 1987), 
the Court undertook a particularized review to determined 'whether or not the agency 
had a taken a "hard look" at the proposal, reviewed the evidence presented by the 
petitioner in favor of the rule and the materials presented by the agency to explain 
why they had not promulgated the rule, and the Court decided that the agency's 
denial was "unreasonable" and "arbitrary and capridous," sending it back to the 
agency for reconsideration. The AP A's Section 706 provides for courts' review of 
"abuses of discretion." The Horse Protection case indicates that judicial review is 
realistically available and potentially effective. 
"See cases and materials analyzed in Luneburg, 88 WISconsin Law Rev. 1, 53-58(1988). 
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Summit)":: 
The AP A's Section 553(e) holds real potential for Alaska, enabling the State to pe 
directly for federal rulemaking on particular regulatory recommendations. Whe: 
the State, as a substantial petitioner, is well-prepared, drafts a specific text for a ruJ 
backs it up with documentation, and follows through, the 553(e) avenue shifts th 
tactical and procedural balance, enhancing the possibilities for putting a particula: 
rule on the books, thereby mobilizing desired applications of federal regulatory 
power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
. In the wnnath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster. States arc reexamining their legal 
and institutional S1rllctu::res for preventing and responding to oil spills in marine and coastal waters. 
In particular. the question has arisen to what extent existing fedcrallaws and regulations constrain 
the scope of State statutory and regulatory measures to improve oil spill prevention and response 
activities of oil tankers, marine t:rmina1s, and government agencies. A general answer to this 
question is that the States have considerable awhority to enact tough controls and to require effec-
tive contingency mangements. These standards mUSt be designed, however, recognizing the 
szrong possibility that oil shippers will challenge these enacunents as preempted by federal law. 
The federal preemption doc:aine. as courts have developed it in the field of oil spill preven-
tion and response. docs not pose a si&nificant barrier to most requirements that a State is likely to 
want to implemenL There are some clear limitations on what the StateS may enact, but dlese are in 
a very nmow area of regulation. The federal courts and the Congress have recognized the exten-
sive authority of StateS under their poljce power and public trust responsibilities to proteCt the 
resomces of their coastal regions. 
To clarify the effect the preemption doctrine has on State law il is necessary to consider 
two major oil pollution control decisions of the U.s. Supr=me Court. It is also instrUCtive to 
examine the federal court review of the State of Alaska'. comprehensive oll spill prevention legis-
lation. enacted in contemplatioD of the extensive crude oil shipments from the the Valdez terminus 
of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. The bases for the court's invalidation of many of the law's provi-
sions 'Will be considered to for its possible influence on future enactments of the State. F'maIly, the 
legislation under considera.tion in California. whose portS receive crude oil shipmentS from the " 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline. will be discussed, as a possible guide to the design of other State enact·" 
ments. 
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Under existing federal statutes, as interpreted in Supreme Coun decisions in the 1970s. the 
Swc is precluded from the direct imposition of oil tanker design and construction Stand.ards. such 
as double hulls and segJegated bal.last tanks. as well as requirements for specific navigational 
equipmcnL The Swc is also precluded from adopting vessel uafiic control systems that go 
beyond what federal authorities have consciously concluded are needed for a particular porc. The 
State has greater latitude. however. in the field of oil spill contingency planning and the require· 
ment of containment equipment and preparedness. The overlap between these twO regulatory· 
domains may cause to uncertainty with respect to a particular measure. The intersection of W1ker 
desipand .cquipment Standards and spill contingency planning could take the fom of a require-
- ment of specific. on-board containment equipment and ccn:ifica1ion of aew training in the usc of 
mc~pumuu1t CD a contingency plaD.. Sach ~ rcquimnenu are likely to be upheld u 
long as they do not contlict with fcdc:ral requirements. -Coa.flict" in this instance means the srate 
requirement makes it impossible to meet the feCcnt standazd.. 
One of the t.W'0 major court d.eci.sions from which these parameters are drawn. Ray L 
. Adantic .RiclWeid ~ in which .several provisions of the Washingmn Tanker Act wen: invalidat-
ed 1IIIderthe ~pdon 4octriD.c. would probably be decided differendy today_ A number of 
facmal circumstances now exist that would support a court ruling that looked. more favorably upon 
eoncm:rent swe regulatory j~n in the field of aU spill prevention regulation. Just one 
indication that federal policy has shifted in favor of Swe power is me 1987 Execwive Order. 
signed by President Reagan. that calls upon federal apncics to cxe:cisc their authority in a manner 
that does not inte:rfete with the authority of the StaleS over maacrs of critical imponancc to them. 
Also. federal law is chanJi,ng with respect to oil spill prevention and liability. Since mach 
of the recent debate in Congress bas centered amundtbc question of state authority. and since non-
preemption.of state liabUity law seems a likely outcome. the new fedeIal oll pollution legis.1ation 
could reflect a different intent in Congress. one that is more favorably inclined toward state regula-
tion. one that would supplant the preemptive intent that was found in Rax. 
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The pending federal oil pollution legislation includes specific provisions concerning vessel 
and terminal operations in Prince William Sound. It is possible, therefore, that the enumeration of 
federal protective standards specific to Prince William Sound will preclude the adoption of state 
regulations imposing different Standards if those pose a conflict. If the federal provisions are 
enacted it will be JlCceswy to aaalyze each one to dete:rmine if any actUal conflict betweeen 
federal and state law exists. An analysis favorable to state regulation would be aided by any 
language in the staatte or in committee repons or floor debate supporting broad s_ regulatory 
authority. 
Given the unc:mainty with respect to the "preemption-sensitivity" of any particular new 
requirement or institutional arrangement and the l.ik:elihood that courts will view recent events as 
demonstrating the need for the stron;est and most effective oversight of oil shipment activities, it 
is recommended that the State proceed. as the State of California is doing. with the drafting of a 
comprehensive system of spill prevention and response control mechanisms without constraint 
under fear of federal preemption. Those areas of the recommended new control system that fall 
within the exclusive federal domain can be pursued through a multi-state strategy of legislative 
lobbying and admin.ist:rar:ive agency petitioning for significant improvements in Coast Guard 
regulatory conrrob and surveillance to complement a stronger. more vig:i.lant system of SLate risk 
reduction and monitoring. 
ANAL YSIS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Basic Principles 
The doctrine of federal preemption is based upon the suprem~ clause of Article VI of the 
U.S. Constitution which states that the Constitution and the laws enacted pursuant to it, as well as 
treaties made by the U.S •• are the supreme law of the land. Thus, laws enacted by the CC?ngress 
pursuant to one of its constitutionally delegated powers, such as the commerce power. take prece-
dent over state law. 
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The basic criteria for federal preemption have been summarized by the Supreme Coun in 
the following tcmls: 
[S]wc law can be pre-empted in either of two 
general ways. If Congress evidences an intent 
to occupy a given .field.. any state law falling 
within that field is pre-empted.. If Congress 
bas DOt entirely displaced state regulation over 
the matter in question. state law is still pre-
empted to the extent it acmally conflicts with 
federal law, that is. when it is impossible to 
comply with both swe and federallawt or where 
the state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplisbment of the full purposes of Congress. 
Silkwood L Ken--MeGee ~ 464 U.s. 238 
(l984)(ci.wions omitted). 
In addition to the above. there is a WJd form of preemption wherein Conpss includes 
:language in a federal statute makin, it clear that Stare law on a parric:u.1ar topic is prohibit=. The 
three forms of federal preemption may be described as (1) express preemption wbc= Congress 
spells out its intention to preclude S'I:Ite law, (2) implied preemption whera congressional intent to 
preempt is made evident by its enactment of a comprehensive scheme of federal reJUlarion that 
lcave.sno room for state law on the same subject (so-ca.lled floccuparion of the fieldj, and (3) 
«wjlietpreem¢on that occurs because the st:ate law poses an acrual conflict with fcde:tallaw or 
regulation or stands IS an obstacle to accomplishment of federal objectives. Tribe. American 
Constitutional Law (2d. 1988) at 481, n.14. Frequently Congress includes language in a S13.ttltc 
that is ambiguous O'! which only pa:n:iaIly addmses the question of c~t S'I:Ite jurisdiction. 
Thus. preemption analysis must tab place on a "case-by-ca.se basis, looking at the entire statUte 
and comparing it against specific provisions of swe law to determine whether any fatal conflict 
exist!. It is also necessary to look at reguladons enacted pursuant to the federal statute to find if 
any actual conflict exists. 
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B. The Supreme Court Decisions or 1973 and 1978 
The U.S. Supreme Court a.ddressed the preemption of state law to prevent oil spills in two 
major cases in the 1970s: Askew ~ American Waterways Operators. Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973), 
considering state oil spill liability and clean-up laws in light of the Federal Water Pollution Con-
wI Act of 1970. and Ray!:. Atlantic Richfield Co .• 435 U.s. lSI (1978). addressing state oil 
t.ankerregulation and the federal Pons and WaterWays SafelY Act of 1972. (The Rav decision was 
responsible in large pan for the federal district counts invalidation of the 1976 Alaska oil spill 
legislation which is discussed in Subpart B below.) A comparison of the two decisions indicates 
that the ouzeome of the preemption analysis depends upon the strucmre, comprehensiveness. and 
~cific lanjuage of me federal statute. The court's consideration of these faacrs is likely to be 
influenced by its view of the nature of the problem the laws address and the comparative institu-
lional capacities of federal and state authorities. Since these conditions have changed since the 
19705 it is likely that a 1990s preemption analysis would reflect current realities. including the 
poor federal perl'ormance to date and the poor prospecu for its improvement given budget and 
other instirutionallimitations. and could lean more favorably toward state protective regulation. 
In Askew, the Supreme Court found the federal water pollution statute to reflect an intent 
:by Congress that a coordinated federal-state effort be employed to combat the threat of coastal oil 
spills. The Florida Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act of 1970 imposed strict and 
unlimited liability for any private or state damages incurred as a result of an oil spill'in Florida 
waters. The Act also authorized the Florida Department of N at'Ilr3l. Resources to enact regulations 
requiring marine terminals and oil tankers to maintain oil spill containment gear and equipment to 
prevent oU spills. Shonly before the Florida law was enacted, the Congress adopted the WafJ!r 
Quality Improvement ACE of 1970 (a predecessor to the Federal Water Pollution ContrOl Act of 
1972, now commonly refen:ed to as the Oean Water Act. 33 U.S.c. 1251 .. 1356). The 1970 feder-
allaw included a provision (now at 33 U.S.C. 1321) imposing strict but limited liability on marine 
tenninal facilities and vessel operatOrS for federal clean-up costs (up to 514 million and 58 million, 
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re.spectivcly}. It also authorizcdthePresident to promulgaa: p:gul.ations requiring u:nninal facili-
ties and vessels to maintain spill prevention equipment. 
The Supreme Coun rejected the oil shippers' claim. that the Florida Act was preempted by 
the federal provision. noting that the fedcrallaw was conCerned solely with the recovety of acma1. 
federal clean·up costs, nOl damages to other panics. Writing far a unanimous Coun.lustice 
Douglas foamd the federal act to contain a waiver of pmemption in the following language. which 
is still present in the fedefal oil spill continl=CY planning and liability provisions of the Clean 
Wattr Act (secq.on 1321(0); bills pending belate Congress this session would. however. alter this 
provision): 
(1) Nothinl in this section shall affect or . 
modify in any way the obligations of any owner 
or operaror of any vessel. or of any owner or 
operator of any onshore facility or offshore 
facility to any person or agency undc=r any 
provision of law for damages to any publicly-
owned or privatz:ly-owned propcny resulting from 
a discharge of any oil or from the removal of 
any such oil. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be coa.rcrued 
as preempting any Swe or political subdivision 
thereof from imposinl any requirement or liabil-
ity with respect to the discharge of oil info 
any waters within such Stare. 
(3) Nothing in this section sbaIl be 
constnlcd _. to affect any Swe or local law 
not in conflict with this Section (emphasis 
added). 
. . 
1ustice Douglas found that the Act's directive that the President prepare a National Con-
. . 
tingency Plan for 1he containment. dispersal. and removal of oil. contemplates cooperative actions 
with the staleS. Other evidence of inlended swe-fedcral cooperation is found throughout the stat-
ute. In his view ~ language in sccdon (0)(2). quoted above, was included because "the scheme 
. 
of the Act is one which allows- though it does not requirc- cooperation of the fcdcraI resime 
with a state regime. If Florida wants to take the lead in cieamng up oil spillage in her w~, she 
can use .•• the [Florida] Act and recoup her COSt from those who did the damage. _ It is sufficient 
for this day to hold that there is room for state action in cleaning up the waters of a State and 
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recouping, at least within federal limits. so far as vessels are concerned. her costs •••• If the coordi-
nated federal plan in acmal operation leaves the State of Florida to do the cleanup work. there 
might be financial burdens imposed greater than would have been imposed had the Federal 
Government.acmally done the cleanup work. But it will be time to resolve any such conflict 
between federal and stu&: regimes when it arises." 411 U.S. at 332. 336. 
W"uh Jespect to Florida's ability to require sPecific conrainment gear of vessels and termi-
nal facilities througb regulations, Iustice Douglas found that me Presidential authority to impose 
similar requirements did not strip the State of its spill prevention regulatory power, abSent any 
specific con:flict between federal. and state requirements. The subject of oU spill prevention was 
not one in which unifonn federal sta.ndards were reqi.Lircd. Any finding of preemption would have 
It) aW&it a n:viewing comt's 6nding of a serious conflict between a spceific Florida regulation and 
Coast Guard regulations promulgated under the federal statUte. (These regula.tions, 33 c.F.R. 
Clapter L subchapter 0, had been promulgated only a few months befme the Coun's decision, 
dms dlc ilsueof any acmal conflict between State and. federal spill prevention regulations had not 
been litigaIed.) 
Justice Douglas also found no m & conflict between applicable federal legislation and 
'florida's .requirement of terminal facility licenses. The federal \\'ater pollution SWUte clearly 
contemplated swe licensing, which the 1ustice referred. to as "a traditional swe concern. " by 
requiring state r:enificar:ton of consistency with swe water quality standards befCR issuance of 
federal discha:je licenses.. Moreover, Congress has recently enacted me Ports and WaterWays 
Safety Act of 1m Title I of which explicidy provided that the States were not precluded from 
prescribing for "suucmrcs" higher safety equipment requirements or safety stand.a:ds. 33 U.S.c. 
1222(b}. 'While. not elaborating on the meaning of this provision. Justice Douglas took it as sup-
porting evidence of congressional intent to allow state regulation of marine terminal facilities to 
prevent oU spills. It is very likely that the Coun was influenced by the limited scope of the federal 
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regulatOry scheme under the federal statute. It was probably reluctant to crearc a significant Ie gal 
vacuum by finding state regulation in the same field to be preempted. Tribe,!!m!!. at 497. citing 
Askew at 336-37. 
The florida. and federal stamrcs were enacted in 1970 in response to the growing threat of 
oil spill damage to the marine and coastal environments. Recent cawttophic oil spills such as the 
Torrev Canvon disaster and the tremendous grow in oil tanker shipments and· the advent of super-
tankers prompted theirenactment. The Swe of Washington's Tanker Act was passed in 1975. in 
response to these as weD as factors peculiar to the region. Canada had just I.lHlOtulced that crude 
oil shipments to oil refineries along the Paget Sound would be curtailed. The State of Washington 
expected to replace these shipments with deliveries of North Slope crude oil through tankers 
loaded at the Trans-Alaska Pipeline terminal in Valdez.. Alaska. Concerned about the devast.a.ring 
effect that a tanker accident and spDl would have on the productive and fragile waterS of Paget . 
Sound, the State adopted a number of direct and indirect controls on the size. design. equipment. 
and operation of oil tankers. 
The Washington law was challenged on the day it lOOk effect by the owners of one of the 
Puget Sound refineries.. They were joined by a major tank vessel owner and shipbuilder. The 
plaintiffs claimed the entire stanlte was preempted by the PortS and Waterways Safety Act of 
1972, another law enact:d at least paniaUy in response to the Nonh Slope oil discoveries. A 
three-judge federal district court agreed and found the law to be completely preempted. On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court affimled me lower court ruling in part and reversed it in pan, upholding 
certain previsions of the state law. In Ray!:. Atlantic Richfield ~ the Sapreme Court found 
Congress· enactment of the 1972 law to signify an intent to establish uniform national standards . 
for the design and consrruction, maintenance. and operation of oil tankers to ~ vessel saf~ty 
and to protect the marine environment, thus preempting more saingent state requirements. See 
Tribe. ~ 11486-487. It is from this ruling thll the principal indices of federal preemption of 
state tanlcer contrOls are drawn. 
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The preemptive effect of the 1912 federa1law varied with respect to the four major provi~ 
sions of the WashingtOn law: the requirement of a swc-licensed pilot for all federally enrolled 
and licensed tankers over 50,000 DWT navigating in Puger Sound. the outright ban of supertank-
ers (over 125.000 DW1J from transiting the Sound. the imposition of vessel design. construction. 
and navigational equipment standanis on tankers between 40,000 and 125,000 DWI". and the 
provisiOD of an alternative rug escort requirement for vessels Dot meeting these standards_ Each 
was considered separately as they implicated different provisions of fedcrallaw and therefore 
. 
raised individual questions of congressional intent. 
"The swe-Iicensed pilot provision was dealt with easily, as the Coun was able to find in the 
federal enrollment and licensing laws clear evidence of con~ssional intent with respect to state 
pilotage. While the federal law did Dot completely preclude st.ale pilotage laws, it did expressly 
pchibU·staIIe pilotage laws for vessels enrolled in the c:oa.st'Wise trade (interstate shipping). 46 
U.S_c. section 21S. 'lb.e Coun held. however. that federal law left swes free to impose pilotage 
'requirementS onforeip trade vessels dw enter and leave their pons. Washingwn could therefore 
require "registered" as.nkers larger than 50,000 DWT to employ a state-licensed pilot while in 
PeFt·Somd. 
the ,'S;~':~:rtmkersdety 'Standards presented a much more difficult questions of congres-
sional intent. The relevant federal law. ntle :a of the Pons and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA), 
contains no express Ia.n.guage regarding pennissible state law. In ntle ]I Congress requin:d the 
. 
Coast Guard to promulpte marllle environmental proteCtion regulations specifying standards for 
. . 
maneuverability and stopping that would reduce the risk of Collisions, groundings, and other 
accidcntstflat could. lead to an oil spill These regulations 'W'Cl'C also expected to reduce oU pollu-
tion resulting from normal operations, such as ballasting. deballa.stin~ and cargo handling. 46 
U.s_c. 391a(7)(A).. Vessel inspections and eenifica.tes of compliance would indicate that a panic. 
War vessel complied with applicable design and constl'UCtionstandards and that its crew ~as quali· 
fied to handle oil as cargo. ~ section 391a(9). 
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The WashingtOn Tanker Law required tankers between 40.000 and 125.000 D\VT navigat-
ing in Paget Sound to have certain "standard safcty fcalmes," including a pa:nic:ular s.baft horse. 
power to dead weight tonnage ratio (1 to 2.5). twin propeller screws, double bouoms beneath all 
~il cargo compartments. two operating radars (one being a collision avoidance system). and other 
navigational position location systems as required by the State board of pilotage commissioners. 
These stan.dards were not required of vessels while in ballast or while escorted by a rug vessel or 
vessels with a combined shaft horsepower equivalent to five per cent of the tanker's dead weight 
tonnage. These design features were man: stringent than those under federal regulations. 
The Supreme Court ruled that these tank:r design and equipment provisions were pre. 
cmpted.. The Court found in TItle n a statutory pattern that revealed a con,ressional intent to 
entrust ta thc Secretary of Transponation the duty to determine which design characteristics render 
oil tankers suffic:icndy safe to be allowed to proceed in me navigable waters of the United States. 
That thcS~ alone was to make the risk assessment judgment was evident to the Coon, as it . 
Con,ress inu:ndcd uniform national sWlda:ds far 
[tanker] design and construction ._ that would 
foreclose the imposition of different ar more 
Slringent state requirements •••• Congress did 
not anticipate that a vessel found to be in 
compliance with the Seaetary's design and 
consaucti.on regulations and holding a Scc:re-
wy's permit. arits equivalent, to cmy the 
relevant cargo would nevertheless be balrcd by 
st.ale law from ope:ra.ring in the navigable 
waters of the Unhed States on the ground d:w 
its design characu:ristics CODStiWte an undue 
. ha:zarcL_ •. The Supremacy Oa.usc dictates that 
the federal judgment that a vessel i! safe 'CO 
uvigate U.s. waters prevail over [any] conttal)' 
stlIle judgment. 
435 U.s; at 163-164.165. 
To square its holding under rule n with Court decisions made prior to enactment of the 
PWS~ the Court concluded that State and local governments ma~ enforce local laws against 
federally licensed or inspected vessels only if they are aimed at objectives that differ from those 
embodied in the fede:allaw. A5 TItle n was aimed at tanker vessel safety and environmental 
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protection. states may not, at least directly. mandate different or higher unker design require-
ments. Can they impose them indirectly by n:quiring tankers not meeting the standards to be 
escorted by rugs? This question made it necessary for the Court to examine me congressional 
intent behind Tule I of the PWSA concerning vessel ttaffic controls and pan safety. 
ibC Tegulation of vessel traffic and pan. controls has been delepted less exclusively to the 
fcdcra1 government than has tanker dcsip and construction. The Court found the language and 
structure ofTulc I to evince a mach Jess preemptive effect on state law. Tule I gives the Secretary 
of Tl'I.llSpOlWiOD the discretionaxy authority EO adopt vessel traffic systems (VTS) for particular 
U.s. portS for preventing damage to vessels. structures (a term not defined. in the Act but most 
likely meaning bridg'es. piers. roadsteads. and other harbor installations). and shore areas. as well 
as prevent poUutiOD of navigable waters and marine resources. Under a VTS. the Coast Goard 
o:xumIs.1IIeiSICl a£6c durislg periods of congestion and hazardous conditions by specifying vessel 
movement limes, size and speed limitations. vessel operating conditions. navigational equipment. 
and minimum safety equipment. 
. The Supreme Court viewed WashingtOn's tug escort provision not as a desip requirement 
'"""j but ODe "marc ai::iim to an operating rule arising from the peculiarities of local waterS that call for 
1 
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[Dde 11 aulbariry." 435 U.s. at 171. UaIib Title II. however,l1tle I contains explicit language 
allowing the state to cxen:ise legal authority in the field of vessel aaffic and pen safety. Section. 
1222 (b) provides that TItle I does not prevent a state from prescribing for structureS higher safety 
equipment tcquirements or safety standards .. than those which may be ptcsaibed pt.U'SU3Dt to nw: 
1." 33 U.S.c. section 1221 (b). Higher state safety standards for the protection of StrUCtureS are 
allowed even if'the Coast Guard lw enacted provisions to achieve the same objective in its regula-
tions and applicable VTS. The implication is that swe safety standards for vessels are also per-
missible but they may not impose higher standards than any that are adopted under the fedcral1aw. 
435 U.S. at 114. (This is not entirely clear. however. as the Court's opinion la.terref'ers to legisla-
tive histOry that could be interpreted as precluding any state regulation of vessels. 435 U.S. at 
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174, citing House Report No. 92- 563. pt.2 (1971) at IS. But the Coun's analysis regarding the 
supertanker ban. discussed below, indicates the Court' s belief that State action respecting vessel 
safety and equipment is permissible as long as the Coast Guard has not considered and acted upon 
the particular measure.) Until the Secrewy actS it is not possible to determine if the state standard 
imposes an impermissible higher safety standard. 
Thus the federal PWSA allows states to ~gulatc in the area of vessel safety and traffic 
contrOls as long as they do not conflict with federally-promulgated regulations. States may 
- impose more proteetive SWldards with respect 10 SIZ'UCtUmS even if they go beyond what the Coast 
Guard ~ deemed necessary in its regulations. Whether WashingtOn'5 tug escort requirement. a 
provision concerning vessel ttaffic safety. was precluded by the authority of the Secrewy of 
Transportation depended Otl whether the Coast Guard had either promulgated ia own tug escon 
requirement for the Puget Sound VTS or had decided that such a requirement should Dot be 
imposed. Since Ihe record revealed DO evidence that eilhe: ~0l'1 bad been tak:n. me Washin,-
ttm tug escort provision was DOt preempted. The Court, however. left open the possibility that 
subsequent Coast Guard rulemaking flO 33 CFR. Pan 164. under nde 1) setting minimum stand-
ards for tug escans would oust me stare provision. 43' U.S. at 172-
The members of the Coun were divided on whether the tan.ker design SWldanis were saved 
by the altemative tug escort provision that allowed ta.nk:ers to avoid compliance with the design 
standa.rds. The Coun found the Puget Sound tug escort provision to be a requil'cment "with insig-
nificant international consequences" as it did Dot coerce tanker 09me1'S inlO adopting' the statets 
design Standards. The provision was in effect just a tug escort requirement. a permissible local 
regulation that was not mom preempted as would be a direct state desiJD Sta.Ddard. The tug escort 
provision could stand as long as it did not conflict with a federally promulgated tug rule. The 
1972 Act authorized the Coast Guard to impose a tug escort rule but did not compel it. and no 
such requirement had yet been adopted for the Puget Sound vessel traffic system. nor bad a policy 
decision been taken that such a requirement wu unnecessary. Justice White's plurality opinion. 
joined in full only by tlu= justices, Chief Justice Bmget' and Justices Stewart and Blackmon. 
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implied. however. that if the Coast Guard were to enact Such regulation, the state tug provision 
would be preempted. 435 U.S. at 171-172. Because the state had the power to require all vessels 
10 usc a tug escort, it could also require only those vessels not meeting the specified design stand-
ards to usc tugs. The Court also found that the tug escort provision did not violate the Constitu-
tion's commerce clause by imposing heavy costs on interState shipping. 
In a dissenting opinion. Justice Marshall. joined by Justices Rchnquist and Brennan. 
agreed that the tug escort provision was pcnnissiblc. Because all affected tanker owners had opted 
to use tug escortS and thus had Dot felt forced to comply with the design requirements. it was 
unnecessary for the Court to address the question of whether the state design requirements were in 
conflict with the federal goal of national uniformity and thus not preempted. 
'Ihe Court was also seriously divided on the question whether the fcderallaw prevented the 
5Q1e ~ banning supena.n.kcrs from Puget Sound. The majority found Washingtonts prohibition 
of tankers gremer than 125,000 D'WT to be prcempled by the Coast Guard' 5 authority under 
PWSA ''I TJ.t1e I 10 establish "vessel size and speed limiauions." Both the majority and the dissent 
agreed that Title I did Dot on its face preempt all state regulation of vessel size; prc:emption de· 
pea.d.edonwhethcr the Coast Guard hadaddrcssed and acted upon the particular regulatory issue 
of liD: limitations,. 1'he justices .disagreed., however. whether the Coast Guard had in fact consid-
·1m:dthe question and concluded that no size limiwion wu necessary. The ~ajority concluded 
that the Coast Guard" s local navigation role contrOlling tbe number and size of vessel in Rosario 
Strait at any given time constituted federal action with respect to vessel size limit that precluded. a 
higher state standard. The State could nOl have adopled the supcrta.n.kcr ban as a maner of state 
judgment that very large r:an.k vessels unsafe generally. Such a blanket determination would be 
precluded under TItle II as a judgment respecring tanker design. As a judgment reflecrln, consid-
eration oflocal condidons and water depths. however. the ban would have been permissible had 
the Coast Guard not made its own judgment that the local conditions did noc wamnt such a prohi-
bition.. The Coun was not concerned that the Rosario Strait role was an unwritten policy and 
therefore did not clearly refleet an affinnative Coast Guard judgment that a supertanker ba.n was 
13 
p 
unnecssary. The Secretary's failu:re 10 adopt a supertanker ban "takes on the character of a ruling 
that no such regulation is appropriate .. because: the Title I required him 10 give full consideration to 
numerous factors in setting vessel traffic controls. Because his responsibility to consider and 
balance factors was so broad.. it was apparent that the the ban was determined to be unnecessary. 
, , 
This reasoning appears somewhat strained, however, as it seems .to say that because the Act re-
quires the Secretary to consider everything thoroughly he must have done so. 
The dissent did not buy the majority·s analysis either. It nOled the Coun's well-established 
principle in cases of supre1'JW:Y clause analysis that state and federal SWiltory schemes should be 
read to the greatest extent possible as compatible and should only oust Stale law to the extent 
necessary to protect achievement of federal aims. The dissent took particular note that the Coast 
Guard's Puget Sound Vessel Traffic System, 33 CFR Pan 161, Subpart B, contaiite4 no tank:er 
size limitation.tbe Coast Guard comment! on the System in the Federal Register during Us 
promulgation indicated that no consideration of the need for a ban took place. To the dissenters 
the Coast Guard's unwritten rule prohibiting more than one tanker larger than 70.000 DVIT from 
tranSiting Rosario Strait during clear weather reduced to 40.000 DVIT during bad weather was 
insufficient to establish a federal policy that a supertanker prohibition was UDWa..."Ta.Dted. 43.5 U.S. 
at 183.0.3. 
Co~trary to the majority's conclusion that Tule I preempted the supertanker ban. the dis-
sent forJ?C1 support' for the Slate ban in a provision authorizing local VTSs. Section 1m (e) 
provides that .. the existence ofloc:al vessel-tta.ffi.c-control schemes must be weighed. in the bal-
ance" [by the Coast Gaard] in determining which federal regulations should be imposed. 435 U.S. 
at 184, n.4. Likewise, Tu:1c n of the Act. regarding tanker design and construction standards did 
not preempt the State·s supcrtank.er ban. The dissent rejected the suggestion to that effect made by 
the majority's statement that TItle II preempted "a state judgment that, as a matter of safety and 
environmental proteetion icnerally, tankers should not exceed 12S.0CX) DWT.tt 435 U.S. ~ 175 • 
. Justice Marshall wrote: 
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It is clear. however. tb.al the Tanker Law was . 
not merely a reaction to the problems arising 
out of tanker operations m general, but instead 
was a measure tailored to respond to unique 
local conditions - in particular. the unusual 
susceptibility of Puget Sound to damage from 
large oil spills and the peculiar navigational 
problems associated with tanker operations in 
me Sound Thus, there is no basis for preemp-
tion under TIde n (emphasis added). 
435 U.s. at 184-185. 
The fact thai: the Court wrote three separate opinions weakens me force of the Rav deci-
sion. Moreoeever. the holding is Dot helped by the PWSA's lack of clear congressional intent with 
. 
respect to s.mte regulatory jurisdiction. Most imponant. however, is that the Court's most forceful 
argument for fedemI preemption of tanker design and consttuction standards was based upon the 
assumed need for uniformity in order to achieve international agreement on tanker safety stand-
cds.. Aa. upment·coWd be made that vessels can:ying North Slope: crude oil from Va1dez: to portS 
on the West coast are engaged in inlefState trade only. 1beyare not competing with foreign tank-
ers for lnu:tnalional shipping. Many of these tankers, like the Exxon Valdez. were constructed 
spec:ifica11y for the North Slope: trade. Rather than frus1%'lte the federal objective for uniform... 
inremati9ll ~the adoption of consistent swe-imposed tanker standards by all StateS 
Itmdl:iDgKonh.~ a"Odc oil could help demons1Dte the need for a higher, minimum inte.ma-
tiona! standard of tanker safety design. Consistent state tanker standa:nis enacted by all the swes 
rccei~g North Slope crude oil would. eUmiaatc the otherwise polent argument aired in Ray that 
national stimdards are needed to prevent the very cosdy impact On shipping of diverse state design 
requ.imnents. for example, among WashingtOn, Oregon, and California. See. U, Ray, 435 U.s. 
at 14-1S.· 
The problem of costly, divergent state tanker Standards was raised in the separate concur-
ring opinion by Justice Stevens, joined by Iustice Powell. They critici.ud the majority's decisic:m 
not to preempt the tug escort alternative provision. They believed it to be of no consequence that 
the escon penalty imposed only a modest additional coSt on ta.nkefS not meeting the invalid design 
rules. In their view~ these additional costs would be magnified by the enactmentS of similar n:-
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quirements by other states attempting to impose more stringent standards. Evidence of dris multi-
plier problem could be found in the fact that Alaska had just recently enacted an explicit system of 
economic incentives to tty to get rankers to adopt safety and design standards similar to those 
required by the Washington Tanker Law. The decision in Ray despite its weakness was to have a 
serious impact on this newly enacted Alaskan law, although it is not entirely clear that it should 
have. It is ro this story that we now turn. 
C. Alaskats Experience with Federal Preempdon: Chevron L Hammond 
To address the significant risks of oil spills posed by the imminent commencement of 
shipping operations from me tcmrinus of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline in Valdez, the Alaska Legisla-
ture adopted SB 406 in 1976. enaclCd as Chapter 266,1976 Alaska Laws. SB 406 was a compre-
hensive act covering all aspects of marine oil uamponation and bandling. Section 1. the Tank 
Vessel Traffic Regularion Act, required safety and maneuverability feamres on tankers and tug 
escons for certain vessels, and the adoption of a swe system of tanker traffic regulations. The 
Tank Vessel Act included a provision authori:zing ADEC to adopt a comprehensive systcJll of 
traffic regulations for tankers that did not conflict wilh regulations adopted by the Coast Guard 
and one authorizing the Governor to enter into interState compacts to achieve the purposes of the 
Act. Section 2. the Oil Discharp Prevention and Pollution Con1:rOl Act, prohibited the discharp 
of oil in. state ~ and required the payment of annual risk charaes by terminal opemtorS and 
vessel owners intO a fund to pay for c!ean .. up. research. and. ~ The amo~t of the 
I 
annual risk charges depended upon the presence or absetlCC of the specified vessel fea.run:s. Provi .. 
sions of the new law also controlled the placement of ballast water in umkers and prohibited its 
The new law took effect on luly 1. 1m. On September 16, 1m, Olevron USA. Inc. and 
others filed suit in the federal district court for Alaska. claiming that key provisions of the ~w 
were unconstitutional During the pretrial phase of the litigation in March, 1978. the Supreme 
Coun announced its decision in Ray ~ Atlantic Richfield Co. In response ro the Ra! ruling, 
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Chevron and the State stipulated that certain provisions of the 1976 Tank. Vessel Traffic Regula-
tion Act were preempted by the federal Pons and Watcr'Ways Safety Act and thus void. This 
agreement settled a significant pan of the challenge to the state law. 
Stipulated as preempted under the tanker de~gn provisions (Title m of the PWSA was the 
Jequiremem that all tankers navigating Alaskan waters have on board what Ala.sk:a considered to 
be "standard safety and maneuverability fea.tmes." The safety feamres included two marine radars 
systems. collision avoidance radar systems. LORAN-C navigational receivers. and other position 
1ocation S)"$tCIllS as ~scribed by n:gulations by the Alaska Department of Environmental Con-
servation (ADEC). Provisions requiring tug escons for W1br.s greater than 40.000 D'WT tbat 
lacked such maneuvembility and stopping featUl'es as lateral thrusters. contrOllable pitch propel. 
Iers. and backup propulsion equipment were deemed preempted in light of the Coast Guard's 
promulgation of the Prince William Sound Vessel Traffic System under TItle I of the P\VSA. The 
parties also agreed on the invalidity of provisions controlling the placement of bal.Iast water in 
vessel cargo tanks. They were not invalidated under the PWSA, however; they were deemed to 
posed an unreasonable bu.rden on interstate commerce and wen: thus invalid under the commerce 
clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
The parties did not agree with n:spect to the validity of the Oil Discharge Prevention and 
PoIlwi01'1 Con~1 Aa.. They decided tbat a two-phase trial was necessary. The first phase of the 
trial would consider the Validity of the annual risk charges and the Coastal Protection Fund. The 
second phase woUld a:y the validity of the b~ water discharje provision. loading and unload-
ing requirements. the contingency plans and capability criteria. the certification provision, and the 
financial n:sponsibility standards. This law authorized ADEC to take all necessary steps in coop-
eration with federal authorities to prevent oil spills. including the inspection and supervision of oil 
ttansfer activities. to mange for the prompt and effective containment and removal of spilled oil. 
and to provide procedun:s to compensate victims. The key aim of the law was to provide econom· 
ic incentives for oil terminal facilides and tanker owners to adopt the State·specified safety and 
maneuverability fearures by assessing annual risk charges and by requiring risk avoidance cenifi· 
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cateS and proof of financial responsibility. The cert.i.fical:es would be issued upon payment of an. 
annual risk charge intO the Coastal Protection Fund and upon proof of capability to carry out all 
required state and federal spill ~tion and condnBency plans. Oil terminal facility and marine 
carrier certificates would not be issued unless the owners could demonstrate their ability to pro-
; 
vide all equipment, personnel and supplies to contain and clean-up any on disCharzes. The statute 
provided for the establishment of differential risk charges based upon the preSence of the risk-
reducing equipment and design fearares. 
The Act also authorized the State to undertake the immediate removal of disharBcd oil and 
to direct operations of all contraCtorS and depanmental personneL The Coasul Protection Fund 
was created as a revolving fund consisting of all annual risk charges, payments for damages, 
penalties, and other fees established :mder the Act. The Fund's purpose was to finance ADECs 
cfmlnistrativc. enforcement and clean-up expenses and to fund research on spill prevention and 
removal. 
After a trial in the first phase. the U.S. District Judge. Judie lames M. Fitzgerald. ruled in 
lune, 1978. that the State's system of risk avoidallce charges was preempred by the federal PWSA. 
The Coastal ProteCtion Fund was invalid in light of Article IX, section 7 of the Alaska Constitu-
tion prohibiting the dedication of license fees for a special purpose. The State of Ala.sk.a filed an 
appeal of this ruling but later abandoned it. DeWls of Judge Fitzgerald's views on the risk charge 
system" are presented below. 
After this ini1ial nill.ng. the remainin, issues ~Dcemed me validity of the State's ballast 
water discharge regulations requiring onshore treaDnent, constitutionality of the warrantless 
ADEC searchet and inspections of tankers, and the permissibility of State certification of tankers. 
Judge Fitzgerald ruled in September. 1979 thaI the ballast water provisions were prcemp~d by the 
federal PWSA. Before he could rule on the other provisions, the Alaska Legislature ~ed both 
the Tank Vessel Regulation Act and the Oil Discharge Prevention and Pollution Control A~t. HB 
205, Chapter 116. 1980 Alaska Laws, effective July I, 1980. 
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The State ultimately appealed only one of the provisions that ~udge Fitzgerald ruled 
unconstitutional. the ballast water discharge provision. Alaska eventually prevailed on this issue. 
The U.S. Circuit COUl't of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Coun reversed Judge Fitzgerald.. h held 
that the federal Pons and Waterways Safety Act, as amended by the Pons and Tanker Safety Act 
of 1978. did not "occupy the field" of tanker discharge regulation in State waters, thaI the State's 
discharge prohibition did not pose an imconcilable conflict with any regulations adopted by the 
Coast Guard pursuant to the P'WSA nor prevented the achievement of that Act's objectives. and 
that the federal Clean Water Act reflected express congressional intent to achieve maximum state· 
federal cooperation in protecting the marine environment within three miles of the shoreline .. 
ChevronLHammond. 726 F.2d483 (9th Cit. 1984). The U.S. Supn:me Coundenied Chevron's 
petition for a wri·tof certiorari and the litigation was finally concluded. 
It is difficult and probably unwise to speculate On what the N'mth Circuit would have held 
had. the State decided to appealludge Fitzgerald's decision to invalidate the oil spill risk charge 
system. His preemption analysis was not particularly convincing nor detailed. however, and it 
-seems clear from his opinion that his principal concern was for the adequacy of the statistical basis 
for the risk charge system. His reading of the Supreme Court's decisions overlooked the complex-
ides of the Ravdcclsion that could have limited its impact and it completely ignored the Counts 
meq~emor ftare authority in spill contingency mcuU1'eS in the Askew case. On these 
grounds it w:ould have been more appropriate to appeal the decision to me Ninth Circuit for a more 
comprehensive'reading of the applicable case law. Ii may be that the regulations' technical defi-
ciencies revealed by ludge Fitzgerald's close scrutiny made the State reluctant to pursue meir 
vindication in the Coun of Appeals. 
The judge seemed l:'arrlcuIarly bothered by the nature of the actUarial statistics and data on 
tanker accidents that were used as the basis for eStablishing the different risk charges by W1ker 
size and conswction.. His discussion of the system and of the qualifications and methodology of 
- the ADEC contractor who designed it. suggest that it was the program', execution rather than itS 
legal basis that troubled him. That being me case, the more appropriate response would have been 
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to remand the risk charge regulations to the agency to comet the defectS rather than invalidate the 
system entirely. 
Judge Fitzgerald considered at length the ADEC methodology employed in setting the risk. 
charges, emphasiZing the Department's conscious decision. with the encouragement of the Attor-
ney General, to develop the program as a system of insurance premiums rather than regulatory_ 
standards for tankers. This approach was taken in light of the potential for preemption under the 
federal regulatory sta.tute, the PWSA. He was particularly persuaded by testimony of Chevron '5 
expert wimesses that the ADEC conttaetor's report. which formed the basis for the risk charge 
regulations. was "statistically and actUarially unsound" and based upon inadeqOlEe and misapplied 
data. Memorandum of Decision. June 30. 1978. at 29. (These data concerned the casualty experi-
ence of the world-wide ta.nker fleet on the b!Jh seas, and did not take account of the pe:formance 
of tankers in Alaskan coastal wuers.) 
The model employed. in the report assumed a simplistic and unproven relationship between 
particular tan1a:r design featt.m:s and navigation equipment and their Rduction of the risk of an oil 
spill. Judge FItzgerald found the risk reduction estimates to be sd.bjective. mcomplete, and unsup-
ported. He condemned the conaactcr's report as "devoid of merit" but faulted the ADEC decision 
to use an actuarial method for which the cont:ractor was unqu.alified and for which he was given 
I inadequate time (six weeks), :sources, and staff assistance, Noting the complexity of the task of 
!, determining tanker standards to reduce oil spills. Judge Fitzgerald pointed out that the double 
.. 
• bottom issue alone had consumed years of study and debate before it was ultimatelyrejectcd by 
- -
the International Mariti.mc Consultative Organizatio~ (fMoo) in Febntaty, 1978. just four months 
prior to his ruling. He wu apparently influenced. at least in pan. by the results of the !MOO 
dehoerations, but he assumed. probably naively, that the IMoo decision was a ~hnical rather 
- than a political and economic cine.. See Silverstein. Superships and Nation-States: The Transna-
tional Policies of me Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Qrganization (1978) at 184-186 
("IMCO is an inhetently sympathetic forum to mari~ interestS" _ which has not functioned effec-
tively as a regulatory body because of itS lack of an independent research capability). 
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Judge Fitzgerald gave significandy less mention ro the legal question whether Alaska's 
risk charge regulations were preempted by the PWSA. Again be noted the international dimension 
of me problem of tanker oil spills. adding that President Caner's proposal for double bottoms on 
rankers had been rejected four months before at the International Conference on Tanker Safety and 
Pollution Prevention on safety grounds and in preference for further stUdy of the selective place-
ment of segregated ballast tanks. In his view the risk charge system was an 3Dempt to influence 
the design cha.racleristics of tankers~ a subject that the Ray!:. Atlantic Richfield decision of three 
months prior had indicated. was completely preempted by Tule II of the PWSA. 
He rejected the argument that the risk charge system was similar to WashingtOn's alte:ma-
ave designltugescon requirement, and as an operating rule reflecting the peculiar conditions of 
'local 'WaterS. h was Dot preempted under ntle I until specific federal judgmentS to the contrary 
were madi:. Judge Fitzgerald merely concluded that because the risk charge system was designed 
to provide incemives for the incorporation of state-dcsired safety and maneuverability features it 
''WIScomrary to the·coal of nde n to achieve uniform national and intem.ati.onal sWld.al'ds. In 
light of the divergence in opinion respecting the effectiveness of various design characteristics to 
p:vemt oil spills,he predicted tft.at a widely varying a:m.y of conflicting state sW1dard.s would 
ISdtlf\swes 1YCr!e :a!Iowedtoezw:t lheir own taD.kcr standards. 
The actual impact the state regulations were baving on 'tanker design was not considered, 
:although tbis was an important part of the Supreme Coun's consideration of the WashingtOn's 
dcsignltug escort alternative in Ray. Judge Fitzgerald made no mention of the fact that tanker . 
owners were paying the risk charges instead of incorporating the State's safety and design fea-
tureS.. Moreover~ be did not even discuss whether the risk charge system was effectively an oil . 
spill contingency fund the contributions to which were assessed on the basis of the different risks 
posed by cenain kinds of tankers. If he had undertaken this line of inquizy he may have upheld 
the risk charge system as a contingency fund provision authorized by the federal Clean Water Act 
as lntel'p1'Cted by the Supreme Court in Askew.!:. American WaterWaYS Operarors, as discussed 
above. A more thorough consideration of these issues could have been made by the Court of 
Appeals. thus the S~·s fallure to appeal the ruling ;'S unfcrrunate. A ruling by the Ninth Circuit 
on all aspectS of the Alaska law could have helped clarify the application of the Rav and Askew 
rulings and promoted the development of this uncertain area of the law. 
D. California's Legislative Initiatives 
The Swc of California is cun:enuy pursuing legislation to revise and strengthen the State's 
contrOl over oil shipmentS through state waters. 'There is both a petition drive to Jet new legisla-
tion enacted by refcn:ndum and bills pending in the State Senate and Assembly. All of these 
proposals promise to enhance considerably the State's power to prevent an Exxon Valdez disaster 
in State warers. While these proposals may raise concerns regarding federal preemption. and are 
likely to be challenged. by a litigious oil indusay. they merit serious consideration by other StateS. 
They are likely to have a more positive reception in the federal courts. if me new federal oil spill 
legislation reflects a renewed spirit of cooperative state-federal responsibility for oil spill preven-
tion and if me deficiencies of me federa.t regulatory performance since 1978 can be presented. 
California's Environmental Initiative is cun:ently being prepared for a citizens t petition 
drive and voter rcfem1dum in November. 1990. If' adopted it would enact comprebensive envi-
romnentallegislation to contrOl pestidde use, reduce the production of greenhouse gases, protect 
old growth fo:roests. prevent toxic water pollution. and reduce the risks of coastal oil spills. The oil 
, spill pro.;.sions sbould be of interest to other states because mey skillfulIy employ the strongest 
" aspectS oftbe State's legal aumority to build a comprehensive oil spill prevention and response 
system. 
Recogni.z:ing that most if not all on development and trar1SpOITation facilities are located on 
state tidelands ('mcluding offshore exploration and production facilities. pipelines. tanker termi-
nals. and refineries). the new law would forbid the renewal of any Stafc lands lease for such facili· 
ties until a State Oil Spill Prevention Plan is adopted. The Plan must be implemented by all agen-. 
des with authority over potential sources of on pollutio1'l. -It will include at a minimum "tug-escortS 
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for oil tankers. the establishment of emergency stations far disabled tankers, and periodic inspec-
tions for all oil-related fac:ililies. 
Permit approvals for facilities that pose the risk. of oil spills will be withheld in the absence 
of an approved oil spill contingency plan that meets requirementS specified by the California 
Coastal Commission. prepared in consultation with the State Lands Commission and the Depart-
ment of FISh and Game. (Together the heads of these agencies will form a Sw.e Oil Spill Coordi-
nating Committee to oversee implementation of the new law.) Local governmental and port 
contingency plans will be developed and incorporated into local coastal management programs, 
giving them the force of federal approval and consisrency under the federal Coastal Zone Man-
agcment Act. 
In the·cvcm of a spill. the Act contemplates that state agencies will direct all containment 
and clean-up operations. including those of the responsible pany. subject to the overriding authori-
ty of the U.S. Coast Guard.. A new agency within the Department of FISh and Game. the Office of 
Oil Spill Response. would direct spill response, interagency coordination, and most imponandy. 
oil spill contingency training and plan implementation. The Office would have available funds 
from an Oll SPill Prevention and Response Fund created by a variable fee on oil deliveries by 
ranker and offshore pipelines. The variable fee provision adopts a relative risk approach that is 
similar in philosophy to the 1976 Alasulegislation. The fee of up to twenty-five cents per banel 
"~hal.l be commensurate with the oil spill risk posed by the method of transporta.tion and volume of 
oil ttansparted." Initiative Measure. Section 24. add.in:g Public Resources Code. section 6232 (a). 
Bills pendinj in the California legislature should also be noted. They reflect a new bold-
ness and a willing to exercise the maximum state authority to prevent the occurence of catastrOph-
ic on spills. The pending Senate and Assembly bills use the State's regulatory authority over 
shoreside terminal facilities to impose risk-reducing standards on tankers. This approach. if tested. 
in the courts. will bring into direct focus the somewhat conflicting policies on state authority that 
are reflected in the federal Clean Water Act and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act/Port and 
Tanker Safety Act. 
23 
Oearly the aim of the California law is to influence tanker design and construction but 
does so through the sta.te's police power and public trUst responsibilities as applied to marine 
tenninal facilities. The impact of the BAY and Askew decisions on this approach is uncertain. A 
reviewing coun is likely to be influenced by the ineffectiveness of existing federal and state con-
tr?ls as revealed by the Exxon Valdez disaster. ~ether it concludes that the is greater scope for 
state contrOl could depend on the'language Congress adopts in enacting the 1989 Oil Spill Preven-
tion Act. These developments should be followed closely. 
.' 
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"An Emergency Resource-Mobilization Requisitioning System for future Oil Spill 
Emergencies" 
L ProSl'eC'tus 
This report analyzes one proposed component for the State of Alaska's future oil 
spill prevention and response program: a system for requesting and requisitioning a 
variety of necessary private resources and services in the event of a declared oil spill 
emergency. In such an event, on land or water, codification and application of 
existing and proposed Alaska law will provide for necessary quick access to resources 
by the state's emergency response command, and legal and economic protections to 
the per.5OllS and private property interests affected. . 
• The State of Alaska should aeate a comprehensive emergency resource-
requisitiorJng process for requisititioning corporate and private resources and 
services in the event of major declared public emergencies. 
• The emergency resource--requisitioning process should make a basic distinction 
between .requisitions made of responsible corporate parties and those made of 
pRvate third-parties. 
• The emergency resource-requisitioning process should provide for appropriate 
protections for requisitionees, to the fullest extent when applied private third-
partieS, in terms of compensation, coverage against injuries, and tort law 
immunities.. '. 
• By statute, the emergency resource-requisitioning process should incorporate a 
shift in tort law duties, so that persons refusing to provide requisitioned resources 
and services an be sued by injured parties in subsequent civil litigation for injuries 
to persons and property that occur because of such refusals. . 
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n. Introduction 2nd Background 
Privatization, dominating the process by which Alaska oil transport is administered 
and supervised, has been repeatedly identified as a significant contributing cause of 
the laxities that produced the Exxon Valdez oil spill and other oil spills. 
The dominating presence of the oil industry was evident throughout the course of 
response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, as well as prior to the spill in the ongoing 
management of the oil transport system - operation, maintenance, testing, 
oversight, "prevention'" and spill-response preparation, including c~ntingency 
planning. 
A private lockup of virtually all necessary cleanup resources was one of the strategic 
causes, in the confusion and turmoil that followed the Exxon Valdez spill, that 
allowed the private corporation to dominate the oil-spill response and clean up. As 
soon as the tanker's grounding was known, many or most of the logistical 
requirements and equipment for oil spill response and dean-up were quicldy locked 
up by private purchase, lease, or contract, so that only the private industry entities 
had the wherewithal to undertake response efforts. 
1be encumbered resources included aircraft and boats, other transport vehicles, 
radio and telephone systems, deaning equipment, fuel supplies, and the like, as well 
as facilities for housing response workers and staff (in a community with severely-
limited hotel and motel space available.) The short supply of some resources was 
made even tighter by the influx of media personnel, who often desired exactly the 
same kind of resources that were necessary to facilitate the deanup itself. In 
circumstances where state and federal officials arriving on the scene could not even 
be sure of having a place themselves to spend the night, it becomes dear in 
.retrospect that such industry lockups of resources can be a major logistical problem 
in the event of major oU spills. Beyond the short-term lockup problem, moreover, 
is the fact that in some urgent c:irc:umstances governments may have to request and 
requisition various other private resources from third parties, when government-
owned equipment cannot be brought on site sufficiently quickly to respond to the 
emergency. . 
. In these circumstances, if the State decides that future oil spill response must never 
again-be so privatized as to relegate governmental participation to the backseat role 
it played in the Exxon Valdez incident, then state governmental offidals must be 
able to request and requisition available resources for governmental clean-up 
efforts. The following system sets out a basis for temporary governmental 
aquisition of volunteered or requisitioned resources by the state's disaster response 
coordination center. 
There are, of course, major consequences to private property rights when a. 
governmental entity requests or requisitions private assets. Circumstances may 
vary according to whether the assets and resources requisitioned belong to parties 
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implicated in the cause of the spill, or are sought from third parties in the locality 
with no responsibility for the spill or its clean-up. Circumstances may also vary 
according to the type of use that is sought to be made, the length of time for which 
the requisition is sought, the necessity for private personnel to work with the 
government in deploying and using resources, and the differing needs for 
immediate short-term compensation .therefor. 
Current A1a.ska law already provides many of the powers and procedures to be 
applied in the event of a civil emergency, and these include the power of 
requisitioning private assets as necessary. AS 26.23.020(g}(4). In the follOwing 
analysis of the requisitioning mechanism, existing authority is noted, and areas in 
which further ~tatutory authority is necessary are likewise noted. Precedents and 
analogies have been drawn from other states that have considered the problem. 
This proposal is based upon general assumptions about the State of Alaska's future 
emergency response system as set out in the attached report, "Some Suggested 
Elements lor an Improved Oil Spill Response System". 
m. Description of the Proposed Lqal Mcchanis 
Under the authority of existing statutes, with the addition of certain further required 
statutory provisions as noted, the State of Alaska should define, by regulation, a 
comprehensive format for requisitioning required oil spill response resources. 
The requisitioning system would be primarily directed toward "un-locking" 
resources that are aiticaI to the State's response to a spill that have been "locked-up" 
in the immediate ·aften:nath of a major spill by the industry itself. [If necessary it 
·could also be applied to third-party resources; politically, as well as in terms of 
appro~,bowe¥er, the industry is a far more practical object of the process 
and powers set out here.] 
A declarati~ of oU spm emergency [or on-site "preliminary declaration" in urgent 
cases] is the threshold requirement for the requisitioning process. It triggers the . 
existing powers of the State, andthe proposed statutory powers of the St.te and the 
on-site command centerl to respond to the emergenCYI including the proposed 
power to requisition. 
Take as an example four possible emergency requisition r~ests: 
• The State requests that the Village Inn in Valdez tum over 20 rooms for 
the use 01 the State's response team persot:mel, for a period of 20 days, even 
though the corporation responsible for the oil spill has already contracted 
with the Village Inn to reserve all the Inn's rooms for a 30 day period. 
• The State requests that Alyeska provide two bulldozers, five trucks, and 
portable pumping equipmentl present at a North Slope location [or at a 
pumping station near the Brooks Ranget to be turned over to the State's on-
site command center, along ""i.th the personal sel"Vices of those employees 
necessary to operate the equipment, in order to respond to a spill of oil in 
tundra along the pipeline corridor. 
• The State requests that Alyeska make available the use of three large cargo 
helicopters rented by Alyeska from a Houston company and recently flown to 
the locall ty of the spilL 
• The State requests the use of a fishing boat to transport urgently needed 
booms to protect the port of Homer. 
The requisition system set out here operates in each case, by either voluntary or 
mandatory compliance. The written requisition is defined initially as a "request," 
and if the persons requested to provide resources/services in an emergency do 
acquiesce in the request, they will receive benefits of legal protection, quaJified legal 
immunities, and rights to compensation for the value of resources/services 
provided, as applicable. 
Note on oil industry, and third-party, applicabilioc. 
The primary motivating circumstance that requires a requisitioning system is the 
corporate lockup of resources already noted. In some cases, however, private third-
party resources may be necessary. Past experience in the Exxon Valdez spill indicates 
that third-party private resources will usually be made readily and willingly 
available. .In such circumstances the primary effect of the proposed requisition 
system is to provide legal and economic protections to the private third-party 
resources and seNices. Most requisition requests, in Iact, can be expected to be 
honored, whether made of corporate parties or private third parties, especially if the 
system proposed here is in place and well known. Where, however, the industry 
parties responsible for the spill and its_cleanup are the objects of requisition orders, 
some of the legal and economic protections may proposed here may be 
'inappropriate. Reimbursement for use of corporate cleanup equipment, for 
example, would seem to miss the point of corporate responsibility for response 
preparedness and liability for spills. Oil and pipeline company requisitions might 
well be directed into a special arbitral tribunal to take account of their special nature . 
. The legislation implementing this proposed requisitioning system should establish 
. differing categories of protections, depending upon the ,role and responsibilities of· 
the various second and third parties. . 
The full range of protections presented below are primarily directed toward private 
third-party requisitionees. . 
-Enforcement autborlt,y 
If persons requested to provide resources/services initially refuse to acquiesce, the 
order to provide resources and services operates as a mandatory requisition, and 
there are three consequences possible: . 
• immediate enforcement by law enforcement officials; 
• prosecution [as a misdemeanor]; and 
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• (by a proposed statutory change), a new degree of responsibility and civil 
liability for any injury or loss of life to persons or property that is caused in 
whole or part by the unavailability of the resources/services requested, 
U the requisition must be mandatorily enforced, it nevertheless carries with it, once 
transfer of dominion and control of the resources/services has occurred, the 
benefits of qualified legal protections and immunities previously noted, and the 
right to compensation for the value of resources/services provided,· 
. 
The administrative and procedural components of the proposed requisitioning 
system are straightforward, 
The liability, qualified immunity, and compensation provisiOns are slightly more 
complex, but not problematic. 
The potential legal constraints upon the State's ability to requisition resources and 
services lie in: 
(a.) the federal pre-emption problem, which may be quite serious in special 
cases (like a State attempt to requisition a nearby empty tanker for offloading a 
grounded tanker, in circumstances where the Coast Guard has declined to 
make such an order); 
(b) the federal constitutional due process and takings clause [not a major 
concern]; 
(c) the federal constitutional contracts clause [likewise not a major concern]; 
and 
(d) the need to compensate for the value of resources I services taken [not, 
however, a major issue where the requested party is the corporation 
responsible for the discharge of the oil, which in any event will eventually 
have to reimbu.rseAlaska for the State's expenditures, including any 
payments for use by the State of the corporation's own assets.] . 
(e) the need to compensate for injuries to persons whose services are 
requisitioned. 
IV. Legal Analysis . 
Requlaitioninl Authodtx 
AS 2623.020(g)4, and other authority 
Property . 
Personal Services 
Adininistrative and Pxocedural Requirements 
Declaration of emergency 
Master C-pJan 
Decisional officers 
N olice of request and requisition 
-s •. 
Filing in Registry 
Enforcement, evil and penal 
Liability and Compensation Provisions 
Compensatory coverage for injury to property and persons requisitioned 
Qualified immunity 
Uability for damages caused by failure to provide 
Compensation system, and quantifying compensation amounts 
~nstjtutjpnal Constraints 
Pre-emption 
Due process, takings 
Contract clause 
Compensation 
Req.uisitioninl AuthotitJi AS 26.23.020(,)(4). and other 
Requisitions of 'Property 
\ , 
A significant part of the powers necessary to operate a requisitioning system already 
exist within Alaska law. Under the Alaska Disaster Act, .AS 26.23.020(g)(4}, the 
governor, upon the proclamation of a civil emergency, specifically may 
·commandeer or utilize any private property [except for news media] if the 
governor considers this necessary to cope with the disaster emergency,· following 
the required procedures for declaration of emergency, notice, (see Rep't No. 6.2J, 
compensation, etc 
By dtingthis authority, and making the assertions noted below in §IVand in the 
Draft Requisitioning Request Form [see Appendixl, it is clear that the Governor 
already possesses the necessary powers to take short-term dominion and control of 
needed private property so long as the emergency lasts. This power in tum can be 
delegated to an oil spill command center. AS 26.23.02O(f). 
Requisitions of Services 
As noted in the second example above, of a requisitioning request made to Alyeska «, 
to provide equipment and equipment operators, the State's oU spill response 
command center will sometimes need to requisition personal services, in cases 
where personnel trained to run the equipment may be as necessary to the clean-up c",,' 
effort as the equipment itself. 
The Alaska Disaster Act, however, does not specifically authorize commandeering ;iV' 
~e services of individuals. Other states have enacted statutory authority for the 
requisitioning of personal services in the event of an emergency. In Alaska, that 
power must be derived. from other statutory and common law sources. 
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Several statutory sources of authority to requisition personal services lie within the 
more general provisions of the Disaster Act. If such services are determined to be 
critical to a spill response, the power to requisition them could be grounded initially 
in §26.23.020(a)and (b)~ . 
(a) The governor is responsible for meeting the dangers presented by disasters 
to the state and its people._ 
(b) [and] may issue orders, proclamations, and regulations necessary to carry 
out the purposes of this chapter .... These orders, proclamations, and 
regulations have the force of law. 
nus general grant of necessary powers is supported by a specific reference to the 
govemor"s ability [in specifically llQ!l-mrutary or paramilitary drcumsta:nces, 
26.23.200(4)1 to exercise the powers of a ·commander-in-chief of the._Unorganized 
mllitia.. .. AS 26.23.020{e) and (f). The "unorganized militia" is specifically defmed as 
including -an able-bodied. persons between the ages of 17 and 59 years, inclusive, 
who reside in the state." AS 26.23.230(7). This particular authority thus clearly 
allows the requisitioning of services by the governor, at least if the requisitioned 
persoaneI are IeSidentsof the State. And the Act also a.f£irms the governor's martial 
law powers. AS 26.23.200(4). 
Beyond the slat\1.tm'y -powers, the State of Alaska, along with other American state 
governments, possesses the inherent authority to mobilize emergency resources and 
,j services under the common law doctrines of posse comitatus. When law 1 enforcement officers reasonably demand the assistance of private persons and 
property in responding to an ongoing violation of law, the dtizens have a legal duty 
to respond. See Kagel v. Brugger, 119 NW2d 394,397 (Wise. 1963); Babington v. 
Yellow Cab Co., 250 NY 14,164 NE 126 (1928); Application of U.s., 427 F2d 639 (1970). 
The comitatus powers apply to crimes "in exigent circumstances." To extend them 
to the oil .pilH '~,&ettingmay require a showing that the discharge is 
punishable underpenai.1aws, that each day of discharge be defined as a separate 
count, and thatdemup response actions be deemed law enforcement, but in the 
spill setting these elements are 'readilly shown. The Alaska cases menti~ning 
-emergency impressment" may support such an interpretation.. The authority for 
1 ' requisition is likely to be carefully scrutinized by the Alaska Supreme Court. See. 
~ Seward v. WISdom, 41~ P2d 931 (1966). 
1 
Dele,iation of Governor's Powers 
, The Disaster Act specifically says that the governor may delegate his Iher emergency 
command authority by appropriate orders or regulations. AS 26.23.020(f). As 
suggested in Report No. 6.2, "Some Suggested Elements for an Improved Oil Spill 
Response System," the governor should provide for a delegation of the full range of 
emergency powers to ADECs OHSR or whatever other 'on-site command authority 
the State creates to handle response and dean-up functions. To accommodate the 
sensitive political question of requisitioning resources and services from third 
parties, the governor might choose to delegate only certain portions of the 
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emergency powers, so that, for instance, the declaration of emergency in a particular 
spill might delegate only those requisition system powers needed for unlocking the 
resources of corporations involved in oil transport or responsible for the oil spill 
emergency. 
Administrative and Pro"dural Requirements: 
Declaration of Emergency 
As noted in Report 6.2, "Some Suggested Elements for an Improved Oil Spill 
Response System," the declaration of emergency in the event of oil spills triggers an 
array of powers and duties under existing Alaska law. There is currently a multiple 
jurisdiction over oU spills, where the Department of Emergency Services ["~ES''] 
has jurisdiction up to the amount of 100,000 barrels, concurrent with ADEC, which 
has the ab~ty to exercise some emergency powers, but does not get full powers 
. unless the spill reaches the full 100,,000 barrel level. AS26.23.040; AS46.03.86S; 
AS46.04.0SO. . 
As recommended in the "Suggested Elements" report, oil spill jurisdiction should 
be centered in one entity, and the 100,000 barrel trigger for full response powers 
should be eliminated. The 100,000 barrel standard was set up by the federal 
government to define those catastrophes in which the federal government would 
assert federalization. The levels of concern over an oil spill and the range of 
interests involved, differ markedly between the state and federal governments, and 
accordingly the 100,000 barrel defining line does not appear to serve a useful purpose 
in triggering full Alaska state response efforts. Moreover, because of the fact that ,"y 
future oil spills may well occur inland, where relative dangers diHer proportionately 
from ocean spills, the 100,000 barrel trigger is doubly inappropriate, and deserves 
amendment. 
Also as noted In the 'Suggested Elements" report, there may be a need for on-site 
personnel to order an immediate dvil emergency declaration to mobilize resources, 
in the form of a ~preliminary declaration of oil ~pill emergency" which will require 
new legislation. 
. The Master Contingency Plan 
The "Suggested Elements" report [6.2] discusses some of the requirements for 
improved contingency planning. A competently structured contingency plan, in 
place and clear enough to guide the immediate responses of state personnel, is a 
requirement of this requisition system because it will identify the kinds of efforts 
and kinds of resources necessary to the state's response, which likewise justifies the 
requisition requests to be made hereunder. See the recently enacted requirement of 
a statewide master plan, AS 46.04.200ff, discussed in Report 6.2. 
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Decisional Officers 
Decisions about what particular equipment or personnel are needed are likely to be 
best made on-site, not back in the state capital. Accordingly, it is important that the 
power to requisition be delegated by the gQvernor in each emergency, or via a prior-
designated delegation under regulations issued in the recodified emergency 
response system, so that on-site officials can exercise an immediate response effort 
including necessary requisitioning powers. It is presumed that the person in 
command of the on-sight response command center would be the one who would 
have to authorize each particular requisition request. 
Notice of Request of Requisition 
. The draft form appended at the end of this report (Appendix: "Draft Requisitioning 
Request.Form,") identifies ~ requirements of a requisition order[and see AS 
9.55.43O}: multiple atations of authority, a request and requisition for particular 
identified resources/services, a statement of the particular purpose under the 
contingency for which the request is made, the duration of the request, and 
statement of rights and liabilities for voluntary or mandatory provision of 
resources/ services. 
,cJ:_ ,. I:I'-"';~ p:u...~i'm·~ 
It is a simple requirement of administrative process and private property rights that 
.;the requisitioNDgorders be filed in some appropriate registry, either at the relevant 
Registry of Deeds, or with the municipal derk in the area where the requisition is 
made, as is required with the initial declaration of emergency. See AS 26.23.02O(d). 
The requisitioning orders should also be filed in one central state office which will 
manage compensation requests thereaiter, SO a state filing is administratively as 
AeCeSSa.ty uthe localliling required by property rights. 
Enforcement, Ciyiland Penal 
'Where a requested person does not respond affirmatively to a requisition request, 
the statuteS should be amended to clarify that law enforcement offidals have the 
ability to take dominion and control of private property for requisitioned uses 
without a prior hearing, if the requirements of the requisition order are otherwise 
in order. Under the Maine oil spill statutes the state offidals' emergency orders and 
regulations are not to be stayed, even if appeals are filed. 38 MRS §5S7. There also is 
the possibility that in some cases an immediate possession of the resources is not 
necessary, and in that circumstance the statute may allow normal condemnation 
action to take place under the state's powers of eminent domain, although a "quick: 
take .. prQ9!dure is advisable so that the matter would be put immediately at the 
front of the docket of whatever court has jurisdiction. . 
Violation of the order would appear to be a misdemeanor under existing statutes. 
Enforcement, of course, must follow all the requirements of procedural due process; 
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these .requirements, however, allow for a balancing in emergency situations that 
takes account of urgent public exigencies. See the three-part balancing test in 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.s. 319 (1976). 
LiabUity and Compensation Proyisions 
Compensatory Coverage for Injuty to Reguisitioned Property or Persons 
Under principles of constitutional due process protections of private property rights 
and personal rights, the state government must not only compensate persons for 
the value of resources taken, but also must reimburse them for injuries or 
destruction which may occur during the requisitioned period. This proposition 
holds irrespectiv~ of language in AS 26.20.140(b) which purports to eliminate tort 
liability on the part of the State or those working for the State. Further, the 
protections of worker's compensation laws extend to persons providing 
requisitioned services because they are legally regarded as state employees. See 
Gulbrandson v. Midland, 36 NW2d 655 (SD 1949).-
• \ 
0wilifie4 immunity 
AS noted above, it is appropriate and apparently normal practice for states which 
make emergency use of private resources or services to extend affirmative 
immunity in tort law to persons and property requisitioned. The exception is in 
cases of gross negligence or intentional misconduct. Alaska has adopted this 
approach for a part of its emergency response law, and should probably apply it 
generally to all emergency requisitions. See AS 26.20.140(b); 46.03.823; 46.08.160. See 
also Restatement of Torts 2d §265. The alternative approach of adjusting insurance 
coverages for requisitionees and volunteers is the subject of ongoing federal studies 
by the Department of Justice, but appears to be primarily directed at settings different 
Bom the emergency response situation. 
In this case it is also advisable to extend statutory immunities as well. It is 
altogether foreseeable that clean-up and response equipment will itself have 
. incidental discharges and other circumstances which could open the owner of the 
equipment to further statutory liability, and it appears a~visable that, except in the 
case of gross negligence, or where the equipment is not being used according to the 
requirements of the state's response system, that qualified immunity from state 
statutory liability also be extended. See AS 46.08.160 (where immunity "from costs or 
damages" may cover some statutory liabilities.] The state, of course, has no ability to 
• The opposite result is likely. however. in the case of ·pure volunteers: persons who 
provide emergency services to the public 011 their 'own unfettered initiative. without 
having been requested to provide such services by an authorized emergency official. 
City of Seward v. Wisdom. 413 P2d 913 (1966); local political subdivisions CID 
nevenheless include volunteer firefighters. police. and ambulance drivers' under 
worker's compo AS 23.20.092. Members of the newlt authorized volunteer Response 
Corps would appear to be covered by worker's compo AS 46.08.110. 
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extend such immunity for ,actions , violating federal law, except insofar as the state 
has assumed federal authority, under the Clean Water and Oean Air Acts, 
(NPDES, 33 USCA §1342ff; SIP, 42 USCA § 7410ff). 
Liability for Damai§ Caused by Failure to Provide 
This is a provision that substantially ina eases the practical incentives upon private 
parties to acquiesce in a requisitioning order. 1£ they do not, the proposal is that the 
oil spill act (AS.46. 04.010ff, and the Civil Disaster Act,'AS26.23.010ff) be amended to 
reverse, in effect, the traditional tort law that , does not hold. person to any "duty to 
rescue". 1£ the statute is drafted to state that- "failure to provide resources or 
services upon the proper requisition and request of a dvil emergency official shall 
constitute a breach of duty to persons and properties injured by the failure of the 
person to so provide"- major tort damages may follow. For a stubborn property 
owner, this may be a more persuasive incentive to cooperate with state efforts than 
the uncertain possibility of conviction for a misdemeanor. In the event that major 
injuries to persons or property occur, a person or corporation could lose the entire 
value of the requisitioned resources, or much more. 
"'Analogues for this kind of statutory aeation of a spedal tort duty can be found 
under the law of posse comitatus. See Babington v. Yellow Cab Co., 250 NY 14, 164 
NE 726 (1928); Application of US., 427 F2d 639 (1970); Blackman v. Cincinnati, 3S 
NE2d 164,166 (Ohio 1941). 
CttmpcMitiqn System 
Under AS 26.23.020(g)(4), compensation is required under the terms of subsection 
160 for any property that has been "commandeered." In that section, a person files 
claims for compensation with DES, although presumably if ADEC was exercising the 
same power by delegation under its oil spill authority, cla.ims would be filed directly 
withADEC. 
Compensation' claims should be directed to one single state office, to permit 
coordination and uniformity in the compensation process. An arbitration panel 
could be set up administratively to fadlitate the process. See 38 Maine RSA §5S1(3). 
Ultimately, all claims may be taken to .' court as with regular eminent domain 
condemnation. 
The question of quantifying compensation amounts is treated in the next section. 
Constitutional Constraints 
Preemption 
- Under preemption, where the federal government has jurisdiction over an area and 
expressly preempts the area, the state has no power to regulate. There do not appear 
to be any areas of express exemption in the oil transport system, with the possible 
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exception of the Coast Guard standards. Implied preemption, however, is an ever 
present concern where a regulated industry can resist state efforts on the argument 
that the function being exercised is properly a federal function, and that congress 
impliedly intended to occupy the entire field, whether or not congress or a federal 
agency is acting in a particular area. 
The requisition system discussed here largely does not run afoul of preemption 
concerns. The federal emergency management agency administration (FEMA) has 
indicated that it does not itself wish to exercise the requisitioning role, and fully 
expects that the State would requisition required resources and services, perhaps 
turning them over to the Federal On-site Coordinator in the event of federalization. 
Likewise, in a number of areas of response effort, the federal agencies may be 
expected to be relieved that the state is taking the initiative. The on-land response 
actions of the state, including reqtrlsitioning, do not appear to raise any substantial 
preemption issues. On the tanker route sector of the system, however, the Coast 
Guard exercises predominant control over the navigation and design and 
equipment standards of the tanker trade, so that short-term requisitioning of a 
vessel that is otherwise under Coast Guard jurisdiction might run afoul of the 
preemption doctrine. This issue is to be treated further in another report. 
Due Process, takings 
Under the principles of due process and takings, the requisition system proposed 
here does not raise major concerns. The authority for a taking will be clearly 
established, there is dearly a proper public purpose sounding in health, safety, and 
welfare; the requisition order, if it follows the terms of a rational contingency plan, 
is clearly rationally related to achieving the purposes of the state's oil spill response 
effort; and any burdens upon the private property are straightforwardly handled by 
the existence of the compensation remedy. The statutory change in tort liability, 
proposed to increase the incentives to cooperate with a requisition, does not raise 
takings issues because the courts have held that individuals and corporations do not 
have a right to the continuation of particular common law rules. 
Contract Cause 
In some cases, as the examples show, a requisition order may directly interfere with 
contracts made between a corporation that has locked up resources and the supplier 
of thOse resources. This clearly is a state action "impairing" a contract, which raises . 
questions under the Contracts Cause of the U.s. Constitution, Art. 1 § 10. The 
Contracts Cause, however, has repeatedly been interpreted to permit a state to 
modify or abrogate contracts when the requirements of due process and valid 
regulatory actions have otherwise been fulfilled. The leading case in the area is 
Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1933): ..... The . 
State ... continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. It 
does not matter that legislation appropriate to that end 'has the result of modifying 
or abrogating contracts already in effecf._.{T]he reservation of essential attributes of 
sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order .... This 
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principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the necessary 
residuum of state power has had progressive recognition in the decisions of t~is 
Court." 290 U.S. at 434-435. While the State's power is not unlimited, the effective 
result of Supreme Court holdings is that the same balance that supports an action 
against due process and takings challenges will concurrently satisfy the Contracts 
Clause. 
Compensation 
Under Alaska and federal law, it is dear that in many, if ~ot all instances, 
compensation must be paid for property which is taken; the due process 
requirements Qf the eminent domain proceeding are statutorily codified in the 
condemnation provisions of Alaska Statutes, §§9.55.290-340 and 420-460. 
Several special questions arise, however. U it occurs that the state orders, for 
instance, the destruction of a grounded tanker with all its remaining cargo by burn 
technology, there is some authority to indicate that the state does not have to 
compensate the owners of the vessel therefor. See· US. v Caltex, 344 US 149 (1952); 
<Sib v. Larimer, 601 P2d 1082 {Colo. 1979); Franco-Italian Packing Co. v. U.S., 128 
F.5upp.408 (Ct Claims, 1955); Miller v. Schoene, 276 US 272 (1928), and cases 
involving the destruction ·of houses in the path of fire. In such cases, moreover, the 
corporation that owns the grounded tanker will often be responsible for the cost of 
dean-up, so that the action of destroying a ship and cargo, if necessary to effective 
ft!Sponse, insw:h dramlStances would be part of the corporation's clean-up 
response obligation and hence not compensable. 
There is also the question of assessing the amount of compensation. In the example 
of requisitioning hotel roams,wnere the corporation has already reserved the same 
~hotel rooms, it zn\ghtbeargued that it is not enough that the state itself pay the 
hotel for the rooms used by the State. The corporation that had reserved those 
rooms, of course, does not have to pay for rooms it did not use (and if it prepaid the 
rooms, the State would haveta repay that amount). But the corporation may well 
argue that the value of the contract to the corporation in the emergency 
circumstances was &reater than the actual cost of the rooms, in effect a "special" 
benefit" of the bargain. In these circumstances, could the corporation that has been 
ousted from its reservations demand compensation for the loss of those 
reservations? This does not appear so much the loss of a property interest as a 
contract clause claim. The language of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
determining whether Stich contract losses would have to ~ compensated does not 
offer much support to .the corporate position. 
A further question arises with the amount to be paid where the existence of the oil 
spill emergency dramatically raises the on-site going market rate for available 
resources. Ii the corporation responsible for the spill is the target of the requisition 
request, it is hardly likely that it can demand inflated premium values from the 
State. Even were it to do so, the state is authorized to recoup clean-up expenses from 
responsible parties under AS 46.04.010, and, accordingly, whatever the State would 
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have to payout to the corporation in compensation, it would probably demand as a 
reimbursement from the corporation under that statute and AS 46.03.760(e), and 
46.0B.070. 
The more difficult question occurs in the case where the state will be taking third-
party resources. In the event of a spill, one of the small compensations to a local 
community is that responsible corporations may pay greatly inflated prices for the 
rental or purchase of desired resources. In those circumstances, does the state 
government have to pay the same price? The Alaska statutes indicate that the 
measure of compensation will tie the same as that in other condemnation cases. AS 
26.23.160. This generally means that just compensation will be measured by fair 
market value at the time of the taking. There is some authority, however, that 
government need not pay inflated values for property that is taken by ~ent 
domain, where the reason for the inflated value is attributable to governmental 
demand or governmental orders. See U.S. v. Cors, 337 U.s. 325 (1949). In that case, 
the federal government had requisitioned a steam tug for use in the war effort. 
Many steam tugs had been so taken, and the price for remaining unrequisitioned 
tugs was going ever higher on the private market. The statute involved, however, 
the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, section 902A, stated explicitly that"'m no case shall 
'the value of property taken or used be deemed enhanced by the causes necessitating 
the causes or use", nus is a provision that might well be replicated in an Alaska 
Disaster A~ amendment. The Supreme Court decided that there was no 
constitutional reason why the government had to pay a higher price for private 
assets when the price had been driven up by the government's own actions, in that 
case mobilizing resources for the war. In the oU spill situation, the inflated market 
prices for goods are both generally the result of the emergency situation, and 
spedfically the result of the government's own requirements applied to the 
corporation that it undertake immediate response and clean-up efforts. To make 
the government pay the higher premium owing to its own order appears to be both 
inappropriate and constitutionally unnecessary. 
v. Summal',J' 
For the foregoing reasons, it appears that a requisi~on system, both voluntary and 
mandatory, is both desirable and administratively, legally, and constitutionally 
feasible for implementation by the state of AlaSka, with the regulatory and statutorY 
changes noted as required. 
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[DRAFI'] REQUIsmONING REQUEST FORM 
State of Alaska 
[Oil Spill Emergency Command Center] [or whatever response entity is authorized] 
Under the authority of the Declaration of Oil Spill Emergency issued by_ on ldateJ, and according 
to the regulations for emergency oU spill response set out in Alaska Administrative Code--t as 
authorized by the Statutes of the State of Alaska--t and pursuant to the terms of the Master Oil 
Spill Contingency Plan for {4enotin, sector of ojl transport systemI adopted by the State on--t 1990, 
You are hereby requested to provide the following resources/services to the responsible official signing 
this order or his/her appointed agent: 
The resources/services requested under this order will be utilized for the following purposes, consistent 
with the terms of the Master Oil Spill Contingency Plan noted above: 
nus requisition will continue until . • 
During this ti:me the resources/services veto be used according to the terms of this order, the Jaws of 
the State of Alaska, the applicable state contingency plans, and directives of state officials 
authorized to direct oil spill cleanup and response efforts. 
Your co-opention with the State {)f Alaska's oil spill emergency response efforts is important. and 
deeply appreciated by the State, as well as being required by Alaska law. 
If this order is not compUed with, you are on notice that law enforcement officers have the duty to 
enforce it, andviolation.s are punishable as [misdemeanors} under the terms of Alaska law_. 
FurthermoJ'e,u tN.s order is not complied with, you and your property by statute will bec:ome dvilly 
liable for any injury or loss of ute to persons or property that is caused in whole or part by t~e 
unavailability of the resources/services here requested~ AS 26.-.-. 
FOR REQUtSlTIONS OF 1lilRD P ARn' RESOURCES AND SERVICES: 
You have a right to be compensated for the full, fair value of the resources/services provided to the oil 
spill emergency response efforts. Compensation claims may be filed at the following hjmel-, 
[""eel « {manned-
Because the State assumes dominion and control of the resources/services during the time covered by 
this order, absent gross neglIgence you and your property will not be liable under state statutes or 
common law for actions taken according to the terms of this order. Damages to persons or propeny are 
likewise the responsibility of the State so Jong as actions with the requisitioned resources/services are 
being taken according to the terms of this order. 
Authorized official, address, contact teL no., Date 
-lS~ 
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"SOME SUGGESTED ELEMENrS FOR AN IMPROVED On. SPIll RESPONSE SYSTEM" 
L Prospectus 
The first SeaGrant Report [Rep't 1.2, by Prof. Johnson,] covers the various 
possible prevention mechanisms that the state of Alaska can promulgate in order to 
prevent, to the maximum extent possible, oil spills from occurring at any point in 
the oil transport system, over land or water. This present outline is a less ambitious 
and less comprehensive report, sketching out some generic response system options 
required when prevention systems fail, an eventuality that is unfortunately not 
unlikely. 
The outline identifies some elements of a clarified structure for the state of 
Alaska's oil spill response system. It defines the initiation of oil spill response, the 
mechanisms by which the state's response should be centralized and coordinated, 
and the powers and functions of a state tactical command center that would operate 
as the central coordinator of all oil spill efforts, a base for state, local, and federal 
communications, managing and directing all aspects of oil spill response. 
n. Introduction; In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez 
The hours, days, and weeks that followed the Exxon Valdez oil spill 
demonstrated that, although the industry, state government, and federal 
~t officials had considered and to some degree prepared for catastrophic 
oil spills, none of the systems in existence performed capably. The oil spill response 
system was fundamentally privatized; the Exxon Corporation took over from a 
disorganized Alyeska, and assumed overall responsibility for the clean-up. Given 
that tlbeExxonCorporation was the only actor on the scene with the resources (both 
'tedimical and :firumdal)to undertake the clean-up, it dominated the direction and 
day-'to-d~y control of oU spill response efforts. nat allocation of function presented 
advantages and disadvantages (not the least the disadvantage to the Exxon . 
. Corporation itself that it was forced to deal directly with an enraged public, which 
may well have prevented it from making rational triage decisions that would have 
been available to governmental authority directing the dean-up effort). 
This outline presumes that the State of Alaska and federal government are 
likely to reject the privatization approach to oil spill prevention and response. The 
problem then is to design a governmental response system that can utilize the vast 
resources and expertise of the industry, while maintaining governmental directive 
authority for all phases of oil spill clean-up. In some cases the requirements of such 
an improved system are relatively clear, reorgani.2?ng existing Alaska authority, 
issuing new regulations under existing statutes, and in some situations refining 
.new statutory authority. In other cases there remain fundamental polley choices 
which the state of Alaska must address. This sketch outline attempts to set out an 
array of those potentially useful options. 
----------------.---~. 
DL Leaal Mechanisms of an Improved Alaska Qil Spill Response System 
Summary Outline and Recommendations: 
-Emergency response powers and duties are triggered by a declaration of 
emergency by the Governor, or in some cases by ADEC [Existing: A.S. 
26.23.020] 
• There should be provision for urgent "preliminary" declarations of 
emergency by on-site officials to permit short term rapid response. 
[Requires statutory supplement] [note: the recent A.S. 46.08.130 gives the new 
Oil and Hazardous Substance Response Office (OHSR)some authority to 
respond, without a formal declaration, but not itself to declare an emergency.] 
-Oil spill response powers and duties for all discharges from the Alaska oil 
transport system, on land and sea, should be vested in one agency, 
presumptively AOEC, instead of two or more. . 
[Requires statutory or regulatory supplement] 
- ADEC has been delegated full powers and duties, equivalent to the 
Governor's general powers in civil emergencies, in the event of "catastrophic" 
oU spills, defined according to the federal standard at 100,000 barrels, with 
lesser powers and duties in other spills. 
{Existing: A5. 26.23.020, AS. 46.03] 
- ADEC should be able to declare an oil spill emergency, triggering its full 
scope of response powers and duties, in the event of any substantial spill, 
without limitation by the federal-inspired standard of 100,000 bbl., because the 
levels of concern differ between state and federal governments, and because of 
the fact that future oil spills may well occur inland where relative dangers 
differ proportionately from ocean spills. 
[Requires statutory or regulatory supplement] 
- The State should set up an "oil spill tactical command center" system to . 
coordinate all state-federat-local-corporate response efforts, at least prior to , 
federalization, and thereafter to assist in assuring rational federalized efforts. 
(This goes beyond the recent aeation of the OHSR offic:e.) 
[Requires statutory or regulatory supplement; See Nestucca spill report] 
- The State's response efforts should be guided by Master Contingency Plans -
at minimum one for ocean spills, one for overland spills, one for inland river 
spills - which rationalize and are consistent· with any other offidal oil spill 
contingency plans; the Master C-Plans should be shaped by the State itself 
rather than the industry, prepared by a comprehensive and incisive drafting 
process drawing upon the best sdentific and technical advice available, in 
cooperation with federal agendes and local governments. 
[Requires regulatory supplement; statutory authority has recently been 
enhanced by the amended AS. 46.04.200] 
-., -
-The State should improve its ability to mobilize all required resources in the 
event of a major spill, by codifying and further authorizing, as necessary. an 
"emergency resource requisitioning system." 
{Requires statutory supplement; see Legal Res. Rep't, No. 5.2 ] 
1. Declaration of Oil SpjII Emer.=ns:y 
A. Initiatini the declaration: Authority . 
A legal declaration of an oil spill emergency is the fundamental trigger for the 
powers and opera~ons of an oil spill emergency response. 
The governor of the state is the primary official authorized and respOnsible 
for declaring emergencies under the Alaska Disaster Act (Alaska Statutes, Title 26. 
ch. 23 §010 and following sections; hereafter using the abbreviation form AS. 26.23 
§OlO). There is no specific requirement for a partic:uIar finding before a declaration 
can be made by the governor but it requires the support of the legislature. If the 
legislature rejects any declaration of emergency, it immediately terminates, AS. 
26.23.020 (e), and in any event it must be renewed every thirty days by-legislative 
approvaLlhe governor is given strong, specifically defined emergency powers, 
including the power to: 
• act as amunander-in-ch.ief of the organized and unorganized militia, and 
other emergency forces, 
• suspend regulatory statutes as necessary, 
• direct state and local government resources, 
• commandeer or utilize any private property [except property belonging to 
the news media1 . 
-relocate populations in the emergency area, 
- control movement within the area, 
• allocate ~vailab1e emergency supplies 
The Alaska Department of EnVironmental Conservation (ADEC) also has the 
power to declare civil emergencies on its own authority, AS. 46.03.865; such ADEC 
declarations, however, have less specifically broad powers set out than a 
gubernatorial declaration, unless a "catastrophJ,c:-' oil spilI of more than 100,000 
barrels is involved. In drcu:mstances where oil spills potentially exceed 100,000 
barrels, ADEC has a broader array of delegated emergency powers, taking over the 
functions and extensive powers of the Division of EmergenCy Services of the 
Department of Military Affairs and Veterans (DES). AS. 46.04. 080. (Even where a 
spill does not potentially exceed 100,000 barrelsl the Commissioner of ADEC may 
request the Governor to declare that a release of hazardous substances fulfills the 
-requirements for disaster emergency, and to delegate his powers to ADEe, thereby 
adding the stronger powers of the gubernatorial declaration to ADEC's independent 
disaster authority. (AS.46.09.030.» Given the fact that the next oil spill disaster 
may well occur on land rather than water, ADEC's full powers under AS. 46.04.080 
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and AS. 26.23.020 should be available for spills less than 100,000 barrels. The fact 
that ADEC can current! y take full command of an emergency situation, overriding 
the authority of DES and other state agencies, only where a spill potentially exceeds 
100/000 barrels of oil (a standard inspired by the federal government's standard for 
"catastrophic" spills requiring federal takeover) is a problem. This limitation 
should be amended to include full powers in the event of lesser major spills, 
because the state and federal governments have different levels of concern, and 
because of the fact that future oil spills may well occur inland where relative 
dangers differ proportionately from ocean spills. Under AS. 26.23.020(c), and 
46.04.120(2), the Governor's mobilization of full emergency powers is not limited by 
the 100,000 bbl requirement. A declaration may cover "any discharge which the 
governor determines presents a grave and substantial· threat to the economy or 
environment of the state." 
ADEC has recently been given additional authority under AS. 46.08.100, by 
the creation of the Oil and Hazardous Substance Response Office (OHSR) within 
ADEC. OHSR is to be prepared to respond promptly to oil spills. AS. 46.08.130. 
nus response, however, can be activated in only three ways: an emergency 
declaration by the governor or ADEC under A.S. 26.23 or 46.03.865; a catastrophic 
spill declared by ADEC under AS. 46.04.080; or by order of ADEC's Commissioner 
without a declaration where ,s/he "reasonably believes" that there is going to be a 
spill under the prior standards, or an "imminent and substantial" threat to public 
health or safety. The OHSR office's -emergency powers" are distinctly 
underwheI.ming; .apparently the OHSR's primary "power" in such cases is the 
ability to enter private property and go to work cleaning up spills by itself, A.S. 
46.08.140 (a), backed by an uncertain state fund, AS. 46.08.020. 
Under Alaska sta,tutes, the mobilization of necessary governmental powers 
r.equires a declaration of emergency. If a declaration is to be the initiation of full 
emergency response efforts it must come quickly. Even in the catastrophic Exxon 
Valdez spill, however, the official state declaration did not come until.Oay 'Three. In",,,, 
some states the mere occurrence of a natural disaster creates legal authority in civil 
officials to take emergency measures; in other states, local governments have 
declaratory power. (Some states permit the legislature by itself to declare a state of ,r 
emergency. See rey:ised statutes MO 44.010(4?). 
In Alaska's circumstances it is advisable to provide for a system of 
preliminary declaration of oil spill emergency, to be issued by either the Governor. 
or ADEC officials on-site, upon the first verified reports of a significant oil spill. 
nus would trigger all initial response duties and powers, but should be followed . 
within three days by a formal declaration of oU spill emergency in order to continue 
those duties and powers. 
B. The Content of on Spill Proclamation, Filings and Notice 
The proclamation declaring or terminating a state of emergency "must inaicate the 
nature of the disaster, the area or areas threatened or affected, and the conditions 
that have brought it about or which make possible the termination of the disaster 
emergency". A.S. 26.23.020 (c) 
I 
A declaration of emergency must be "disseminated promptly by means 
calculate to bring its contents to the attention of the general public, and unless 
prevented or impeded by circums~ces attendet;nt upon the disaster, properly filed 
with the Alaska Division of Emergency Servicesl the lieutenant governor and the 
municipal derk in the area to which it applies." AS. 26.23.020(d). These provisions 
do not require amendment. 
C. Duration 
A disaster emergency, once declared, remains in effect until the governor 
finds that the threat or danger has passed, or the disaster has been dealt with to the 
extent that emergency conditions no longer exist. If such conditions exist for more 
that th.irty days, the legislature must vote to continue the proclamation. The 
emergency is ended by the proclama.tion of the governor so stating, by concurrent 
resolution of the legislature at any time, or by legislative failure to renew an existing 
emergency proclamation after a thirty day period. AS. 26.23.020(c}. These 
provisiOns do not require amendment. 
2. The Governmental Entity in Command of Oil Spill Response 
{If federal government agencies officially "federalize" the oil spill dean .. up 
response function, as they may in certain circumstances for spills occurring both on 
'land and. em. water, then the State of Alaska will not continue to exercise the 
command role, instead yielding it to the federal government under the terms of 
iederal.statutes and the supremacy clause of the U.s. Constitution. In a number of 
·on spm situations, however, federal officials may choose not to federalize the dean .. 
up response efforts, or may delay federalization, deferring to state agencies for initial 
response efforts, choosing to assist and coordinate with state officials until a 
,situanon dearly requires federalization (if ever). In each event, the State of Alaska 
will substantially improve the overall governmental response machinery if it has 
created. an effeciWec~ state command system for assuming all response 
,effarts.;) 
What entity should be placed at the center of the Sta~'s future spill response. 
system? There are two preliminary considerations required to answer that question: 
. FllSt, what entity is the State's choice for overall direction of the oil transport 
systE9l\? - . . 
-Should the State choose to make an existing or new agency into a "super-
agency" as ~ as oil transport goes, focussing all powers and duties therein? 
This would require a difficult discussion about which of several agencies can 
best be entrusted with such a mandate, not an easy process politically or 
logically. . 
-The alternative approach recommended in Prof. Johson's SeaGrant Rep't 
No. 1.2, is to avoid such major reorganization, instead setting up a small 
higblevel standing '"Permanent Oil Transport Supervisory Taskforce,· 
reporting directly to the Governor and legislature, to act as an overview 
watchdog With no active administrative "mission" duties, but rather assuring 
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constant oversight, coordination, qUality control, management of spill 
prevention efforts, and response planning and readiness. 
The choice on this issue may by its terms determine who commands the State's 
response efforts if indeed a "superagency" is given overall prevention and response 
powers. The legal Research Team prefers the Taskforce approach; such a taskforce 
would focus on SUpervision and management prior to a spill, and response would 
be undertaken by an action agency. 
Second, is the response action agency to be a cleanup service or a supervisory 
command entity? (Either way, as to funding, ·the oil industry will inevitably and 
necessarily be the ultimate source of funds for any major state dean-up response 
system.) There are two different basic models that might be followed: 
• prior creation of a dedicated state response service, so that the state has all 
the resources and personnel necessary to take on the clean-up of an oil spill by 
itself, or 
• state take-over and direction of the private industry's clean-up resources in 
the event of a major spill. 
(a) In Maine, the Department of Environmental Protection itself is 
charged with the actual clean-up of oil discharges, including on-land spills 
involving pipelines; it es~blishes and maintains personnel and equipment where 
they may"be deployed to handle oil spill emergendes, and apparently can take on the 
entire task of cleanup (though of course the size of potential spills in Maine is 
generally far more limited than in Alaska). 38 Maine Revised Statutes Annotated 
544,548. This approach, however, is most feasible where spills are likely to be small; "'" 
in Alaska circumstances it would require an immense technical and economic 
undertaking on the part of the state. 
The recent OHSR entity does not appear to take on full cleanup responsibility. 
It proVides for a volunteer Response Corps, Response depots, and a response 
director within ADEC, who are backed by a severely limited OHSR fund. AS. 
46.08.020,110,120. This is not a suffidently comprehensive framework to support 
the full required functions for cleaning up major spills ~n land or water. 
Even if it were conceivable, a fully-adequate Alaska state clean-up service 
would be vastly expensive to maintain. In Maine there is a special transport license 
tax of [1 1/2d on every barrel of oil moved in the state, to finance the state's 
purchase and maintenance of adequate cleanup equipment and facilities, and Alaska 
. might wish to replicate that fund. but the Alaska Constitution's prohibition against 
dedicated funds appears to prevent creation of the Maine approach. 38 M:RSA §SSl; 
see Portland Pipe case, 307 A2d 1 (Me.1973; the Maine fund can be used to pay third 
party injuries Id.(2». (In the event of a spill, of course. Alaska can obtain direct . __ 
reimbursement for its costs. A.S. 46.04.010.) Theoretically interstate compacts might -
help bear some of the cost of clean-up response services, but the practicalities of 
distance and logistics indicate that interstate compacts would probably be of more 
use in the prevention sector of oil transport regulation. 
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(b) Given the scope of the Alaska subcontinent and the resources available 
to ;he State, it is clearly preferable that the State of Alaska follow, at least in part, the 
less elaborate approach: Instead of attempting to establish and maintain a service 
with complete cleanup capability, the State would still rely substantially upon the 
resomces of the petroleum industry for response and cleanup actions, while setting 
up a strong directive body to assert a dominant, active, hour-by-hour command of 
the response and cleanup process (absent federalization.) 
Lead asency and tactical direction of response efforts 
Which should be the state entity in command of an oil spill emergency? The 
OHSR office appears to have been given a start on that role, according to the recent 
Oil and Hazardous Substance Response Act, AS. 46.08.100ff, although as noted 
earlier its powers are not clear. Whatever entity is ultimately given primary 
authority, it is recommended that (preferably prior to, or in the event of a spill) the 
governor delegate his/her special emergency powers under the Alaska Disaster Act 
and otherwise {see discussion of authority, Reptt No. 5.2,] to some form of Oil Spill 
Tactical Command Center on-site. Such a command center proved its tactical 
effectiveness in the recent Nestucca oil spill in the waters of British Columbia and 
Washington. (See appendix - Nestucca Oil Spill On-Scene S:oordinator's Re,portc 
Seatde. Auf:USt1:9a2*) In the Nestucca oil spill response, the command center 
organization successfully integrated state and federal clean-up efforts. 
Under a Letter of Agreem.ent between AOEC, EPA, and the BLM Alaska state 
office dated 8 April 1982, ADEC was designated the On Scene Coordinator {OSO for 
all spills 0fiBinat:ing on state or private land, and spills incidental to operation and 
maintenance of the pipeline. (BLM is OSC only for spills from pipeline failures on 
federal lands.) The command center thus presumptively would be headed by a 
senior ADEC official who would be designated on-scene coordinator for the state. It 
would have ,liaison sta:ffassigned to it by relevant state agencies, operating under its 
command, including state .police, DES, -community development, health, and the 
like;as ~aild serve:as a common location for the Federal On-Scene 
CoordinalOr (FOSC) and the Responsible Parties' On Scene Coordinator <RPOSC), as 
well as IiaismlCD .Native corporations potentially affected, and to citizen groups. 
ADEC is already entrusted with the lead. agency role as to environmental . 
emergencies in genf!:Tll and on spills in particula:r. There is a split of authority, 
however, under the terms of the Alaska Disaster Act. Under the terms of that 
statute, the governor has the ability to act personally or through a delegee, to take 
contrOl of and direct the state's response to emergencies in general. The Division of . 
Emergency Services has concurrent jurisdiction to prepare f9f and carry out 
emergency responses, and to develop "plans" to cover various potential civil 
emergencies. AS. 26.23.040.. 
ADEC has two forms of emergency authority. Like the Governor, it has tJ'le 
full emergency response powers noted where spills exceed 100,000 barrels, and the 
§86S power in lesser spills to declare emergencies, and "issue orders directing 
persons to take action the department believes necessary to meet the emergency, and 
to pfotectthe public health, welfare, or environment." AS. 46.03.865. The 
department may order other state agencies to take particular actions, but the 
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operational chain of command and the degree of ADEC authority are not clear. 
A.S.46.03.865{c). The nature and force of such §865 orders, moreover, is not made 
. clear under that statute, and anyone who is given an 86S order may immediately 
request a hearing, which might effectively undercut the effectiveness of an 
emergency order. A.S. 46.03.865(b). (Pre-enforcement review of emergency orders, 
and of compliance orders generally, should not be provided except in extra-ordinary 
cases.) 
ADEC now has authority under A.S. 46.04.200 to "prepare and annually 
review and revise" a statewide master spill response contingency plan, and regional 
plans {Id. §210], with annual open public review, and hold unannounced oil spill 
drills [no set frequency]. The statewide plan obviously can not have just a single set 
of standards and procedures; statewide oil spill threats differ as widely as Alaska's 
waters and terrain. Accordingly ADEC should be directed to incorporate several 
specifically-tailored sectoral cxm.tingency plans within the statewide master plan'- at 
minimum one sectoral plan for ocean spills, one for overland spills, one for inland 
river spills, adjusted for seasonal and climatic variables - which rationalize and are 
consistent with any other official oil spill contingency plans. The master C-plan[s] 
should be shaped by Alaska itself rather than by the industry, prepared by a 
. comprehensive and incisive drafting process drawing .upon the best scientific and 
technical advice available, in cooperation with federal agencies and local 
governments. 
As noted, only where a spill potentially exceeds 100,000 barrels of oil (inspired 
by the federal government's standard for "catastrophic" spills which require federal 
takeover) does ADEC take full command of an emergency situation. AS. 46.04.080. 
For the reasons noted earlier, this is a limitation that should be amended to allow 
full response as required by ADECin any substantial oil spill situation, weighing the 
spill in its environmental setting so as to determine the degree of seriousness and 
whether an oil spill emergency should be declared. 
Also, to improve subsequent response efforts, the State should supervise the . 
development of protocols for the deployment and use of recovery technologies . 
(including innovative coagulant technologies, bum methods, and disperSants, as 
appropriate.> Major doubts about these technologies, including the question 
whether some might do more harm than good, prevented dedsion.ma.kers in the 
Exxon Valdez spill from knowing enough to make rapid reasoned decisions. After 
an appropriate course of investigations and hearings, there should be a sufficient 
technical and policy basis to improve the data base and in some cases to prepare 
protocols pre-authorizing the deployment and use of these technologies. 
3. Functions of an OU Spill Command Center 
A. ContinSen£Y Plan 
Alaska has recently taken an essential step toward strengthening its spill 
response capability in enacting legislation requiring ADEC to prepare a statewide 
master contingency plan for oil and hazardous substance discharges, and 
prevention. A.S. 46.04.200. In formulating the master contingency plan, ADEC is 
\ 
I 
i 
I 
directed to include "federal and state aiencie~-~d private parties, in assessi:1g, 
clarifying, and specifying response roles." [The DES is required to have contingency 
plans for various emergencies, but does not appear to have produced oil spill 
contingency plans, given the fact that ADEC has concurrent authority, and take-over 
authority if spills potentially exceed 100,000 barrels.1 It is proposed that ADECs 
mandate, under the statewide plan requirement of A.S. 46.04.200, be interpreted to 
require specifically-tailored component contingency plans for spills in each of the 
relevant five sectors of oil transport, and for particular spill scenarios in each: 
(a) for off-shore oil drilling operations and surroundings [currently primarily 
Cook Wet, but potentially elsewhere] 
(b) for north Slope gathering areas for the pipeline, and analogous gathering 
areas for other fields [currently exempted from most direct regulation]. 
(c) for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 800 miles overland from North Slope to 
Valdez terminal (requires three different types of C-Plan: over-(and under-) 
land SlIms; and spills into inland waters. i.e. at the Yukon crossing; and 
wetland spills]. 
Cd) for Valdez Terminal. and adjacent harbor spills. 
(e) for the tanker route from Valdez through the Sound and the Gulf to the 
Lower 48. 
Having Alaska set up its own contingency plans for these sectors is necessary to 
ensure that the State is a dominant player, avoiding the privatization that has 
,Characterized management of operations, contingency planning and spill response. 
B. Notification 
Among the immediate fur.ctions of the ADEC oil spill command center 
would be to initiate the declaration of oil spill emergency, notifying all relevant 
. parties of the occurrence of a significant spill. The initial notification sets in motion 
the mobilization of resources and procedures as designed in the revised contingency 
plans. The State's command center serves as .the site of active coordination for pre-
designated representatives of state agencies, federal agencies, local governments, 
native corporations, dtizens groups, and other responsible parties. Rapid 
implementation of an effective communication system is one of the basic 
requirements of an effecti~e response organization 
C. Cleanup and Res.ponse Operations 
Subsequent course of action follows according to the terms of the revised 
contingency plans ... .For an instructive analysis of how a response team can 'work in 
the confusion of a complex emergency, see Nestucca OU Spill On-Scene 
Coordinator's Report. Seattle. AUiYst 1989. 
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Judicial Remedies for Prevention of Future Oil Spills 
L Pros.pecius 
This report surveys several judicial remedies which can be advantageously 
applied by courts reviewing the Exxon Valdez disaster. under general equitable 
powers; they can also be applied in other future public safety and resource protection 
litigation. 
n. Recommendations 
PROSPEcnYE EQUITABLE REMEDIES 
• The Oil Spill Commission, the Legislature, and the Governor should urge the 
Attorney General to include requests for a variety of prospective equitable 
remedies - including injunctions and court-appointed monitoring.~ to be 
included in any final judgments or consent agreements resulting from the State's 
Exxon Valdez litigation. 
PROSPECTIVE IN}'TJNcnONS 
• When the -ongoing court proceedings produce major findings and 
determinatioN about particular wrongful past conduct contributing to the spill, 
these sh~ each be encapsulated In injunction decrees. These should be decrees 
oriented toward prospective cond.uct (z:tot merely remedial orders aimed. at 
restoring put natural resource conditions.) Such prospective decrees should 
variously prescribe or proscribe relevant practices, conduct# and conditiON. as 
required. to assure maximum feasible avoidance of future oil spills. and 
maximum feasible response in the event such future spills do occur. 
EQUITABLE MONITORS 
• Where court orders deal with areas of the oU transport system that are 
particularly complex. informatfon--sensitive, or problematic for compliance, the 
State should suggest to the court that it appoint one or more post-decree 
monitors to supervise the ongoing implementation of the court's orders. as well 
as maintaining continuing jurisdiction. 
s 
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m. Introduction 
This report outlines a variety of judicial remedies arising through the 
equitable jurisdiction of courts. The cu:rrently-ongoing lawsuits, seeldng recovery for 
injuries to natural resources and property arising from the Exxon Valdez oU spill, 
provide an opportunity for the State of Alaska to ask the coUrts to issue forward-
looking remedial orders in addition to money compensation, thereby "piggybacking" 
equitable remedies upon the dvil damage litigation. 
More than one hundred and forty lawsuits have been Bled in the Exxon 
Valdez case. In the course of this Utigation# whether consolidated or separate, the 
courts will develop extensive evidence about the conduct of the industry parties, the 
state, and the federal government. 
Wherever it is determined that particular negligence or wrongful intentional 
acts contributed in whole or part to the Exxon Valdez disaster, a court may 
appropriately tallor forward-looking injuIu:tive relief to its dvU damage remedies, 
seeking to prevent those wrongful conditions from recurring in the future. 
likewise in other controversies through the 1990's, as natural resource 
problems continue to arise and be addressed in serious fashion, equitable remedies 
should be actively considered for judicial application. Especially where the State 
exercises its role as public trustee, reaffirmed in the recent Owsichek case (see 
SeaGrant Report 8.ll, equitable orders will regularly be the preferred judicial 
remedies. It would be timely and fitting for the State's enforcement offices now to 
start developing special expertise and planning for informed, imaginative, expanded 
use of modem equitable remedy doctriJ1es. 
~ memorandum surveys some of the particular areas in which various 
equitable remedies aD be applied, and briefly analyzes their nature, supporting 
authority, and practical consequences. 
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IV. Some Examples of Prospective Equitable Remedies 
By way of example, the following are a range Qf injunctions and other 
equitable remedies which could be applied to parties in the Exxon Valdez litigation, 
or more broadly in other litigation under the equitable powers of a court. (These 
examples, though drawn from allegations arising in the Exxon Valdez incident, are 
completely theoretical, and do not presume that there will in fact be specific findings 
of wrongful conduct in that controversy SO as to support anyone or more of the 
following particular hypothetical decrees): 
1. The Court orders the Exxon corporation, Alyeska, and other iNiustnal 
defendants to establish specialized fish hatcheries on the shores of 
Prince William Sound to re-stodc aquatic resources lost in the oil spill. 
20 The Court orders the Exxon corporation to refrain from paying any 
bonuses through any internal corporate procedures, direct or indirect, 
that reward shortcuts or speed in the safe handling and transport of oil 
through the Culf of Alaska.' ' 
3. The Court orders Alyeska to maintain a permanent spedalized. tanker-
loading aew at the Valdez terminal, as originally undertalcen, so as to 
avoid the sevezal dangers posed by inexpert loading practices at that 
fadlity. 
The Court orders Alyeska to provide it and the Alaska state 
government with an data obtained from through-the-pipeline 
monitoring "pigs", and undertake monitoring of corrosion, 
subsidence.. and other damage to the pipeline at least twice a year. 
S. The Court orders Alyeska to maintain in constant ready condition all 
booming, skimming, and oil retrieval storage equipment, as specified 
,in applicable state and federal oil spill contingency plans - with 
duplicate badcup resources if there is any q1.1estion ol.equipment 
uncertainty - and to run tri-mo~t.hJy unannounced readiness drills to 
mafutaln a high state of preparedness. [This example illustrates the 
role 9f equity as a complement and reinforcement to other public law 
regulatory devices; see below, VlL] , 
6. The Court issues an injunction requiring double-hulling, minimum 
aew size, and use of ARPA (Automatic Radar POSitioning Aid) in 
Alaska waters, against aU liable defendants. [This example illustrates 
the conjectural role of equitable orders setting judicial requirements 
that would certainly face serious problems if ~pplled by state statute; 
see pre-emption section below, in VIL] . 
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8. 
The Court appoints an equitable monitor to observe and report, on a 
bi-monthly basis on the defendant's compliance with the injunction 
on oil spill contingency response readiness set out in Injunction 
Example 5, above. 
The Court appoints an equitable monitor to observe and report to the 
Court, on a twice-yearly basis, from within the defendant corporation, 
at the defendant's expense, (1) on the defendant's compliance with the 
prohibition on speed. bonuses set out in Injunction Example 2. above. 
and (2) with recommendations for modifications of th~ injunction 
whenever such appear necessary to assure its effectiveness in reducing 
internal corporate incentives for Oltting comers on navigational and 
environmental safety. 
9. U in the course of any future controversy over environmental 
hazards, a Court identifies a defendant corporate entity that is either 50 
obstructive, recalcitrant, or managerially incompetent, that the Court 
deems it highly improbable that the defendant will be able to comply 
with statutory law and court orders, then in the interest of public safety 
the Court can find it necessary to put the defenctant corporation into a 
managerial receivership, to be reviewed and renewed on an annual 
basis, 50 ~ng as necessary. 
and so OD._ 
.s.. .. 
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v. Injunctions 
A 
Injunctions were for a long tiIne regarded as "extraordinary" remedies, to be 
issued only in those rare occasions that economic damage awards were inappropriate 
or insufficient. A certai:n hesitancy in applying injunctions continued through the 
mid-20th century, explai:ned in part by New Deal judges' aversion to some 
conservative courts' exercise of injunc:t:i.on powers against labor imions. Over the 
past two decades, however, the injunction has become the remedy ot choice in a 
wide range of public and private law areas, fueled by the growth of administrative 
law; civil rights, and environmental litigation. In these and many other areas of 
modern practice, money damages are often insufficient or inappropriate. Often only 
equitable orders can provide fully relevant relief. 
oThe virtues and advantages of injunction-based remedies are obvious. They 
can be taUQreci quite precisely to the specific drt:umstances ·of each case, based upon a 
full court record and findings of past and prospective wrongful conduct. As 
necessary and expedient, a court can issue orders with great specificity as to time, 
place, personne4 conduct, equipment, organizational procedure, and required 
performance standards. These decrees are not generally subject to political lobbying. 
bureauaatic pressures, or procedural requirements like pre-enfon:e;ment review, as 
is normally the case with administrative agency orders. They are, moreover, backed 
by the constant presence of the court's contempt power, which makes criminal. not 
civil, sanctions available for any violation of the court's orders. 
In the State's 'Exxon Valdez litigation to date, although the complaint does 
request equitable relief, the disc:ussions of contemplated injunctive remedies appear 
to focus Oft retrospective restoration injunctions. like hypothetical injunction 
example aum.ber 1 ;above, seeking to return conditions in Prince William Sound and 
elsewhere as far as possible to their prior state. 'That initiative is worthwhile, but 
misses out on potentiany far more useIul prospective applications of injunction 
remedi,es: seeking to prevent as far as possible the occurrence of another such 
catastrophe in the A.lasb aU transport system, and seeking to assure a high state of 
response readiness if another disaster does happen. 
Under Alaska law, as in virtu.al1y an modem state caselaw, it is quite clear 
that an injunction can be affinnative as well as merely prohibitory in its effect. 
Injunctions are issued regularly requiring defendants who have been found to be 
involved in wrongful action to take positive affinnative steps to coned those 
actions and to mitigate their effects on plaintiffs. See Weed v . .A.l.n\ 516 P2d 137 
(Alaska 1973), 
In each case it is required that the court identify a wrongful act which has 
injured the rights or property of persons or the state. In the oU spill context, that 
kind of wrongful conduct is not likely to be difficult to demonstrate in most cases. 
An injunction is issued where the plai:ntiff argues that money damages are not 
sufficient. Given the ecosystemic injuries of oil spills, and the longterm difficulties 
of rehabilitating Prince William Sound and other potentially-polluted sectors of the 
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oil transport system effE!Cti~elYI'aniIijUrtCtidriis clearly available. Prospective 
injuries are dearly irreparable under non:nal economic damage remedies. 
. Although such injunctions are not frequent, insofar as injunctions specify 
particular internal corporate conduct of a defendant corporation, there is no a priori 
reason why such conduct is not as fully susceptible to injunctive remedy as 
individual conduct. if the corporation's conduct has been found to be wrongful The 
question rather is how difficult it may be to define the terms of injunctions 
spec:ifically enough to effect the subtleties 01 corporate conduct. In the example 
above of corporate bonuses for speed in transiting the rocky waters of the Sound and 
the often ice-dogged waters of the tanker channeL it may be difficult to aaft 
injunctions that are specific enough to be enforceable by the equitable remedy of 
contempt of court. The only question, however, is the technical task of ~fting the 
terms of the injunctions. 
The application of prospective injunctive remedies to the Alaska oil transport 
situation thus is legally straightforward and feasible, and offers a variety of 
substantive and tactical advantages for achieving higher levels of prevention and 
response. 
VI. Belond InJunctions 
. Tn a number of cases, courts do not merely issue an injunction. They 
supplement it with an order creating a court ... ppointed. post-decree "monitor', and 
can even go so far as appointing and aeating manc:!Atory "receiverships" over 
defendant corporatiON. Both of these named orclen are post-judgment remedies, 
but they differ greatIyin the scope and aggressiveness of the cure. 
Remedies beyond injunctions appear to be ordered in at least four standard 
situations; where the defendant has demonstrated bad faith, where the defendant 
has shown general incompetence and mismanagement, where the defendant is 
lacking in suffidentre;oUlCeS to overcome economic, technicaL or poUtical obstacles 
in complying with law. or where the size and. complexity of the undertaldng are 
themselves dauntinJ. 
ruC£jVEBSHlPS) 
The most stringent remedy beyond simple issuance of injunctions Ja 
receivership. A court-appointed receiver moves into an organization or corporation 
and, backed. by the judidal order and contempt powers within it, takes over the 
actual day-to-day formal administration and. management of the entity. A receiver 
in effect becomes the chief executive officer and. chairman of the board of a defendant 
corporation under receivership. Receivership II familiar and fairly uncontroversial 
in the area of bankruptcy, where court-appointed receivership is a familiar method 
of choice for resolving the complex financial d.i.fficuIties of corporations with 
massive debt. The receiver manages the company until ~ can either be Uquidated or 
brought back to solvency 
Receiverships, however, have been extended beyond the bankruptcy setting, 
to include a variety of less frequent but nevertheless interesting appUcations, where 
corporations are systematically incapable of following a particular set of regulatory 
requirements. See Morgan, 379 F. Supp 410; S09 Fed 2d 580 (l974). where the 
receivership extended over the entire Boston public school system owing to 
violations of statutory integration requirements; and see Johnson, "Equitable 
Remedies: an Analysis of Judidal Utilization of NeoReceiverships to Implement 
Large Scale Institutional Change", 1976 Wisconsin L Rev. 1161; Receivership as 
Environmental Remedy, 10 ELR 10059 (1980); Venae. 671 F. Supp 595 (ED Ark. 1987); 
Chern-Dyne, C.A. 80-03-0021 (Ohio App. 1981). 
Receivership, however. is the big gun, a-remedy of such force that when it 
leaves the accepted area of banlcn1ptcy to enter into enVironmental enforcement, it 
can stimulate resistance and resentment from judges as well us defendants. and 
hence may not be a regularly available or advisable enforcement tool 
POST·PE'CREE MONIlOBS • I 
But the spedal remedies beyond simple injunctions need not go 50 far as a 
court-appointed receiver ac:tual1y taking over the management of a defendant 
corporation. 
A useful and more measured remedy is the carelully-defined appointment of 
one or more post-decree monitors 50 as to provide for continuing equitable 
survemance of the operation of the court's order. See hypothetical examples 7 and 8. 
Once an injunction is issued, there are always questions whether it was properly 
drafted to answer the problems for which it was requested, whether c.hangmg 
circumstmces have made its terms less appropriate, or whether experiaace has 
shown. that the order should be made more stringent, in addition to questions of 
ascertaining the defendant's good faith compliance, competence, and tec:hnia1 
ca pabillties. 
In .each case a judge may appoint a "monitor" to be stationed on-site with the 
defendant 50 as to oversee and keep an eye on the defendant's compliance with the 
injunction, and on the sufficiency of the injunction. 
. Having such • court monitor placed within a defendant corporation, (paid by 
the corporation and yet sepamte from it, with a mandate to scrutinize the litigated 
drc:umstanc:es and report from within to the observing courtl, accomplishes • 
number of pra~ advantages. Compliance with the order is removed from an 
adversa.rial setting, where plaintiffs ~ constantly ovenide the counterpressure of 
defendants III order to have the court take account of their arguments, and. 
defendants must continually mobilize the special resources needed to mount an 
active part!san defense. If the observing monitor Is the court's own agent, that 
person is automatically removed from the adversaria1 mode, committed to 
nonpartisan objectivity, and court proceedings are accordingly potentially much 
more efficient. 
Ulce all equitable orders, the order appointing a monitor is backed by the full 
authority of the equity court" including the contempt power. This means that .failure 
to provide required information, or provision of will.fu1ly inaccurate information, 
immediately opens defendants to criminal sanctions. 
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The mere presenceofa monitor within a defendant corporation, moreover, 
provides a constant visual manifestation of the court's authority, the seriousness of 
public concern in the tnatter, and the probationary nature of the defendant's ongoing 
conduct. The monitor can also serve to identify legitimate problems arising with the 
injunction, where it appears that the need for an injunction has ended, or that the 
terms of the injunction do not fit the particular goals and purposes for which it had 
been created, and can facilitate amendment or supplementation of its terms. 
The authOrity lor s··"::t a monitor lies both within specific Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and witlw~ the general common law powers of courts. Under FRCP 
Rule 53, courts can appoint masters or monitors, paid. by the defendant, to supervise 
and manage litigation issues. Usually a Rule 53 "master" 15 appointed to handle 
matters prior to the 6:nal decree in a case, but the same terms have been used to 
authorize post-deaee masters as well. (Convention tends to use the word. "monitor" 
for post-ciecree appointments, reserving the term "master' for pre-decree judicial . 
appointees.) FRO' 66 codifies the equity jurisdiction, incorporating receiverships as 
well" as the injunctive jurisdiction and eveJything in between, including the 
inherent power under equity to issue such orders. FRO' 70 provides courts with 
whatever powers are necessary to assure that their orders will be complied with. 
FRO' 701 in other words. is a free-floating grant of such powers "necessary and 
proper" to insure complian:e. 
The Supreme Court.. furthennore, has held that courts have an -mherent 
power" in the circumstances of equity to tailor their remedies so as to achieve the 
goals and purposes of the judicial forum. In an opinion by Justice Brandeis, In Re: 
Peterson, 2S3 U.s. 300 (1920), the court asserted that remedies beyond injunctions 
could be designed when injunctiON in themselve would not accomplish the goal. 
when expert assistance to the court in implementing its decree was necessary. or in 
general in other "extraordinary circumstances". In each case the court should look at 
the nature of the plaintiff, the nature of the violations of lawl the difficulty of the 
circumstances, and the complexity of the violations or the relief that is sought, in 
determi:ning whether equitable remedies beyond injunctions might issue. 
" In sum, the option of seeking court appointment of post-ciecrte monitors, as 
an equitable remedy supplementary to injunctions, offers a number of very tangible 
benefits to legal enforcement efforts, and deserves serious attention In anyattem.pt to 
improve Alaska's resource protection polldes. 
¢ 
VII. Equitable Remedies as Supplements to Regulation 
Equitable remedies, particularly prospective injunctions and equitable 
monitors discussed above, can obviously offer major benefits for environmental 
protection, spill prevention, and respons~. even if they are not integrated into a 
comprehensive policy of state administrative enforcement efforts. Equally 
obviously, they can strengthen and improve the State's programs if they are 
conceived and requested to operate alongside ongoing legislative and administrative 
efforts. 
One of the equitable examples above (number 5), for instance, illustrated how 
a court's order can d.irectly incorporate and parallel administrative remedies. thereby 
sharing roles with the administrative process. 
Is it apPropriate lor judges in equity to enter into areas in which regulatory 
gove~ent plays a prominent role? . 
It is dear that in many cases judicial remedies may undertake the same kind 
<of regulatory actions a state could otherwise accomplish through statute or rule, in 
advance of such state action. This does not appear to be unusual or inappropriate. 
Courts have often been able to respond to sodetal necessities at a pace faster than the 
. administrative or legislative processes. As has often happened over the years, a 
court may be asked to enter into a situation involving sped.fic plaintiffs and 
defendants, and issue an order that ultimately becomes a model and a catalyst for 
subsequent administrative or legislative action. 'That dearly is a possibility in 
Uti.gation concerning the Alaska on transport process, and ultimately an important 
reason why judidal remedies should be considered. in the ongoing litigation, and in 
future cases superintending the resources of the state, both hydrocarbon resources 
and otherwise. . 
Fwther" there .is no reason why equitable remedies in litigation should not be 
mobilized to supplement aDd reinforce ongoing governmental1nitiatives. They do 
offer advantages over administrative remedies In speed. precision, and the 
seriousness with which they are taken. The prima%y jurisdiction doctrine is not a 
bar; a self·imposed judfda1 restraint, it focusses on whether a court should take on 
the fu.t:ldamentalliabUity fact-finding process when an agency is authorized and 
ready to do $0. Where courtroom litigation over liability issues is already underway, . 
as herel the defense is nat applicable. Moreover, when a·court Is dealing with issues 
of potent:ia.Uy catastrophic effect upon a statel its people and resources, its equity role 
is dominated by the compulsions of the public interest rather than deference. Where 
dangers are demonstrated to exist, and equitable orders are demonstrated to offer 
potentially important protections to the public Interest, a court acts within Its 
historically traditional equlty role, as well as its modern mandate, in aafting 
protective remedies. 
[POSSIBLE m·EMrnON AOV ANlAGES] 
There is a further point at which equitable remedies may ofter advantages to a 
state's enforcement effortsl though it is quite conjectural. Under the supremacy 
clause of the United States Constitution, there are certain areas where state 
governments cannot regulate because the area has been expressly or impliedly pre-
empted by the federal government. In Chevron v. Hammond, 7.Z6 F.2d 483 (9th eir. 
1984), Alaska's attempt to regulate certain aspects of tanker transport was struck 
down by the dist:rici court and only partially resurrected by the d.n:uit court of 
appeals. Pre-emption is discu.ssed. exterlSiveIy in the oil transport setting in Professor 
Rieser's report (Number 4.2). 
The question arises, however, whether the common la:w and its equitable 
remedies can issue judicial orders even where their substantive requirements would 
in allllkelihood be pre-empted. against statutory action by a state. 
In the examples, for instance, of an injunc:tton requiring doubl~hulling, 
minimum crew size. and use of ARPA (Automatic Radar Positioning Aid) in Alaska 
waters. state statutes would almost certainly be pre-empted, but there is at least a 
possibility that injunctive remedies might not be equally pre-empted. Injunctions 
and couu:non Jaw actions are designed to tailor restrictions on potentially hannful 
conduct to the needs of particular neighborhood and local conditions. Statutes are 
usually designed to provide overall generic: regulation for general nationwide 
conditions. Accordingly it might be argued that common Jaw remedies in the 
neighborhood of Prince William Sound, or elsewhere in the oil transport system, are 
localized dec-ees which do not contradict the generic regulatory role of the federal 
govenu::nent but supplement it This argument's weakest ground is where a court 
holds that unilormity is a dominant federal goal; otherwise the argument holds 
some possibilities for state action. 
There is some authority in the United States Supreme Court to support this 
argument. In the case of the Estate of Karen Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corporation. 
-464 US 2.38 (1984). the United. States Supreme Court held that the question of 
radioactive safety was completely pre-empted by federal law against state statutory 
regulation-The Supreme Court held. however, that the state court could 
nevertheless go forNard and sanctior. the nuclear ma..."lulih.-turer, by exercising its 
common law remedies. The manufacturer had to respond to the common Jaw 
act!o~'s compensatory damage claims, and even more significantly to punitive 
damage daimsl which are directly designed to punish and deter future action by the 
corporation. 
The Simplest answer probably would be that if a matter is dearly Pl'1H!mPted. 
against state regulation by a federal statute, then an injunction upon the defendant 
has precisely the same effect that a state regulation would have, and should. be 
similarly pre-empted. Silkwood, however, does not take that simple approach. In 
Silkwood It Is dear that the state, through its punitive damages, was seeldng to effect 
the defendant's future radiation safety behavior, and yet the Supreme Court held 
such legal action to be non·pr~pted. In several other cases, the Supreme Court 
has indicated that common law remedies, spedficaUy mentioning injunctions, may 
survive in ci.rcumstances where state regulation would be pre-empted. lnthe 
Cannon case, 79 S.Ct 773,778-779 (1959), the Supreme Court stated. that where the 
federal concerns are "periphery" and "the regulated conduct touched interests deeply 
rooted in local feeUng and responsibility," pre-emption would not operate. 0. 
MaIlinkrodt, 698 5W2d 854 (Mo. App. 1985). 
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In the final analysis, the results of pr~emption arguments can never be 
accurately detennined before the fact. Courts have no consistent dear standards bv 
which they find implied pre-emption. Where there appears to be a plausible ~ 
opportunity to circumvent pre-emption, the state and other plaintiffs may well wish 
to request the injunctive remedy, allowing the arguments to prevail as they may in 
subsequent judicial hearings. As the judicial-political climate has shifted more 
toward state's rights, the scope of pre-em.ption is J..ikely to continue to shrink. 
Summaxy 
Equitable remedies have a variety of uses in attempting to regulate conduct of 
the oil transport industry SO as to avoid future oil spills and to assure" effective 
response measures if spills do occur. The availability of prospective equitable 
remedies dearly enhances the ability of the State to add aedible clout to its 
administrative enforcement efforts. In particular, prospective injunctions and 
equitable post-decree monitors recommend themselves to the serious attention of 
state officials and involved citizens seeking to improve Alaska's efforts for longterm 
resource protection. 
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INTROOUCTION 
THE PUBLJC TRUST OOCTRINE 
AND ALASKA OIL 
by 
Ralph W. Johnson 
Professor of Law 
The purpose 01 this study is to analyze and explain the relationship of the public 
trust doctrine to the oil transportation and spill probfems of Alaska. 
Alaska Senate Bill No. 2n, established the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Commission, -to 
.. investigate the Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster and to recommend changes needed to , 
minimize the possibility and effects of similar oil spills. - The commission has a duty to 
-make findings and recommendations· on -govemmental practices or laws that should be 
changed to minimize the potential for future similar events,· and recommend -steps that 
should be taken by au fevels of govemment to ensure proper management, handling, and 
transportation of crude oil and to improve the ability of industry and govemmental 
agencies to respond to oil discharges.· 
With the support of Sea Grant Alaska, this study analyzes the potential application 
of the public 1rust doctrine to these mandates. The public trust doctrinee,' put simply, is 
an ancient, but recenUy expanding, judicially created doctrine that says the public has an 
1 A seled few of the artie/es on the public trust doctrine indude: Cunning, The Publi« 
Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law: OISyord or Harmom1 30 Rocky Ml Min. L mst. 
17·1 (1984); Johnson, publiC Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Love' •• 14 U.C. 
Cavis L Rev. 233 (1980); Sax, ThO PubliC( Trust DOddnO in Natural AesoucQOs Law: . 
Effective Judicial1ntorvontfon. 68 Mich. L Rev. 471 (1970); Wilkinson, The Pyblic Trust 
Doet"no in Public Land Law. 14 U.C. Oavis L Rev. 269 (1980); Ausness. Water Rights. 
ThO Public Trust Qoctrino. and the Protection of 'nstream Usos. 1986 U. m.L Rev. 407; 
Lazarus, Changing Conceptions pf Prpcerty and sovlrOignty in Natura! Resoyrces; 
Qyestion the Pyblic Trust DpdOng. 71 Iowa L Rev. 631 (1986). 
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interest akin to an easement, which predates all private ownership, for the protection of 
navigation, commerce, fishery. wildlife habitat and kindred interests. 
This study will survey the origins of the Dublic trust doctrine, its current application in 
., other states. its current development in Alaska, and its potential application to oil 
transportation and oil spill issues. It is noteworthy that over the past 15 years, in half the 
states, over 100 reported cases involving the public trust doctrine have had a major 
impact on natural resources protection.! 
The report concludes that the public trust doctrine could be used in Alaska as a 
basis for zoning or land use management. For example. tidelands could be zoned as 
-natural" areas. thus preventing fills in those areas or construction of oil facilities. Use of 
the public trust doctrine would eliminate the possibility of constitutional challenges to 
such zoning which could be raised if the normal ·police power" authority of the State is 
the basis 10r zoning. The public trust doctrine might also be the basis of litigation 
enjoining sloppy oil tanker navigation practices. or crew management, although 
preemption issues need to be addressed here. Other possible uses of the public trust 
doctrine will be discussed at the end of this study. 
Z See Lazarus. supra. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The public trust doctrine is an ancient doc'::'ine, used to protect the ~!,.;t:!ic ir.!erest in 
navigation. commerce. and fisheries. Courts around the United States have expanced 
this doctrine in recent years to explicitly cover pollution and water quality Questions. As 
thus developed the doctrine can provide a useful tool for the state of Alaska to contrel cil 
. spills. 
The Alaska Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3, adopts the public trust doctrine. 
, Section 3 provides: 'Wherever occurring in the natural state, fish, wildlife. and'waters are 
i 
reset\led to the people for common use: While the term ·public trusr is not explicitly 
used, the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention make it dear that the intent of the 
language was to express this doctrine. The Alaska Water Use Act (A.S. 45.'5) directly 
incorporates the Section 3 language, thus providing that this basic water law Should be 
interpreted consistent with the doctrine. In 1985 the Alaska legislature enacted (Ch. e2. 
Section 1. SLA 1985. Temporary and Special Acts) specifically codifying the public trust 
doctrine with regard to navigable or public waters of the state and their beds. 
Two key cases decided in 1988 gave a major boost to the public trust doctrine in 
Alaska. In ewe Fisha"el, Inc. v. 8unkgf (755 P. 2d 1115. 19S5) the court held that 
privately owned tidelands were subject to the public trust doctrine so that the public could 
.enter these lands for navigation, commerce and fiSheries in spite of their private 
ownership. The court said that to convey tidelanc;fs Jree of this public trust would require 
the conveyance to be in furtherance of a specific public trust purpose and without 
substantial Impairment of the public's interest in the land conveyed. The conveyance in 
question was not in furtherance of a public trust purpose, so the land is still subject to the 
trust. In ONslchek v. Statg Guide Wcensing and CQn1ro! Board (763 Pt 2d 488 ~, the 
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Alaska court relied on the public trust dOctrine to strike down legislation giving exc!usive 
use permitS to hunting guides for different areas. 
Alaska is launched on a path of reliance on the put-lie trust doctrine. The followir.g 
, recommendations are based on the assumption that this trend will continue. 
4 
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The public trust doctrine as a basis for legislation. 
Recommendation No.1. 
The public trust doctrine should be used as the basis for environmental proteC!ion 
., legislation designed to prevent oil spills, on land. or water. When so used it removes the 
question of unconstitutionality of the legislation. If the public trust doctrine is applicable. 
then the burden it imposes antedates al/ private rights or cfaims and imposes a pre· 
existing public ·easement- on private rights. It can, for example. be used to zone coastal 
areas, including privately owned coastal and tide lands, for -natural- uses so that oil 
transportation or storage facilities would have to be placed elsewhere. It can be used to 
cbntrot dredge and fill activities. 
Recommendation No.2. 
The public trust doctrine. along with the state police power. should be used to 
regulate the number and size of oil storage tanks available for pipeline emergencies at 
Valdez. There is a significant risk of spUl, into the Sound. if storage facilities are not 
adequate to handle a pipeline or tanker emergency. This problem could be addressed 
under the public trust doctrine. 
Both accidental or intentional discharges of oil from ships can be controUed under 
the pubffc trust doctrine, to the extent that these matters are not preempted by federal 
taw. The discharge of 011 at sea adversely affects fish and wildlife and is thus subject to 
control under the pubDc trust doctrine • 
5 
Recommendation No.3. 
If Congress passes new oil spill legislation allowing states to have "more strict· stare 
regulations than the feceral government adopts. then Alaska should adopt such "more 
, strict" regulations under authority of the public trust doctrine. 
Recommendation NO.4. 
Th. public tryst doctrine as a baSis for litigation, 
The s~. attomey general can enforce the public trust by ~ringing suit against 
anyone violating, or threatening to damage or destroy public trust resources. For 
example, an injunction might be obtained against an oil faCility that was a source of oil 
leaking into streams, or into satt water. Such a suit would be especially useful if there is 
no state statute covering the grob/em. In other words. the public trust doctrine establishe 
common law stanc:Iards for protecting navigation, fisheries, environmental, and dean 
water values, especially where no legislation exists on the topic. or where the particular 
issue 'afls between the cracks.· 
Recommendation No.5-
Citizens should use the public trust doctrine. Ordinarily a citizen of the state. or 
group of citizens, or club, can bring suit to protect pubUc trust resources. Marks v. 
Whitney. §-Cil. 3d 2$1.491 P,id 374, 98 Cat. AW, 790 (19111. This is especially useful 
where the plaintiffs feel state officials are not enforcing environmental laws. 
Recommenda1lon No ... 
The public trust doctrine In Alaska should be used to strike down state legislation 
that Inappropriately allows destruction or damage to pubUc trust resources. The Alaska 
6 
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Supreme Court has said that a conveyance of public trust resources will be upheld cr:ly 
where the conveyance is made (1) in furtherance of a specific public trust purpose, and 
(2) where the conveyance can occur without substantial imca!rment of the public's 
• interest in the trust resources conveyed. This sets a judicial standard against which to 
·measure the constitutionality of legislation that affects public trust resources. It can be a 
high standard. 
Recommendation No.7. 
Nonpoint pollution, including pollution from oil storage or transportation activities, is 
an exceptionally difficult problem to solve. The federal and state governments have 
defaulted to date on their obligation to regulate nonpoint pollution. However any action 
that causes of. contributes to !owering water quality, and which damages fish or wildlife 
~abitat. is subject to judidal control under the public trust doctrine, either by an attomey 
general's suit or a private citizen's suit. The doctrine should be used to require that 
companies transporting oil over land or sea. or storing Oil, all oil transporters use the 
-best practicable,- or the -best conventional,- or the -best available,- technology. to 
protect fishery and wildlife habitat The choice among these standards. or others. is the 
responsibility of the courts applying the public trust doctrine. Afternatively, the doctrine 
can be-used to require that oil companies develop new technologies where existing ones 
are inadequate. 
Recommendation No. 8. 
The Pubtlc Trust Doctrine should be used to protect the land as well as the coastal 
- -
zone and the sea. These remedies would apply anywhere on land or sea in Alaska. not 
merely on navigable waters and their tributaries. Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution 
7 
~xpands the public trust doctrine to cOlier fish and wildlife anywhere in Alaska, net mere!y 
on or near navigable waters. The doctrine should apply to activities in Prince William 
Sound. Bristol Bay, ~~e Gu!f of Alaska. in or near the pipeline terminal at Valdez. along 
, the pipeline corridor. or on the North Slope. 
Conceivably the public trust doctrine could be used to demand that oil tanker traffic 
remain a certain distance away from ree1 or shore hazards. This might be especially true 
where a pattern of tanker traffic poses unacceptable threats to public trust resources. 
Needless to say, the preemption issue is important here, however there is reason to 
believe that preemption will not so readily be found where the state or its citizens are 
protecting public trust resources. 
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.The publiC trust doctrine is I state law doctrine. 
In spite of the fact that 1tIe leading public trust case3 in the nation was decided by 
the United States Supreme Ccurt. the doctrine is nonetheless a state law doctrine. It 
.. applies for the benefit of the citizens of the state. AJthough one leading author" asserts 
that the doctrine should apply-to federal agency management of federal lands, the cases 
supporting this argument otrtside of statutorily based duties, are not strong. 
The state courts can apply the doctrine directly through Utigation,s or as the basis for 
legislation.' When used as a basis for legislation it does not raise constitutional 
qtJ~ns because the doctrine existed as an easement or burden on public lands and 
resources long before any private ownership interest might have arisen. The andent 
origins of the doctrine are discussed in the foftowing section. 
, 
I. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE PUBUC TRUST DOCTRINE. 
The public trust doctrine originated from the widespread practice, from time 
immemorial. of using navigable waters as public highways and .fishing grounds. The 
Institutes of Justinian of S33 A.D. recognized the doctrine saying that it applied to the air. 
running water. the sea. and the seashores. 
:s illinois Central RR v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
• See WUkInsof1t rote Public Trust Ooctrine in PubRc Land Law,- 14 U.C. Davis Law 
Review 269 (1980). 
! See, for example. ONe rlSheries, (nc. v. Bunker,755 P. 2d 1115 (Alaska, 19S8), 
and Owsichek v. State. Guide Ucensing and Control Board. 763 P.2d 488 (Alaska. 1988). 
Wilbour v. Gaflagher, 77 Wn. 2d 306,462 P.2d 232 (1969), cart. denied, 400 U.S. 818 
(1970). 
• See Orion Corporation v. State, 109 Wn. 2d S21. 747 P.2d 1062 (1987). cart. denied. 
108 S. Cl1996. (1988). . 
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In England the doctrine was well established by the time 01 the Magna Chart!. 
Leading English court decisions' recognized that the Crown held the beds of navigacle 
water in trust for the people. Even the Crown could not destroy this trust. 
, fn the United States cases as early as Arnold v. Mundy,' decided in 1921, 
recognized and upheld the doctrine. fn Mundy the New Jersey court declared the trust 
as we know it now, or at least as it was known untit recently expanded. The New Jersey 
court said that the States had succeeded to the English trust. which was held by the 
Crown. and that a grant purporting to divest the citizens of these common rights was 
void. The people. it was held, 
may make such disposition of them and such regulation concerning them, as they 
may thtnk fit; that this power ... must be exercised by them in their sovereign 
capacity; that the legislature may lawfully erect ports, harbours. basins, docks, and 
wharves; ••• that they make bank off those waters and redaim the land upon the 
shores; that they may build dams. locks. and bridges for the improvement and the 
ease of passage; that they may dear and improve fishing places •••• The sovereign 
power itseff ••• cannot, consistently with principles of the taw of nature and the 
constitution of a well ordered SOciety. make a direct and absolute wrant of the 
waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right 
The leading case on the public trust doctrine in this country is Illinois Central 
Railway v. lIIinois.'o tn lass the Illinois legislature, in one of the more outrageous 
schemes of the times, deeded the bed of Lake Michigan along the entire Chicago 
waterfront to the Illinois Central RR. In 1873 the legisrature suffered pangs of conscienca" 
-and repe8Jed ,this grant. The Railroad brought suit cfaiming the revocation was void, but 
• • '~r 
the Court he!d that the revocation was valid and that the original conveyance was -if not 
7 Sea. 2 H. Sracton, On the Laws and Customs of England. 16-17.39-40 (So Thome. 
trans. 1968). 
I S N.J. L 1 (1821). 
tid. at 78. 
1°146 U,S. 387 (1892). 
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absolutely void on its face, .• ~ 'Subject to revocation: The Court said the title of ttle st.; 
to the bed of navigable waters could not be sold except for public purposes. The 'state 
can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, Uk 
, navigaole waters and soils under them. so as to leave them entirely under the use and 
control of private parties •••• than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of 
government and the preservation of peace.· 
Until the past twenty years or so the public trust doctrine was not a major doctrine 
in terms of actual use by the courts. During this past 20 years, however, it has become 
increasingly attractive to the courts and has now been applied in nearly aU of the states. 
Needless to say, its scope is different in various states. not so much because some 
states reject the doctrine, but because courts only respond to cases that are brought 
before. them so the scope of ttle doctrine in a particular state will depend on the 
happenstance of litigation raising the issue. 
WATERS AND OTHER RESOURCES COVERED BY THE PUBUC TRUST DOCTRINE. 
In England the doctrine was applied primarily to the bed of the sea and to tidelands. 
The United States, in contrast. has Jarge navigable rivers such as the Mississippi and 
Columbia Rivers. flC'Ning inland for hundreds of mUes. Not surprisingly the United States 
courts extended the dOdrine to cover navigable fresh waters. Thus in this country the 
doctrine covers an waters -navigable in fact,· whether fresh or salt. 
In a number of western states the doctrine also appRes to waters that are navigable 
only for ple.asure craft. That iSt they are not large enough to be navigable for commercial 
IJse." In the California Mono Lake case, the court applied tne doctrine to non."avigable 
U Some courts initially assumed the doctrine was based on state ownership arising 
from the doctrine of equal footing. Under this doctrine each state, as it came into U1e 
Union, automatically received tWe to the beds of all commercially navigable waters. either 
fresh or salt This rule was based on the fact that the original 13 states had been held to 
S 
tributaries of navigable waters, citing ttle potentially adverse effects of extractions from 
such tributaries on navigable Mono Lake. 
The public trust doctrine protects the public interest in the beds of navigable waterl"'~' 
., up to mean high tide on the ocean, and mean high water mark on fresh waters. No use 
can be made of the beds of such waters without meeting conditions imposed by the 
doctrine. 
In Massachusetts the doctrine has been extended to cover state parks.12 and 
swamps,13 whether or not connected to navigable waters. Thus the Massachusetts 
highway department could not build a highway on public trust land (8 swamp) under its 
general authority to use ·public lands· for highway construction. Such authority did not 
extend to public trust lands. With these lands the department would have to get specific 
authority from the legislature, indicating the legislature was fully aware that tne highway 
would destroy or damage public trust resources. 
~T 
In Meunsch VI Public "rviee Commission.'" the WISCOnsin court used the public 
trust doc:trine to deny a local govemment the power to commit a statewide resource (a"'" 
fishing stream) to power generation purposes. thus requiring more broadly based politica 
decision-making. And In Untted Plainsmen Association Y. North Dakota State Water 
Conservation Commissjgn." the court prohibited issuance of water appropriation permits 
hold such We. therefore each new state. coming into the Union on an equal footing W._I 
the original 13. were also entitled to ownership of the beds of these waters. But 
Wisconsin and some other states have held the pubUc trust applies to waters that are ~W!!( 
shallow to be commercially navigable, and are only navigable for pleasure craft. 
1zGouid v. Greytock Reservation Commission, 350 Mass. 410,' 215 NE2d 114 (1996\., 
13Robbins v. Cepartment of Public Works. 3S5 Mass. 328, 244 NE2d sn (1999). 
14350 Mass. 410, 215 NE2d 114 (1966). 
"247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976). 
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for coal-related power and energy production facilities until a comprehensive state wide 
water-use plan was completed which would take account of such in-place uses as 
navigation, commerce, and fisheries. The court specifically ruled that the public trust 
.. doctrine applied to the allocation of water as well as to conveyances of land that underlie 
or abut water resources. 
jn 1896 the Wisconsin Court held, in Priewe v. Wisconsin Slate Land an!;! 
Improvemont Co .. " that a state law was void that authorized the draining of Muskogee 
Lake. a navigable body of water._for the purpose of private development for a housing 
project The Court said that "the state is powerless to divest itseH of its trusteeship as to 
the submerged lands under navigable water in this state." 
tn Alaska the public trust doctrine. as defined in the Constitution, Article VIII, Section 
3, applies to ~sh, wildlife. and water resources.· Both "navigable" and "public· waters are 
dedared to be held in trust by AS 01.10.070(c). The constitution clearly extends the trust 
in Alaska beyond traditional boundaries when it protec:ts -wildlife". because this trust 
protects wildlife, wherever found. This includes JIE:lQ as well as water areas. The statute 
also makes it clear that the Alaska trust goes beyond "navigable" waters. by declaring 
that it applies to both "navigable· and "public· waters.11 This. indeed. gives the public 
trust doctrine a broad reach in Alaska. 
ACTIVrnES PROTECTED BY THE PUBUC TRUST DOCTRINE. 
1193 Wis. 534, 67 N.W. 918 (lS96), alrd on rehearing, 103 Wis. 537, 79 N.W. 780 
(1899). . 
171t would seem that all waters '"wherever occurring in a natural state" ara public 
waters under AS 46.15.030. See also. Alaska Public Easement Oefense Fund v. Andrus. 
435 F. Supp. 664 (0. Alaska 1977). . 
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The traditional list of protected interests covers commerce. navigation and fisheries. 
This, in itself, is quite broad, because protection of fisheries neCessarily includes 
protection 01 water quality. E\fen in the early days, however, the interests protected were 
.. often stated even more broadly, and more specifically. In Arnold v. Mundv the court 
included '"fowling. sustenance and all other uses of the water and its products •.. : Recent 
cases have said explicitly that other interests are protected. The Califomia Court, in the 
oft..cited case of Marks v. Whitney1'. said that: ' 
Public trust easements are traditionally defined in terms of navigation, 
commerce, and fisheries. They have been held to indude the right to fish, hunt, 
bathe, swim, to use for boating and general recreational purposes .•• and to use the 
bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes. [citing 
cases]. 
The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sUfficiently flexible to 
encompass changing public needs. In administering the trust the state is not 
burdened with an outmoded cfassification favoring one mode of utiliZation over 
another [citing cases]. There is a growing public recognition that one of the most 
Important public uses of the tidelands •• use encompassed within the tidelands 
trust • is the preservation 01 those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve """ 
as ecological units for scientific study. as open space, and as environments which 
provide food and habitat for birds and marine life. and which favorably affect the 
scenery and climate of the area. It is not necessary to here define precisely all the 
public uses which encumber tidelands. 
Increasingly the courts are recognizing that the public trust doctrine protects 
against water pollution. Upon close examination we find that the Mono Lake case involve 
pollution. The extraction of water from the tributaries resulted in lowering the lake. 
reducing its assimilatfve capacity. and causing It to become more saline. This would 
predictably kin 1h, brine shrimp on whieh the birds live, thus causing damage to the bird 
population. 
lIS Cal. 3d 251,259--60,491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptt'. 790 (1971). Marks v. Whitney 
has been broadly cited by other state courts since 1971. 
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STATE POWERS TO CONVEY AWAY PUSUC TRUST RESOURCES OR TO 
DESTROY PUBUC TRUST INTERESTS 
Ever since the 1892 Illinois Central case, courts have held that legislatures have the 
~ pcwer to destroy public trust interests by legislative action. In lIfinois the U.S. Supreme 
Court said that grants of land burdened by the public trust would be justified if occupation 
by private persons did -not substantially impair the public interests in the lands and 
waters remaining- or if the pubtic interest in navigation and commerce is improved. 
For legislation to accomplish this, the legislative intent must be either express or 
exceptionally dear. The Massachusetts and California Courts have spoken most 
extensively on this issue. The Berkeley1. case held that privately owned tidelands in San 
Francisco Say were burdened by the public trust. In referring to the Serkeley deciSion, 
the Mono Lake court said -We held that the grantees' title was subject to the trust, both 
~ the legiSlature had not made dear its intention to authorize a conveyance free 
of the trust and because the 1870 act and the conveyances under it were not intended to 
further trust purposes.- The Berkeley Court also stated that ·statutes purporting to 
abandon the public trust are to be strictly construed; the intent to abandon must be 
clearly expressed or necessarily implied; and if arrt interpretation of the statute is 
reasonably possible which would retain the publiC'S interest in tidelands. the court must 
_ give the statute such an interpretation. 
- Significantly. in Mono We, the Caufomia Supreme Court held that the 1913 Water 
CommissJon Acf!IJ (Callfomla's basic appropriation COde). and appropriation permits 
issued in 1&40 under that code to the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
,. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County. 26 Cal. 3d 515.606 P. 
2d 362. 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cart. denied. 449 U.S. 840 (1980). 
:ZCWater Commission ACt of 1913, 1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 592. 
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~- (DWP) to extract water from tributaries to Mono Lake for domestic use in Los Angeles. 
did not terminate the public trust interests in Mono Lake.21 The California Water Board. In 
issuing the 1940 permits, explicitly stated that it had -no choice· but to grant the 
" applications, despite the harm that would occur to the lake. The Board said, 
It is indeed unfortunate that the City's proposed development will result in 
decreasing the aesthetic advantages of Mono Basin but there is apparently 
nothing this office can do to prevent it The use to which the City proposed to 
put the water under its Applications [domestic use] ••• is defined by the Water 
Commission Act as the highest to which the water may be applied • • •• This 
office therefore has no altemative but to dismiss all protests based upon the 
possible lowering of the water level in Mono Lake and the effects that the 
diversion of water from these streams may have upon the aesthetic and 
recreationaJ vaJue of the Basin. zz 
In 1982, when reviewing the Water Board's 1940 decision, the California Supreme 
Court said, 
The water rights enjoyed by OW? were granted, the diversion was 
commenced, and has continued to the present without any consideration of 
the impact upon the public trust An objective study and reconsideration of 
the water rights In the Mono Basin is Jong overdue. The water law of CaJifomia 
- which we conceive to be an integration including both the public trust 
doctrine and the Board-administered appropriative rights system - permits 
such a reconsideration; the values undertying that integration require It Z3 
The court later added, 
Once the state has approved an appropriation, the public trust imposes a duty 
of continuing supervision over the taking and use of the appropriated water. In 
exercising its sovereign power to aJloca1e water resources in the pubUc 
2133 CaL 3d at 447.048,658 P.2d at 719, 189 CatRptr. at 365~. 
zz/d. at 428, 658 P.2d at 714, 189 CaI.Rptr. at 351. 
'ald. at 426.6548 P.2d at 712. 189 CaI.Rptr. at 349. The Mono We court went even "'''' 
further in dicta. "The state accordingly has the power to reconsider allocation decisions 
even though those decisions were made after due consideration of their effect on the 
public trust.- Id. at 447, 658 P.2d at 128. 189 Cal.Rptr. at 365. See slso, Golden Feather_, 
Community Ass'n v. Thermalfto Irrigation Dist, ••• CaJ. 3d···. "., _ •• P.2d *~ •••••• 
244 Cal. Rptr. 830, 832 (1988). 
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interest, the state is not confined by past allocation decisions which may be 
incorrect in light of current knowledge or inconsistent with current neecs.24 
The Califomia court did not believe that the 1913 Code and the permits issued under it 
were sufficiently clear to destroy the public trust interest in Mono Lake.2S 
Thus one of the important new applications of the public trust doctrine is to burden 
prior appropriation rights, that is. the right to extract water from public streams and lakes 
for irrigation, mining, manufacturing, and other beneficial uses. Until recently it was often 
said that prior appropriation rights were -Vested property rights-. If they were ~ken· by 
the state then constitutional compensation would be required. The casesa and writings27 
assert this is no longer the full story. 
Viewed historically, the prior appropriation system Oncluding the Alaska system) is 
viewed as a special interest doctrine. The system was designed as a means of allocating 
water among appropriators. It was not intended to allocate water vis-a-vis other uses. It 
was specifically not designed to include public trust interests. Again, it was specifically 
not designed to cover water quality problems. 
2433 caf.3d at 447. ass P.2d at 728, 189 CaI.Rptr. at 365. Alaska and tdaho courts 
recently cited the Mono We decision withapprovaJ. See CWC FISheries, Inc. v. Sunker, 
755 P2d 1115 (Alaska 1988); Kootenai EnvtI. AJliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club. 1056 
Idaho 622. 671 P.2d 1085 (1983). 
»rhe Cafdomla Supreme Court sent Mono We back to the trial court for allocation 
of the watera of the tributartM to Mono 1.ake, consi$tent with the court's opinion. 
in 1984, 1he United States Supreme Court held that the Califomia public trust 
doctrine did not apply to property that originally came from Mexican rand grants where 
the owner's We had been confirmed in federal patent proceedings without any mention of 
the public trust doctrine. and where, by federal statute. the validity at the titles was to be 
decided according to Mexican law. Summa Corp. v. Califomia ex rei. State Lands 
Comm'n.466 U.S. 198 (1984). ... 
2ISee the Mono Lake case. 
21See. Johnson, "Water Pollution and the Public Trust Ooctrine: 14 Environmental 
Law 1 (1989). 
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Until recentiy tr.e -:.:;x appropriation system and the public trust doctrine operated 
entirely independer'it'~ :'" ea::: ether. The prior appropriation cases simply are not 
concerned with 1'0111..':.0"'.. Secause of this vacuum a substantial body of statutory and 
'" regulatory water potlux:: control laws have been enacted. at both the federal and state 
levels. Meantime the ::nor a;::propriation system has rol/ed along. concerning itself almost 
not·at·all with pollution. 
The public trust c:x:=be is based on the proposition that polluters do not acquire 
vested property rights Ie 1)OIute. and that all, or virtually all appropriations cause 
pollution. Extractions d water cause temperatura changes, and reduce assimilative 
capacity. . extractions 8ISO ptOduce retum flews containing natural salts. selenium, and 
other chemicals leached tom the soil. which cumulatively affect water quality. These 
retum flows carry oil residues., pesticides, herbicides. fungicides. fertilizers, and other 
polluting agents back intc public waters. IndMdual extractions. although not necessarily 
significant in themselves, cumulatively degrade water quality. Individual actions that 
cumula~ely cause poIution are dearly proper SUbjects of regulation or prohibition. 
If the public 1I'\ISt dod:ri'le is the basis for regulating or reducing the polfution causes 
it does not raise the constHutional issue of a "taking-. because 
the public trust system antedates the prior appropriation system. Under the easement 
imposed by this trust. no one can acqwre a "Vested- property right to pollute that violates 
trust interests. 
It is thus apparent that thI public trust doctri"a. as it il now being construed by the 
courts, can become a major source of control of ail kind I of pollutfon. indudlng oil 
pollution. 
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THE PUBUC TRUST DOCTRINE IN AUSKA 
The public trust doctrine in Alaska is articulated in the state constitution and 
statutes. as well as in recent court decisions. Until recently court opinions had not 
, addressed the doctrine directty. however in 1988 the Alaska Supreme Court decided two 
cases focussing on the doctrine. 
The public trust doctrine in Alaska constitutional law applies to water, fisheries. and 
wildlife. Nearly aU caselaw deafs with the protection of fisheries or wildlife resources, 
however in a proper case the doctrine would apply to water quality as well. 
The Alaska State Constitution. Article VIII of the AJaska state constitution is 
dedicated to development and preservation of naturai resources. Severai sections of 
Artide VIII could be used to further develop the public trust doctrine. For example, 
Section 14 provides for free a:cess by the public to navigable waters; Section 15 protects 
individual interests in the use of waters. subject to the state's powers of eminent domain. 
It is in Section 31 known as the ·common use- dause, that the courts have found the 
embodfment of the public trust doctrine. Section 3 states simply: "Wherever occurring in 
the naturai state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use: 
The framers of the AJaska constitution did not refer explicit1y 10 the public trust 
doctrine as developed in the common law of other state courts.- However, Convention 
papers dearly indicate an understanding of the historical underpinnings of the public trust 
doctrine,- and an intent to prevent monopoly control of trust protected natural resources. 
Article VIII reserves resources to the pub~lc use whire permitting some regulation in the 
process. 
21 4 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitution&! Convention (PACe) pp.24S2..e3 (1956). 
21 6 PACe. API'. V," p. 98. 
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Two points are important. First, the Alaska Courts have not yet determined whether 
the scope of Article VIU, Section 3's public trust mandate is coextensive with that found in 
common law development of the doctrine, illustrated by Illinois Central Railroad v. 
'" IlIinois,:IO and its progeny. Second, permissible regulation as envisioned in this 
. constitutional article is limited. For example, passage of the Umited Entry Act.~' 
regutating state fisheries, required a constitutional amendment to Article VIII, Section 15. 
in order to square its aims and procedures with common use principles. 
Alaska statutes on the public trust doctrine. Many Alaska statutes and regulations 
are potentially affected by the common use clause, as discussed below. Three such 
statutes expressly incorporate public trust principles into the statutory scheme. 
1) The Alaska Water Usa Act,:SZ governs use and appropriation 01 public waters. 
Section 46.15.030 directfy incorporates language from the common use clause of the 
constitution into the statute's policy introduc:tion. No cases have yet been adjudicated 
over the public trust aspects 01 this statute. One federal case, Alaska PUblic Easement 
Oefense Fund v, Andrus.a1 found in the Water Use Act a requirement 01 public access to 
navigable waters through ANCSA lands, noting that the state of Alaska owns and controls 
all Jands under its navigable waters, including navigable fresh waters, and that those 
lands are constitutionally reserved for public use. In addition, the people of Alaska have 
tne right to ~e the water Itself on non.navfgabfe rivers and streams for boating. 
transportation, and other purposes. 
32 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
3f -AS. 16.43. 
32 A.S. 46.15. 
33 435 F. Supp 664 (0. Alaska. 1977). 
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. If and when in·stream flows become an issue in Alaska water management AS 
46.15.030''$ constitutionally based public trust principles Should be useful in resolving 
conflicts in favor of fish. and against oil pollution. whether intentional or accidental. 
Srmilarfy the state water pollution statute. AS 46.03 (the environmental Conservation Act) 
should be subject to common-use strictures. In its Declaration of Polioy.34 the Act calls for 
environmental regulation by the state in order to "fulfill its responsibility as trustee of the 
environment,- but goes no further in incorporating public trust goals into the statute. 
However this language prcbabfy protects the statute from constitutional challenge. 
because it indicates that the statute is based on public trust principles rather than, or in 
addition to the state's police power authority. It would also seem to make dear that no 
one can daim a vested right to pollute, e.g .• discharge oit into public waters, because 
such -right" -has always been subled to the public's trust interest in tfle water resources. 
In 198!. the AJaska state legislature enacted a law codifying specific public trust 
principles,35 The Act prcvides that -u,e people of the state have a constitutional right to 
tree access to 1he navigab'e or public waters of the state\ that • ••• th. state has furl power 
and control of all the navigable or public waters of the state, both meandered and 
unmeandered, and it holds and controls all navigable or public waters in trust 10r the use 
of the people 01 the state_.ownership of land bordering navigable or public waters does 
not grant an exclusive right to the use of the water and any rights of title to the land 
below the ordinary high water mark are subject to the rights 01 the people 01 the state to 
use and have access 10 the water for recreational purposes or any other public purpose 
for which the water Is used or capable of being used consistent with the public trust • 
,.. AS 46.03.010. 
3S Ch. 82. Section 1, SLA 1985. Temporary and Special Ads. 
15 
This act received minor attention in recent public trust cases, but has not yet been used 
as a basis for decision in any public trust litigation. 
AJaska caselaw on the public trust doctrine. Two important 1988 cases tell us most 
'" of what we know about judicial policy on the public trust doctrine. First, however, we will 
examine the earlier cases that brush lightly across the doctrine. 
In Wemberq v. State,3I the court found a highway bridge obstruction to the plaintiff's 
tidewater access to deep waters too be a compensable taking. In so finding, the court 
,ejaded the state's argument that Article VIII permitted the taldngof private littoral rights 
withC?ut compensation, citing Section 3. 
In ~tate Pept. of Natural Resources v. City Of Haines.a1 the state argued that its 
public trust obHgations should prevent an abandonment of public use by operation of a 
law passing tidelands to Alaskan cities. The court did not rule on the public policy 
argument. but noted the dty's response that it too was subject to the same public trust 
obligations as the state. 
In State V. Ostroaky,3i the court interpreted the 1972 amendment to Article VIII. 
Section 15. providing for limited entry regulation of the state's fisheries, to be appficable 
to all sections of the constitution defining state fisheries as a common use resource. 
Judge Rabinowttz' dissent argued that while the limited entry amendment did in fact apply 
to Article VUI, Section 3, 1hat clause mandated implementation of the least restrictive 
means possible.a 
31 516 P.2d 1191 (1973). 
37 621 P.2d 1074 (1981). 
38 667 P. 2d 1184 (1983). appeal dismissed, 467 U.S. 1201 (1984). 
8'n Johns V. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 758 P.2d 1256 (1988). plaintiffs 
challenged the regufatory scheme for a non-distressed fishery • The court noted the ~, 
tension between the limited entry amendment to the constitution and Article VIII. Section''"~ 
3 and 15', common use directives, and agreed with the Rabinowitz dissent in Ostrosky 
16 
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The following two leSS cases address directly the application of the public trust 
doctrine in Alaska. In ewe Fisheries. Inc. v. Bunkert 40 the court examined the tidelandS 
conveyance provisions of the Alaska Land Act. Plaintiffs owned title to a tideland tract 
, and sought ejectment of defendant, who had engaged in set·net fishing on the same site 
for 20 years. Defendant argued. and the court agreed. that ownership of the tidelands 
was necessarily subject to a public right of entry for purposes of navigation, commerce, 
and fisheries. The court adopted the Illinois Central test to require that a conveyance of 
tidelands free of pubtic trust obligations must be made (1) in furtherance of a specific 
public trust purpose, and 2) without substantial impairment of the public's interest in the 
land conveyed. The court then found the tideland conveyance conflicted with the first 
prong of the Illinois Central test. relying in part on Artiete VIII, Section 3 as evidence of a 
public trust mandate to the legislature. The court further found that a staMory scheme 
as broad as the tidetanc:ls conveyance statute couk:l not possibly have been intended to 
give away the public trust interest in vast amounts of Alaska's shoreline!1 tt is especially 
noteworthy that the Alaska court cited and relied on the leading CalifomiaG and 
Washington state cases," cases that have gone the farthest in broadly construing the 
public trust doctrine. 
that fisheries regulation should encroach as little as possible, and within CO\lstitutional 
guidefines, on common use resources. 
40 755 P.2d 111S (1988). 
41 The court also said that where the conflict at issue is between two public trust uses 
(not the cue here). the legislature wiD be granted broad authority to prioritize those uses. 
42 The court cites with approval the Mono lake case, National Audubon Society v. 
Superior Court. 33 CaI.3d 419. 189 CaI.Rptr.346. ass p.2d 709. cart. denied. 4S4 U.S. sn 
(1963); Marks v. Whitney. 6 Cal.3d 251,98 CatRptr.790. 491 P.2d 374 (1911). 
43 Orion Corp. v. State. 109 Wash.2d 621. 747 P.2d 1062 (\Nash. 1987). 
11 
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The other 19S5 case that adds significanUy to our knowtedge of the public trust 
doctrine in Alaska is Qwsichek v. State Guide Ucensing and Control Board.~ The Court 
again relied on Article VIII, Section 3, this time to invalidate the state', hunting guide 
, licensing statute. AS OS.54 provides for the establishment of exclusive areas to which 
hunting guides receive permits to conduct commercial guide business. Despite specific 
legislative enactments, including retroactive reform measures, the court held such 
exclusive use permits to be unconstitutional, in violation of the common use dause, 
absent a constitutional amendment Similar to Artiae VIII. SedJon 15's limited entry clause. 
The court noted that Article VIU. Section 3 provides -independent protection of the 
public's access to natural resources.- Finally the court stated that the ruling in this case 
was not meant to challenge leasing and concession programs that are of limited duration 
and subject to competitive bidding. 
Alaska constitutfonaf. statutory. and judge-made law. is deariy launched down the 
public trust doctrine path. Whether and to what extent it will continue down that path 
cannot be judged with certainty at this time, but the strength of the constitutional and 
statutory language, the importance of natural resources in Alaska. and the character of 
the Alaska Supreme Court's decisions on the doctrine suggest that the court will likely 
follow an approach similar to California Our condusions, which follow, assume that the 
Alaska cases continue to apply. and to deveJop the public trust doctrine. 
~ 763 P.2d 48S (1988). 
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CONC1.USIONS. 
What impact might the public trust doctrine have on the issues raised by oil 
transportation and Oil spills in Alaska? 
a) The public trust doctrine as a basis for legislation. First, the federal 
preemption issue should be noted. This issue is being covered by Professor Allison 
Reiser and thus will not be analyzed here, other than to say that it is an important, 
pervasive issue. Although no cases seem to have addressed the question directly, it 
seems likely that the courts will tend toward finding no preemQlfon when pul;>lic trust 
resources are invotved • because of the traditionally strong state interest in managing 
these resources. 
The public trust doctrine can serve as the basis for state legiSlation. This is true 
whether the doctrine appears in the Constitution, as it does in Article VIII, Section 3 of the 
AI~ Constitution, or whether it is a product of common law court decisions. In Alaska 
it is not yet dear whether the public trust doctrine provision of the constitution is exactly 
the sam. as the common law doctrine, or is greater. lesser, or significantly different than 
the common law doctrine. One thing is clear. however. In Alaska the public trust 
doctrine applies to land as well as to waters and their beds, because the Constitution, 
Article VII, Section 3, provides for protection of wildlife and does not confine that 
protection to water related areas. 
. On. of the dearest examples of using the pu~lic trust doctrine as a basis for 
legislation 11 illustrated In Orion Corporation Y, s"tat •• '" In 1971 the Washington legislature 
enacted the Shoreline Management Act. Under that Act cities and counties zoned all 
lands within 200 feet of weUands. beds of rivers. streams, lakes, and the sea to mean 
high tide. Under this state authority the county had zoned tidelands owned by the Orion 
45 109 Wash.2d 621.747 P.2d 1002 (VVash. 1987)." 
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Corporation 10r natural uses. in other words, prohibiting filling and construction Of hcuses 
as Orion planned. Orion brought suit daiming that the zoning was an unconstitutional 
"tlking" of its property. But the Washington Court held that these tidelands were suciect 
, to the public trust doctrine, from long prior to Orion's acquisition of title and because of 
the existence of this public -easemenf the zoning was justified and did not raise -takings' 
questions. The zoning was an acceptable means of protecting these public trust 
resources. 
Such an analysis means that the standard constitutional challenge • that the zoning ,~.c 
or other reguiations -go too fat', or otherwise violate constitutional due process or 
uncompensated takings rules must fail. If the public has an easement on the property, 
and it antedates the private owners title, then no "takings· issue remains. 
A similar ina of analysis applies to pollution control, including oil pollution. The 
reasoning goes this way. The pubtic trust protects water quafity; this is essential to 
protect fisheries and wildlife habitat As the public trust doctrine dates from time 
immemorial, this means that it dearly antedates anyone's right to cause pollution, either 
by dumping wastes into public waters. or by appropriating and extracting waters that 
reduce assimilative capacity and worsen water quality, or that cause degradation of water 
quality by chemicals brought back to the stream by non point aretum flows.· Under this 
analysis the state is justified in adopting any levet at water quality control It chooses. 
Again. no pofJuter can argue that he has • "vested propert'Y' light to continue depositing 
wastes, or extracting water, because all such rightS ate subject to the pre-existing burden 
of the public trust doctrine. 
As appled to oil transportation or legislation concemlng the control of spill risks, this 
approach allows the state to adopt any level of control It chooses1 because It is 
protecting a public trust resource. Such centro Is might create higher standards for oil 
20 
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transportation sa1ety. zone against oil transportation facilities in ecologically sensitive 
areas, provi'de a basis (at least a political one. if not legal) for state oversight of federal 
activities that might adversely imcact public trust resources, or squeeze federal 
" preemption to its narrowest scope on the ground of traditional state control of public trust 
resources· regarding regulation of petroleum transportation as well as spill risks. 
b) The public trust doctrine as the basis for litigation. 
The state attorney generaJ can enforce the public trust by bringing suit against anyone 
violating. or threatening to damage or destroy public trust resources. Moreover any 
citizen or group of citizens. or organization made up of citizens of the state can sue to 
enforce the public trust and protect public trust resources.*' Such citizen suits are 
important where the attorney general dedines to protect public trust resources. for 
whatever reason. 
Utigation couJd be brought to enjoin oil transportation activity that happened to "fall 
between the cracks- of state or federaJ regulations. The public trust doctrine would 
provide its own standard absent a statutory or regulatory standard. The public trust 
doctrine. especially as constitutionalized in Alaska. provi'des a basis for striking down 
legislation. regulations. or other state actions that adversely impact public trust resources. 
Nonpoint poftutio.n. including poJiution from oil transportation, is a difficult problem 
to serve, so ditftcult in fact. that. congress only authorized its -study- in the 1972 Federal 
Water Pollution Control Ad Amendments, and again in 1urther amendments in 1981. No 
comprehensive regulatory scheme for controlling this increasingly important form of 
pollution hal ever been adopted, Of mandated, by Congress. Because of this tack of 
regulation. the public trust doctrine could be an important methodoiogy for getting hold of 
the problem. Any action that causes or contributes to lowering water quality. and which 
*' See Marks v. Whitney, 6 CaI.3d 251, 98 CaI.Rptr.790. 491 P.2d 374 (1971). 
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damages fish or wildlife habitat, is subject to judicial control under the public trust 
doctrine. The doctrine could be used, for example, to require that all oil trar.sporters in 
the state use the -best practicable·, or the -best conventiona'", or the "best available: 
, technology, or even that oil transporters develop new technologies where existing ones 
are inadequate. 
Aside from the preemption issue, these remedies would apply anywhere in the state 
of Alaska. induding the territorial waters of Prince William Sound, Bristol Bay. or the Gulf 
of Alaska. And, as indicated above, any citizen, group of citizens. or organization, could 
institute a suit to proted public trust resources. 
Depending on how the public trust doctrine is developed by the Alaska courts. it 
can become a powerful tool to reguJate the more egregious problems posed by oil 
transportation and storage. Common law standards can be developed by the courts in 
such cases. 
Under the proposed new federal oil spill Debility law, states win possibly be given 
power to set '"higher" standards than the federal act requires. These higher standards 
could be set either by legislation, or by judicial decisions protecting the public trust 
interest in resources. 
The public 1nJSt doctrine is a powerful legal theory for protecting the environment 
agaJrist damage from oil spills •. Although its scope has not been fully defined by the 
Alaska courts, the declsions on the doetrfne to date indicate that It win be applied 
expansively by the Alaska courts. It can be an important tool In achlevfng the 
Commission', goal of better management of oif transportation and storage, over fend. 
wetlands. coastal zone. and In coastal waters. 
: 
22 
.-
UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA SEA GRANT LEGAL RESEARCH TEAM 
No. 9.2 
PROFESSOflS HARRY BADER, FAIRBANKS 
RALPH JOHNSON, SEATTLE 
ZYGMUNT PLATER, aOSTON, COORDINATOR 
ALISON RIESER, NEW HAVEN 
ADMINI$TRJ.noN : RON DEARBORN, SUSAN DICKINSON U/J. FAIRBANKS SEA GRANT (1071 U4·7OU 
Fina.l draft 
LEGAL RESEARCH REPORT 
"POTENTIAL UTILIlY OF AN I1\TIRSTATE COMPACT 
AS A VEHICLE FOR OIL SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSF' 
Draft submitted: 13 December 1989 
Principal Investigator: Harry Bader 
The contents of this report are presented in draft form subject to amendment and supplementation, intended for 
the use of the State of Alaska Oil Spill Commission, and may not be quoted or used in any manner without the 
permission of the Legal Research Team. 

i 
, 
~ 
j 
~ 
1 
• 
· J 
fL'.1AL 
I. PROSPECIUS 
Federal Courts, in the past decade, have breathed renewed vitality into compact 
clause theory. This judicial activity, coupled with recent creative applications of the 
compact clause by Congress to mounting regional problems, offers the state of Alaska a 
wide r:ange of options which permits conduct otherwise prohibited within the stream of 
interstate commerce. 
Through compact, the state can achieve enhanced sovereignty via regulations 
which have the force of federal law and exert a controlling influence over federal 
agency conduct. CompaCts also permit the pooling of resources generating the 
synergistic effect of creating a sum greater than its parts. Compacts also can be 
designed to increase responsiveness to local needs. 
This paper addresSes the utility of compacting as a means for protecting natural 
resources, notably the abundant fishery, through enhanced regulation of oil 
, transshipment in Pacific waters and terrestrial pipelines, tenninal operations, and 
J production areas. The application of compact concepts in this analysis is, therefore, 
i directed toward resource protection, not resource allocation. Thus, the involved. stat~s 
f should find Uttle opportunity for internal conflict within the compact structure. 
, 
· .-
II. Th.'TRODUCTION 
Alaska has assumed a premiere role as nation's steward by virtue of the 
incalculable natural resource wealth within her borders. Whether those resources are 
unscathed wilderness, alluring placer deposits, the oil which drives industry, or the 
remarkable yet still not entirely understood anadromous fish, these resources are 
Alaskan from whom the future of a nation is fashioned. Due to the importance of these 
resources to all·American, Alaska has often been forced to accept resource policies not 
of her 9wn choosing. It is inannbent upon this state to protect its sovereignty by 
demonstrating a willingness and an ability to ensure the protection and wise use of 
resources vital to both Alaska and the rest of the country. Pursuant to this end, leaders 
in the state must apply proven mechanisms in innovative ways which will enable the 
state to emblazon her own vision to her own future. 
The interstate compact is a potentially valuable instrument lor ensuring Alaska's 
rightful place as chief architect or resources planning management As US. Supreme 
Court Justice Felix Frankfurter championed in a 1925 Yale Law Review article, 
"Conservation of natural resources is thus making a major demand on American 
sta'tesma.nsh.ip. An~loration of the possibilities of the compact idea furnishes a 
. partial answer to one of the most intricate and comprehensive of all American 
lproblems." Indeed, the federal judiciary recently heralded the compact as an 
4t ... innovative system of cooperative federalism-... in ~hich states can substantively 
participate in natural resource decision making. Seattle Master Builders v. Pacific 
Northwest Power and Conservation Coundl786 F.2d. 1359 (1986). 
There are basically two types of compacts which can take on anyone or part of 
:hree forms. The traditional compact is the multi-state agreement A newer type, 
,ioneered under the Delaware River Compact is a multi-state/federal organiz:ation. 
:'he forms of compact may be a self-sustaining service compact such as the New York 
·ort Authority, which operates the New York City commercial port, or the 
1 
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nonregulatory cooperative management agreement such as the Atlantic States Fisheries 
Commission, 56 Stat267(1942), or a regulatory compact with substantive teeth such as 
the Northwest Power Planning Council, 16 USC 839. An effective compact among the 
Pacific states and provinces for the regulation of oil shipments would most effectively 
be an amalgamation of the regulatory and management forms. 
Alaska is no stranger to the compact. Indeed the state is currently a partner in 
seventeen compact organizations, such as the Pacific States FlSheries Compact and the 
Interstate Oil and Gas Compact. All of these compacts, however, predate the judicial 
pronouncements which brought forth the new principles enabling compacts to serve as 
dispensers of federal law; therefore, our state's current agreements lack the ability to be 
an effective forum for enforcing Alaska's appropriate role in resource management. 
m PROSPECTS 
WHATISACOMPACT7 
A compact is a multi--state agreement, (or multi--state/federal agreement) 
a:msented to by Congress, whereby states may coalesce to form an authoritative body 
governing issues of regional mncem. They have been employed to solve problems of 
air pollution" land use planning, water allocation, and a myriad of other applications. 
The one consistent theme, always, is the presenCe of a regulatory problem with 
transcends state boundaries. 
The constitutional basis for compacts is found in article, I, section 10 clause 3, 
which holds that "._ no state shaD, without the Consent of Congress._enter into any 
Agreement or Compact with another state or with a foreign power." Through this 
simple da~ tbe Constitution recognizes the inherent sovereign power of s~tes to 
fonn agreements aimed at regional problem solving. Because a compact is essentially a 
contract between states, the basic tenets of contract law have traditional been applied to 
I 
compact relationships. Pursuant to these agreements, the Supreme Court has 
confinned that states have the ability to delegate their political powers to, and to devise 
financing for, the activities contemplated by compacts. Dyer Sims 341 US 22 (1951). 
Because Congressional consent transfonns compact prOvisions into federal law, 
compacts can authorize state conduct which would otherwise be cons~tutiona11y 
invalid. Cuyler v. Adams 449 US 433 (1981) and Intake Water Company v. Yellowstone 
River Compact 590 FSupp. 293 (1983). 
In struCture, compacts are formal documents made between the states in an 
identifiable text This document is enacted by statute in the legislatures of the separate 
states. The wording of these statutes must be essentially the same for each state. Once 
ratified by the requisite states and approved by Congress, the compact cannot be 
altered, repealed, revoked or ignored by a member state. Disputes arising under 
compacts are taken to the ~eral courts, not state courts, for final interpretation. Unlike 
reciprocal agreements, the statutes ratifying compacts are conditioned upon conduct by 
the members. Seattle Builders at 1312. 
WHAT ARE 1HE POWERS OF A COMP ACf? 
Because a compact is approved by congress, the compact is federal, not state, la~ 
for. consideration of Constitutional objections. Cuyler at 438. Therefore, a compact 
cannot, by definition, be a state law impermissibly interfering with interstate commerC!vr 
or federal supremacy interests, nor do traditional pre-emption problems apply. This 
transformation occurs because Congress, in approving the agreement, exercises its 
legislative power that the compact threatens to encroach upon, and declares the 
compact to be consistent with Congress's supreme power in that area. Intake Water 
Company at 297. Therefore the compact agency may address resource problems with 
regulations that compacting members could not do as individual states. For ~ple, 
many of the Alaska state regulations (SB 406) concerning oil tanker regulation, risk 
avoidance charges, the coastal protection fund, and tanker searches, prohibited by 
. . 
p~ 
federal district judge Fitzgerald in 
Chevron v. Hammond in 1979, or dropped by the state after Rav v. Atlantic Richfield 
I I could, theoretically have been permitted to stand had they been enacted by a compact 
i to which Alaska was a member. Likewise Alaska, through authority delegated by the 
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compact commission, could exert regulatory controls over the North Slope production 
areas, the pipeline, terminal operations and off-shore production, even in areas 
otherwise pre-empted. 
Not only may compacting states enter the realm usually reserved for the federal 
government, compact agendes may even exert a controlling influence over federal 
,agencies when Congress has given a dear and unambiguous mandate to that end in the 
consent legislation. Seattle Master Builders at 1364. Currently, two compacts are now 
operating which possess and wield this impressive authority. One is the Northwest 
Power Council (16 USC 839) and the other is the Columbia River Gorge Commission (16 
USC 544). The more powerful multi-state compact is the Northwest Power Coundl. 
Charged with the duty to develop and implement an energy and conservation plan for 
the states of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana, the Coundl is also empowered 
to oversee the operations of the federal Bonniville Power Administration, at least to the 
extent necessary uta ensure !ederal compliance with the compact's plan. Oversight 
. . 
authority is manifested through several provisions within the consent legislation. 11u;! 
. . 
Coundl may review the actions of BPA to determine whether BPA is consistent with the 
compact's goals and regulations. The Council may notify BPA if the Council deems 
federal conduct inappropriate in light of the plan's provisions. In such cases,the BPA 
may to continue with proposals or activity unless a formal 'Mitten justifiability, subject 
to all the structures of administrative procedure law, is proffered by the federal agency. 
POllCY BEl\lEFlISOF A COlYfPACT ORGANIZATION 
Several benefits accrue from the structural organization and inherent powers of a 
compact Chief among these benefits is enhanced state sovereignty over issues of 
critical importance to the state. Contrary to the intuitive belief that compacts truncate 
state power through binding agreements, ~e compact is a latch key which opens a door 
into an entirely new sphere of influence otherwise inaccessible to states. Oklahoma's 
governor, Johnson Murray, understood this attribute while ad vacating Red River 
Compact. Murray believed a compact II _.an effective block against federal 
enaoachment on state sovereignty .. .and an inspiration to many who are tired of federal 
intervention in every field imaginable." Reviewing the sad history of Coast. Guard 
supervision over tanker and aew safety mOnitoring, federal SUpervision may not only 
be a benign nuisance, but incompetent and dangerous as well. 
Compacts can also prevent federal agencies form acting cavalierly toward state 
interests. The Northwest Power Council was designed to prevent this problem. 
Recently, Alaska has again felt the brunt of federal insensitivity to state regulatory 
organs. In another natural resource field, wildlife management the National Park 
Service violated the spirit of cooperative game management, enunciated after ANILCA, 
by unilaterally ending the land and shoot wolf hunting in National Preserve lands 
without first amsulting the state Game Board last year. Whether one opposes or 
advocates wolf hunting, this lesson of federal condescension towards Alaska's state 
authorities bodes ill for hopes of amicable federal agency cooperation in oil activity 
regulation. 
In addition to allowing states to travel waters normally reserved as a federal . 
province, a compact necessarily inaeases an individual state's representational power 
within a given context. Alaska, for example, is only a voice of 3 within ~ din of S35 
legislators in the federal Congress.. Whereas in a Pacific states compact, Alaska could 
compose fully 25% of the decision making body as one of four equal partners. 
Equally important is a compact's role in inaeasing regulatory responsiyeness to 
community needs and values. nus sensitivity to the local population is achieved 
because of thee great accountability with a compact organization. Citizens can have 
direct access to the compact representatives appointed by their governor, much like 
contacting their state legislator, rather than having to deal with the labyrinth channels 
of a faceless bureaucracy. Due to the traditional tie between compact representatives 
and a governor, there is a doser link with the electoral process than would be under a 
bureaucratic regulatory regime. Because of this responsiveness. compact decisions 
would be expected to be more narrowly tailored to the specific needs of the region, and 
. therefore more effective and efficient than generalized federal policy decisions. 
Sensitivity to local needs is a mandate in the wake of the Exxon Valdez. yet as Attorney 
General Doug Baily has pointed out, there is now a fear that the Trustee Council, 
established under federal law after the spill, may be frustrating the interests of the local 
~Communities in Prince William Sound. 
The responsiveness of an interstate compact also outshines the effectiveness of 
the judiciary in most drcumstances. The judicial instrument is simply too sporadic and 
static to deal with the dynamics of the continuously adjusting environment of regional 
resources management. 
Enhanced overs~ght is another benefit. A good. industry record for 12 years in 
Prince William. sound led to complacency in enforcement of safety standards and 
preparedness which led to unsafe conditions and an inability to respond to the Exxon 
Valdez tragedy. If a particular state or agency is lulled into an ineffective enforcement 
rater the interests and agents of other states could s~ulate additional oversight. 
Compacts increase the number of watch dogs by increasing the number of participant 
within the regulatory and enforcement scheme. 
Likewise, compacts pool the resources (personnel, equipment, financing, 
expertise, etc.) of member states, enabling activity impossible for anyone state to 
accomplish on its own. 
Compacts provide a unified and cohesive agency through which decision 
making is streamlined and coordinated. Such a management scheme would have 
enhanced oil spill recovery efforts this past March. The Skinner-Reilly Report, prepared 
by the National Response Team for President Bush, found that the various contingency 
plans for Prince William Sound did not refer to each other or establish a workable 
response command hierarchy. This situation resulted in confusion and delay during 
the critical first days of the response in the Exxon oil spills, exacerbating the devastating 
environmental consequences. 
Another benefit of compacting as a means of dealing with regional problems is 
its role ~ reducing peripheral interests. In the compacting process, states negotiate 
directly with each other about issues which immediately affect them. This operational 
milieu excludes centrifugal forces beyond the region which may otherwise intervene if 
the controls were to take place on a national level. 
Fmally, compacts foster synchronization of state efforts in controlling regional 
problems. If states pursue their own independent regulatory program, Balkanization 
and duplication can undermine effective controls. More importantly, in the absence of 
a compact, the vigilance of one state may be thwarted by the inaction or lax 
administration of adjoining state. 
HOW IS A COtdP ACf FORMED? 
· ... questions of joining or not joining an interstate compact, or aeating one, 
renewing ~r not renewing" it, of appropriating money for its support, of sanctioning and 
implementing activities, are uniquely the responsibilities of the states and their people, 
and it is the state and their people which should have an intense concern for what they 
may be gaining, losing, delegating or benefiting through the path of interstate compacts 
M.Ridgeway 
Interstate Compacts: A Federal Question 
1971 
There is no form or pattern for a proper compact, the process of its genesis if free 
from restriction aside from the Congressional consent criterion. Thus, states are arbiters 
of their own destiny. With over a hundred compacts now in existence, compacts of the 
future have a rich history to learn from in constructing agreements to meet the needs of 
emerging regional problems. The primary obstacle to effective use of compacts as 
regulatory device is the time period traditionally involved in bringing a compact to 
fruition. Often times, the period form initial negotiations to federal consent, has 
;eonsumedmore than eight years. Glacial slowness need not be the rule, and the 
avoidance of some common pitfalls can serve to greatly reduce delay. 
;Qne contemporary practice which has shortened the time frame for compact 
formation has been the shift away from formal compact negotiation commissions to 
extra..;legal organizations composed of various state officials who share a common 
desire to rectify a particular problem. A most effective start is for each state's 
negotiating team to draft its own provisions for indusion in an agreement to serve as a 
basis for negotiation. 
Because Congressional consent to begin negotiations is not mandated by the 
Omstitution,a campading team ought not to seek this protracted strategy before 
:beginning substantive consultations. Many feel that having prior Congressional 
approval for negotiating enables Congress to guide the states and contributes 
significantly to eventual federal ratificatioz:' chances. However, this advantage can 
typically be gained with the inclusion of a nonvoting federal official in the negotiating 
team. 
Crucial to success has been the involvement of local leaders from potentially 
affected communities and interest groups. This does not mean allocating formal 
. poSitions to such groups, but it does require the creation of a standardized m~anism 
of communication and meaningful participation This approach not only expands the 
information horizon contributing to better compacts, but serves a legitimization 
1 
.. 
function, thereby reducing potentially clisorientating opposition from within state. 
Rarely will Congress give its stamp of approval to a compact perceived as eviscerated 
internally by intra-state strife. 
The experience of the Red river compact found that the early establishment of 
both legals and technical advisory committees for information gathering and processing 
was helpful in facilitating the negotiating process. The Red River example also 
demonstrated the need to guard against information gathering becoming an end unto 
itself, stymieing progress. 
Once the compact document has been drafted, each state must pass enabling 
legislation conditioned upon the consent of the other involved sates. Each statute will 
require reciprocal action to be effective. Northeast Bancorp, Inc. V. Federal Reserve 
Board 86 LEd.2d. 112 (1985). Each statute must be virtually identical in form. and 
wording. After approval by the appropriate governors, the compact is subject to 
federal consent. 
Congressional approval is not required of all interstate agreements. Only those 
arrangements which are .. directed to the fonnation of any combination tending to the 
inaease of political power in the States, which may enaoach upon or interfere with the 
just supremacy 9f the United States" require co~t under the Constitution. 
WasMnston Metro Area Transit Authority v. One Parcel of Land 706 F2d. 1312, 1316 
and Cuyter at 448. an agreement intended.to regulate oil shipments on land and water 
within the Pacific states will most certainly enaoach upon the federal province, and 
therefore must receive consent under the compact clause. 
It is this enaoachment which serves as the vehicle through which compact 
proviSions become federal law. When Congress approves a compact, Congress 
exercises the legislative power that the compact threatens to encroach upon, ~d 
declares that the compact is consistent with Congress's supreme power in that area. 
Intake Water Co. at 297. 
After congress has bestowed is consent, tradition holds the President reserves a 
right to participate in the approval process, though presidential involvement probably 
could be avoided through a concurrent resolution serving as Congress's consent 
mechanism. 
Congress has a duty to ensure that compacts do not proceed to impermissibly 
infringe upon critical federal interests not contemplated in the consent resolution. 
Therefore, Congress retains the power to alter, amend, or repeal a compact. Cuyler at 
439-440. Also, Congress may enact subsequent legislation which is expressly 
inconsistent with an interstate compact to which it had previously given its consent 
The extent of federal power to intervene in the internal affairs of an approved 
compact is <the subject of much debate. While the courts have Sidestepped this 
constitutional issue, dicta provides insight to the judiciary's hesitancy to permit 
wholesale federal intrusion into compact operations. "We have 0 way of knowing what 
ramification would result from a holding that congress has the implied constitutional 
power to alter, amend, or repeal its consent to an interstate compact. Certainly, in view 
of the number and variety of compacts in effect today, such a holding would stir up an 
air of uncertainty in those areas of our national1i£e presently affected by the existence of 
these compacts. No doubt the suspicion of even potential impertinency would be 
damaging to the very concept of interstate compacts.- Tobin v. United States 306 Fold. 
270 at 273 0962). 
WHAT ELEMENTS ARE NECESSARY FOR AN EFFECIlVE COMPACT 
DOCUMEN'I? 
After the Oean Air act, a fluny of compacting activity erupted in the attempt to 
control regional air pollution. to assist congress in s~g through the flood of compact 
proposals~ the Department 01 Health, Education, and Welfare aeated a set of . 
Guidelines denoting key indicators of competent compact drafting. The indicators were 
expected to reveal which documents showed the highest potential for achieving their 
stated goals. See: Air Pollution, 1968 Hearings on Air Pollution Compacts, 52350, S.J. 
Res. 95 Before the Subcommittee on Air Pollution, 90th Congress, 2nd sess. 3 (1968). 
Combined with subsequent Compact debates, a beacon can be constructed which 
provides safe passage for would be compact drafters. An enumerated discussion of 
important draft criteria, based upon the foregoing, follows. 
1. Any agency establishes bv the compact should-have broad standard-
setting monitoring. and enforcement powers . 
. A compact document must articulate the mission and duties for which it is 
aeated and demonstrate the means by which these goals will be realized. The 
document should demonstrate that the mechanisms specified as tools for compact 
operation- will both be effective in achieving the goals as well as being the best possible 
option available. 
The muItistate agreement needs to also explain what type of administrative 
agency will effectuate its purposes. Two basic options are available. Each party state 
may use its own agencieS if they appear to be fully equipped to carry out compact 
policy, or if the complexity of the arrangement necessitates, a special interstate agency 
may be crated. The compact should be able to delegate authority, but it should not be 
required to refrain from taking enforcement action until other entities have had an 
opportunity to do so. In order to coordinate Us activities with the federal govemm~t, 
the compact ought to be authorized to designate liaisons to work and communicate 
with federal agencies involved with the same regional problems. 
In order to attain its true potential, the compact document mU$.t contain a 
provision ensuring that federal activities and projects will be coordinated. to the fullest 
extent possible with the policies of the compact. . 
Fmally, in order to retain the flexibility demanded in the field of resout:ce 
protection, a host of housekeeping provisions must be Contained within the documents. 
The organization should have the power to conduct investigations, make studies, hold 
hearings, prepare findings, adopt rules and regulations, carry out enforcement actions 
(including litigation), and the ability to enter into contracts. 
2. Each state must have equal representation 
It is well settled that compacting states possess equal voting power. despite 
economic, population. and geographic disparities. Allocating several ~oting 
representatives to each state allows a greater range of expertise to be present on the 
authoritative body, as well as minimizing the potential of special interest capture of a 
particular state or representative. Another important provision concerning 
representation involves the ability of states to render their representative accountable 
and:sensitive to their constituency. the accountability dilemma is a real quandary 
because interstate compacts transcend state lines and political units, thereby 
circumventing the accustomed channels and structures of ~ponsibility in the 
American political system. The apparent freedom that compacts enjoy from their home 
legislatures must be d.rcumsai.bed to prevent administrative tyranny without 
emasculating the agency, rendering it unfit for achieving its mission. 
3. Enforcement and business actions by the compact should not require 
unanimous consent 
Business and enforcement actions should not req1Jire unanimity on the part of 
the decision making board; however, a simple majority is just as undesirable due to the 
lack of protection it affords minority interests. Thus, a common trend is the 3/4 
majority requirement. The requirement concerns the total number of voting 
representatives, not three-quarters of member states, permitting state delegations to 
split on a particular vote. 
4. The compact must be able to demonstrate financial integrity. 
Financial integrity incorporates the needs to be able to receive and dispense 
funds. It is imperative for a compact to be able to obtain financing beyond simple 
allocations by member states. 
5. The federal government ought to have an avenue to participate in a 
nonvoting fashion. . 
6. A valid resionalist justification must be presented. 
Compacts are intended to provide a solution for a problem of regional character 
which defies both federal and state oriented approaches. Congress must see that a set 
of unique forces (economic, social, ecological, or geographic) frustrates conventional 
contrivances. Regional interests, regional wisdom, and regional pride must serve as the 
foundation from which the most effective devices will spawn. it is imperative that the 
uniqueness of the region be clearly defended when proposing a compact, or the federal 
judiciary has left no doubt that differing conditions in different geographic areas may 
provide a reasonable basis for different legislative treatment. 
7.' Miscellaneous 
A host of other conditions require treatment in a compact document. Of 
particular importance will be the dedication of drafters in articulating dear definitions . 
and intent for the articles of the compact. BeeaUse it is the federal court system which is 
the final arbitrator in compact disputes and interpretation, care must be taken to ensure 
that alternative constructions of compact articles do not wreak violence upon the 
purposes envisioned by the agreement's framers. 
No dearer example exists of the consequences to Alaska due to curt 
misinterpreting of state intent that the Ninth circuit's inquiry into Alaska's de(mition of 
"rural" under the subsistence provisions found in ANILCA. Kenaitze Indian Tribe y. 
Alaska 860 F.2d. 312,316 (1988). In that case the court paid no special attention to the 
uniqueness of Alaska's remote bush regions, and held that what constituted rural in 
Iowa would serve as an appropriate definition for rural in Alaska. This decision, which 
devastated Alaska's state subsistence provisions in 1988, was a result due in part to the 
state's failure to adequately explain the rationale employed in reaching this particular 
definition. The lesson of this case ought not to be lost on compact designers attempting 
to protect resources under the unique conditions faced in the Pacific Rim Region. 
IV POUCY APPUCATIONS FOR RESOURCE PROTECTION 
This section attempts to portray the spectrum of possibilities available under 
Gi.1IlIlpad theoIyfor mgulation the oil industry, federal agencies, and state government, 
in order to protect the natural resources for which the Pacific Rim is famed nus is by 
no means. an exhaustive analysis, rather, its intent is merely informative and designed 
"to l'ewW the changes that can be reaped, both minor and radical, under the case law 
offer by Cuyler and its progeny. 
Establishment of the uniqueness of this region, justifying compact treatment 
should .notbe difficult. The presence of an extensive aboriginal population extremely 
,dependent upon the anadromous fishery for subsistence and cultural survival, coupled 
with the large non-native subsistence population in Alas~ would alone justify spedal 
action But there are other ties that bond these sta~ as well. Economically,·the fishing 
industry in Alaska; Washington, and Oregon are entirely dependent upon the harvest-
in Alaska cOstal waters. Indeed, these are the most important fishing grounds in the 
nation and the continent. Sea Grant has estimated that over 7090 of the Seattle based 
industry derives its fish from Alaska. Oregonts fishing industry is similarly dependent. 
This condition creates the economic bonds definitive" for regionalism. Also, the 
unspoiled coastlines of the Pacific Coast, from the glaciated wilderness fiords 9f Alaska 
to the wild shores of Washington's Olympic Peninsula down to Oregon's protected 
ocean beaches andCallfomia's Big Sur, reveal a unique ecological treasure preserved 
for the world. Travelling past these environmentally sensitive shores, tankers carry 
one-filth of the country's crude oil consumption. Cumulatively, these factors form a 
regional pornait, separate from the broad strode of the federal brush. 
Canadian provinces, as well as states, may share in interstate compacts, serving 
as full partidpating members. This is currently the case in the Northeast Forest FU'e 
Protection Compact, in which Quebec and New Brunswick are members. A regional 
compact could envision British Columbia and the Yukon Territory as potential 
members as well as the Padfic states. 
W'hen assessing these policy applications, bear in mind that some would require 
express federal consent acknowledging subtle changes to the scope of the Ports and 
Waterways Safety Act and the Oean Water Act Finally, it is prudent to note that the 
Alaska legislature has already invited the application of compact to the task of oil 
pollution control through AS Section 47.04.100 (1984), authorizing the Governor to 
pursue compacting in order to achieve the purposes of oil pollution protection. The 
basis of a compact may be premised upon the very effective Pacific Oil and Ports Group 
created in 1975 by Dennis Dooley of the Alaska on Tanker Task Force under the 
direction of Walt Parker. The group involved Alaska, California, Idaho, Oregon, and 
~ashington, and promulgated a set of Tanker standards. 
AIter the Exxon Valdez debacle, a host of federal, state, and independent entities 
conducted investigations and studies to detennine what went wrong in Prince William 
Sound Interestingly through the morass of accusations and finger poin~g, several 
common themes surface wi.th striking consistency. These findings can be organized 
into four general categories which shed light on a set of corrective recommendati-ons. 
Findings: 
t. Contingency Planning 
The shear multitude of plans and agencies involved in oU recovery stymied 
effective response because of a fundamental failure to unify under a coordinated 
/c."'" command hierarchy. Organizational responsibilities were unclear, decision making 
wallowed as a "team concept" broke down into adversarial relationships. 
2. Coast Guard 
The Coast Guard routinely approved reductions in the number of sailors 
required on oUtankers, as well as reducing the level of experience for tanker operations. 
Pilotage standards for Prince William Sound were lowered to meet nationwide general 
. standards. It appears that Coast Guard decision making is driven by industry initiative, 
rather ¢anagency fact finding. Finally, the Coast Guard failed to carry through its 
promises to develop radar installations and stricter tanker design standards. 
3. Department of Environmental Conservation 
The agency lacks the financial and personnel resources to effectively evaluate . 
industry response capabilities and preparedness. In part, this is due to other priorities 
which DEC has responsibilltytowards. However, DEC apparently failed to enforce 
violations and deviations it detected with Alyeska operations. 
4. Industry 
The oil companies ignored recommendations to improve spill prevention and 
r$ponse. Alyeska, the company, cancelled contract with a company to maintain 
dedicated response teams in 1981, and disbanded is own teams in 1984. Equipment 
inventorl~ were allowed to fall below what was adequate to deal with even moderate 
sized spills. 
S. Interior Pipeline Maintenance and spill Prevention 
Over the past 12 years, more than 1.5 million gallons of hot aude oil have boiled 
across fragile tundra and fouled miles on Interior streams. Innovations in leak 
detection and response technology have not been adopted by Alyeska. DEC has not 
pursued inspection of strategic spill equipment caches. A litany of spill examples bodes 
ill for the lands traversed by the pipeline. Past terrestrial spills have been surprisingly 
large, due in part to the company's reliance on visual or olfactory detection of leaks. 
The 650,000 gallons L"tat poured out at Steel Creek and the 240,000 gallons that polluted 
30 miles of the Atigun Valley were all detected by human inspection, rather than 
electrornc or mechanical means. Pipe check valves and bends have all been the source 
of major spills totalling 1000,000'5 of gallons. Aging equipment and ,,,nasion offer new 
sources for concern and need immediate regulation and monitoring. A spill on the 
Yukm't or Tazlina and their many tributaries a::n1ld devastate the subsistence fishery 
. upon which tens of thousands of rural Alaskans and an ancient culture depend. 
Reconunendations 
1. Adoption of response equipment inventory system, whkh also monitors 
equipment readiness and maintenance. 
2. Development of a comprehensive contingency plan incorporating all 
effected parties to stimulate a streamlined coordinated command structure 
3. Creation of a ~ng1e mission enforcement unit. 
4. Move oil spill responsibility hom the industry. An independent 
dedicated response team permanently stationed to respond to spills, both terrestrial and 
marine, is essential. 
5. Establish an entity with oversight authority concerning Coast Guard 
standard ~tting. 
6. Invoke technology forcing provisions which mandate the application of 
spill prevention and recovery innovations when they become available. 
7. Adopt strict aew size and qualification standards. . 
8. Adopt an emergency requisitioning authority capable of mobilizing 
equipment, personnel, and logistical services . 
9. Ikvelop a pre-authorization procedure for streamlined dedsion:making 
under ex\gent circumstances for burning and dispersant use. 
-10. Implement on-site and on-tanker surprise inspection authority vested in 
the appropriate state regulatory agency. 
COMPACT APPLICATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Comprehensive Monitoring and Water Protection Interstate Authority 
The duty of this compact option would be to provide a coordinated and unified 
command, regulating industry spill prevention and response capability along the TAPS 
route. The authority would be responsible for drafting a comprehensive contingency 
planning process and command hierarchy, superseding the fractured planning 
currentfy in place. 
This entity would have authority to invoke priorities, regulatory aiteria, and 
monitoring capability, which is binding on all member states, to ensure that adequate 
equipment, C'eW, and maintenance are available for spill prevention and clean-up. It 
could maintain a standing dedicated crew of its own, pooling the financial, personnel, 
equipment, and expertise resources of its member states and prOvinces; or, it could 
,oversee .and enforce standards controlling industry and state agency contingency 
operations. 
FiiWIy, a compact could, foreseeably, enact uniform tanker safety standards for 
the .Maska on !rade. Because this trade is domestic by nature and law, compact 
standards would not conflict with the PWSA, an act intended to achieve international 
uniformity. Compacts would provide the consistency in regulation which foreclose the 
argument that federal requirements are needed to prevent the costly impacts of diverse 
state standards.. 
In addition to streamlining regulatory mechanisms and molding them into an 
.. effective unified whole, the organization could be endowed with emergency . 
requisitioning power to prevent industry lockup of response resources. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Interstate compacts are formal agreements, ratified by Congress which enhance 
the power of member states. Compacting states may express regulations which carry 
the force of federal law, thus immunizing compact conduct from pre-emption and 
interstate commerce challenges. With this enhanced regulatory authority, compacts 
enable states to cooperatively resolve regional problems with powers unavailable to 
solitary states. 
Compacts may serve as an effective vehicle permitting Alaska to regulate the oil 
industry in a unitary fashion consistent with the mandate encapsulated within AS 
46.04.200, requiring a coordinated, master stateside plan. 
